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
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## WAS GREEK CIVILIZATION BASED ON SLAVE LABOUR?\*

### I.

Everyone who approaches the study of Greek life in the historical spirit, with a serious desire to understand and judge it as it really was, must have been pulled up sharp, in his reading, against the ugly spectre of slavery; and most feeling men, I think, find their enjoyment of Greek literature and art, of Homer and Sophocles, Thucydides and Plato a little dimmed by the abiding presence of its shadow. In making up our account with the Greeks, of our debt to their civilization and the value of their example, the slaves cannot be left out of the reckoning; and, in this sense, it is true to say that every sincere student of Greek life and thought has formed, whether consciously or not, his own theory of slavery. He cannot be content to regard it as a mere remnant or survival, which persisted, contrary to Greek instincts, as an accidental excrescence upon Greek civilization. He must see it as the Greeks saw it, appraise its purpose and meaning as the Greeks appraised them, and thus gradually embody it, for all its strangeness into that harmonious conception of Greek life to which it is the object of all true Greek study to attain.

It is this, perhaps, which explains the extraordinary confusion and perplexity which still prevails upon this subject. Everyone has his own theory of slavery. But, here as elsewhere in the fragmentary state of our knowledge of Greek life, no one has a touchstone by which his theory can be tested. Every decade or half decade sees a new book upon the subject; the same authors are ransacked; the same evidence is marshalled; the same references and footnotes are transferred, like stale tea-leaves, from one learned

\* Part of a paper read before the Sociological Society on November 9th, 1908.

receptacle to another; but there is a most startling variety about the resultant decoctions.

Perhaps the best way of emphasizing the need for a new method of inquiry is to put side by side some of the more glaring contradictions which emerge from a study of the literature of the subject. We are told by Bücher, and the Hegelian school of economists, following Aristotle, that slavery was the necessary and natural basis of City State life: and by another school of thought that it was a mere passing phase in its development. Of those who think it a passing phase some, like Wallon, seem to regard it as a survival from more primitive and barbarous conditions; others, like Burckhardt, as necessitated by the demand for agricultural labour after the outburst of colonization in the eighth and seventh centuries; others, like Francotte, as connected with the demand for foreign labourers and craftsmen due to the rise in the standard of comfort throughout the cities of Greece in the sixth and fifth centuries; others, like Meyer, as inseparable from the development of a capitalist system of international trade and industry in the larger commercial centres, especially in the fifth century; others, like Pöhlmann, as marking the decline of City-State civilization into a system of ruthless individualistic exploitation.

Nor are historians any better agreed as to the consequences of its introduction. We are told by Beloch and Mauri that the influx of slaves caused severe and lasting competition between slave and free labour, and by other writers that it caused practically no competition: and of these latter some say, arguing from Plato and Aristotle, that the influx of slaves cast a stigma upon manual labour so that free men voluntarily withdrew from it, and took to soldiering and politics: others, like Francotte, that slave and free went on contentedly working side by side; others, like Guiraud, that an equilibrium was established, slaves monopolizing certain occupations and free workers retaining others.

Thus the historians are agreed neither about the chronology, nor the importance, nor the manner, nor the causes, nor the consequences of the introduction of slave-labour into the Greek City-States. Less ambitious writers, looking at the matter, not from the historical, but from the static point of view, endeavouring to understand the part which slavery played as a settled institution in the normal or 'average' City-State, are little less contradictory. Some of them regard the City-State as a community sharply divided into two classes, of which the one enjoyed leisure for culture and citizenship, and the other laboured under its direction.



Others regard the whole City-State community, citizens, aliens and slaves, as peculiarly homogeneous, and contrast it with the sharp divisions in modern life between capital and labour, and between skilled and unskilled occupations. There is naturally an equal disagreement about the character, treatment and value of the slaves. Some writers, following Cairnes, regard it as an axiom that slave-labour is in the long run more expensive than free labour; others, following Boeckh, bring figures to prove that it is cheaper. Some writers, like Professor Gilbert Murray, say that the Greeks treated their slaves with remarkable humanity; others, like Mr. Paterson, that they treated them most brutally. Some writers follow Aristotle in regarding the slaves as too unintelligent to be free, and their restraint in captivity as an act of educational benevolence; others declare that they were intelligent enough to be responsible for some of the most delicate work of Greek craftsmanship, and some of the most elaborate operations of Greek finance.<sup>1</sup>

There would be no difficulty in extending this catalogue of contradictions; but it is already sufficiently long to show that what we need is not a re-statement of the scattered and fragmentary evidence or a new induction on the basis of that evidence, but some secure foundation upon which future scholars can build without fear of wasting their labour upon an impossible task.

Such a foundation is afforded by the investigations of economists who have studied the working of slavery in more recent times. Modern economists, notably Cairnes, in his masterly book on *The Slave Power*, have approached the subject without prepossession, in the light of our knowledge of the economic behaviour of man, and have built up a theory of the economics of slavery which, if still far from perfected, forms the natural starting point for a student of slavery under Greek or any other conditions. Let us take their results and see how they can be applied to slavery as it existed in the Greek City-State.

What is slavery? The latest writer on the theory of slavery, Dr. Nieboer, gives this definition, "Slavery is the fact that one man is the property or possession of another, beyond the limits of the family proper."<sup>2</sup> In other words, slavery is an economic

1. I append references to the more important authors cited above: Wallon, *Histoire de l'esclavage dans l'antiquité*, i, 62; Burckhardt, *Griechische Kulturgeschichte*, i, 141; Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, iii, § 303; Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, i, 226; Murray, *Rise of the Greek Epic*, pp. 19 and 258; Francotte, *L'Industrie dans la Grèce antique*, ii, pp. 3-30.

2. Nieboer: *Slavery as an Industrial System* (The Hague, 1900), p. 29.

system which places capital and labour in the same hands, in which labour is itself merely so much living capital for the capitalist master. As Mill says, "All the produce belongs to the master. The food and other necessities of his labouring are part of his expense. The labourers possess nothing but what he thinks fit to give them, and until he thinks to take it back; and they work as hard as he chooses, or is able to compel them."<sup>1</sup>

What are the conditions which will naturally grow up under such a system?

First, what will be the distinctive features of work performed under such a system?

In the first place, it will be *reluctant* work. The slave has no motive for working and every motive for abstaining from work; he will therefore only work under physical compulsion or the fear of it; and will naturally tend to be employed in occupations where such compulsion is easily exercised. Slave-labour is therefore profitable in occupations (such as plantation work) where supervision is easy and inexpensive, and tends to become less profitable as supervision becomes more difficult and costly.

Secondly, it will be *unskilful* work. A slave has no motive for acquiring skill, and even if he acquired it, could not be relied upon to use it or be entrusted with valuable apparatus or materials.

Thirdly, it will be *unversatile* work. A reluctant unskilful worker needs to be drilled into his work till he performs it mechanically. He must therefore be found work which is regular and unchanging in its processes; for any alteration will entail time and expense in drilling him into new habits.

Fourthly, it will be purely *manual* and *physical*: for brain work cannot be satisfactorily set in motion by physical compulsion. A slave is therefore most valuable in the prime of life, and decreases in value as he gets older, till he is no longer worth the cost of his keep. He will therefore tend to be treated just well enough to cause him to survive to the end of his working time.

Slave-labour then is reluctant, unskilful, unversatile and physical in character. What other conditions of a slave-system can be discovered?

Fifthly, slavery involves a capital outlay. Slave-labour is sometimes spoken of as cheap labour. Whether, in the long run, it is cheaper than free labour depends on a number of very varying considerations; but it is certainly more expensive in its initial

1. Mill Book II. chapter 5.

stages: for a labourer is only hired, while a slave is bought outright. Employers, and particularly small employers, will therefore naturally endeavour, by the exercise of compulsion, to recoup themselves as quickly as possible for their outlay.

Sixthly, slavery involves a large element of risky speculation; for a slave may die of disease, or commit suicide, or escape: or his employment may cease and he be left on his master's hands. Slaves are therefore not generally employed in occupations which lead to definite diseases (such as rubber-gathering in a swamp or agriculture in a malarious country), but only in occupations which gradually lower the vitality.<sup>1</sup>

Seventhly, the slave, though unversatile, has yet a double function; he can be used not only to work for his master, but to breed for his master. Whether slaves are allowed to breed depends again on a number of varying considerations; but experience seems to show that slavery has never been self-supporting for more than brief periods of time. The American slave territory, for instance, was gradually divided off into slave-breeding and slave-consuming regions.

Eighthly, slavery is unsettling to the community; for, whereas the ordinary wage-earner can only lose, in the long run, by war and social unrest, the slave can only gain. Hence a slave society lives in constant fear of an uprising, and is really in a state of chronic civil war. In the cost of keeping slaves must therefore be reckoned, as Plato and Aristotle were well aware, the expenses of police and governmental supervision, and of the maintenance of defensive forces, to cope with the hostility of the countries from which the slaves are drawn. A slave society will therefore tend to be a military society.

Ninthly, slave labour is alien labour. Under nearly every slave system slaves have actually been imported from outside into the community in which they work; but even where that is not the case, they will be regarded as aliens and representatives of a different civilization. There will therefore tend to be no interchange of sympathy or moral feeling between master and slave.

Lastly, and most important of all, slave labour interferes with the work of production by free labour. It interferes in three ways; it causes the withdrawal of a number of men from production to supervision and national defence; it diffuses a general sentiment

1. '*Gravia loca utilius esse mercenariis colere quam servis*' is an economic maxim at least as old as Varro (*De Re Rustica*, i, 17, 2).

against manual labour and any form of concentrated activity: and more especially it drives free labourers out of the occupations in which the slaves are engaged. Just as, by Gresham's law, bad coins drives out good, so it has been found by experience that, in any given occupation or range of occupations, slave labour drives out free; so that it is even difficult to find recruits for the higher branches of an occupation if it is necessary for them to acquire skill by serving an apprenticeship side by side with slaves in the lower.<sup>1</sup>

This leads to grave consequences; for the men driven out of these occupations are not themselves rich enough to live on the labour of slaves. They therefore tend to form an intermediate class of idlers who pick up a living as best they can—the class known to modern economists as 'mean whites' or 'white trash,' and to students of Roman history as 'clientes' or 'faex Romuli.' Such a class tends to emphasize both the social unrest and the military and aggressive character of a slave state; for politics and warfare remain respectable even after trade, industry and other forms of activity are discredited. A slave society is therefore a society divided sharply into three classes—masters, mean whites and slaves; and the middle class is an idle class, living on the community, or on warfare, or on the upper.

But there is still another result. The general sentiment against productive work leads to a state of affairs in which the slaves tend to be the only producers, and the occupations in which they are engaged the only industries of the country. In other words, the community will rely for its wealth upon occupations which themselves admit of no change or adaptation to circumstances, and which, unless they supply deficiencies of labour by breeding, are in perpetual need of capital. But this capital cannot be found elsewhere in the community. It must therefore be sought abroad: and a slave community will tend, either to engage in aggressive warfare, or to become indebted for capital to neighbours with a free

1. 'We have been impressed with the frequency with which it has been stated in evidence that unskilled labour was 'Kaffirs' work,' and as such not the kind of work which a white man should perform. This opinion is not due to anything inherently unpleasant or degrading in the work, but to the fact that such labour is ordinarily performed in South Africa by the native.' 'The real obstacle to apprenticeship in the Transvaal is that social and economic conditions are unfavourable to it . . . Boys in Johannesburg are reluctant to indenture themselves at all and often leave their employment after a few months because they are not paid higher wages or are made to do 'Kaffirs' work.' Report of the Transvaal Indigency Commission, 1906-8, §§46, 307. The Kaffirs, of course, are not slaves, and the tendencies referred to would act with added force if they were.

labour system, and ultimately to drift into a condition of economic dependence upon them. Thus a slave community is not a self-sufficient community; its production is confined to certain staples which conform to the conditions necessary for the profitable use of slave-labour, and it is dependent almost for everything else, as well as for the workers who are needed for the production of its own staples, upon its neighbours.

Such, in brief, tends to be the economic condition of a community with an extensive system of slave labour. The analysis is based upon Cairnes' account of the economic condition of the Southern States of the American Union previous to the War of Secession, but all points of only local applicability have been carefully eliminated. The conclusions follow irresistibly from the premisses; they can be verified, not only from the history of the Southern States, but from descriptive accounts of slave or semi-slave systems still in active operation in different parts of the world. I would refer particularly to the description of Mr. Nevinson in his book called *A Modern Slavery* of the coffee and cocoa plantations in Portuguese West Africa, which is an unconscious commentary on large parts of Cairnes' work and to Mr. Morel's books on the labour system in the Congo State.<sup>1</sup>

How far are these conditions true of the Greek City-State?

Before answering this question it may be well to point out that we possess a contemporary Greek treatise dealing, like Cairnes', with the theory of slavery. Why should we not use the analysis of Aristotle in preference to the analysis of Cairnes? Because Aristotle was a moralist and Cairnes an economist. Aristotle's account becomes intelligible when the conditions in which he wrote it are intelligible. But it does not help us to understand those conditions. For it is almost impossible to disentangle the two mingled strands in his thought: the Greek City as it was, and the Greek City as he, a Philosopher and a Conservative, wished it to be or wished to imagine it was. Therefore we miss in Aristotle the clear vision of the dispassionate political observer, and we miss also the exercise of trained economic reasoning. For instance, Aristotle's City-State is a slave-state, but it is a slave-state without mean whites, a state in which the middle class is to be the controlling power in government and the bulwark of order and sobriety.<sup>2</sup> It is a state which is to be based on agriculture; yet the

1. See a passage in Mr. Nevinson's book, pp. 33-36, which vividly illustrates most of the points in the above analysis.

2. ὅτι δ' ἡ μέση βελτίστη φανερὸν ὡς μόνῃ γὰρ ἀστυκίαστος: 1296 a 7.

question how 'living instruments' are qualified, or can be trusted, to act as skilled field workers is left unanswered.<sup>1</sup> It is a state with wealth enough to enable its citizens to enjoy leisure for contemplation; yet this wealth is to be obtained neither by plunder and warfare without nor by enterprise in production within. It is a state in which there is an impassable gulf between master and slave, and where the slave only attains to virtue and happiness under the controlling guidance of his master: and yet, by a mirage of misapplied benevolence, the prospect of ultimate liberation is to held up as a stimulus to exertion.<sup>2</sup> This is not an exhaustive list of Aristotle's economic contradictions: but enough has been said to show that writers like Bücher, or more recently Paterson, who base their views of ancient slavery on Aristotle's analysis of City-State conditions, are foredoomed to failure. We must stick for the present to economics: and leave political and historical, as well as moral and Utopian, considerations out of the question.

How far then are these conditions as sketched by Cairnes true of the Greek City-State?

At first sight they seem to bear no likeness at all to anything with which we are familiar in Greek life. Cairnes' slave state is a community of slaves, loafers and slave-drivers, too savage to enjoy the refinements of civilization, and too poor, if it were not too savage, to pay for them. There is nothing here to remind us of the communities which, untaught and unaided, by sheer exercise of enterprise and insight, created the civilization of the Western world.

Yet attempts have been made to connect the two conceptions—to depict Greek civilization as the civilization of a typical slave-state. Greek democracy, we are told, was rendered possible by the leisure of a population of slave-owners; Greek physical beauty is attributed to their distaste for manual labour; and Greek art and philosophy to their freedom from practical cares and preoccupations. In the words of Bücher,<sup>3</sup> "Every activity undertaken for the sake of gain was injurious to the growth of corporate feeling and independence, and made men indifferent to the good and beautiful and unfitted for war and politics." It was for this

1. ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῖς γεωργοῖς δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους περιούκους: 1329 a 25.

2. ὁ γὰρ δούλος κοινωνὸς ζωῆς, ὁ δὲ (βάναντος) πορρώτερον, καὶ τοσοῦτον ἐπιβάλλει ἀρετῆς ὅσον περ καὶ δουλείας: 1280 a 39. βέλτιον πᾶσι τοῖς δούλοις ἄθλον προκεῖσθαι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν: 1330 a 32.

3. *Die Aufstände der unfreien Arbeiter*, 143—129 v. Chr., p. 12.



reason, he goes on, that slavery was introduced, until "even the poorer citizen was seldom without one or several slaves, and the rich often possessed many hundreds and even thousands."

I quote this passage because it carries to its logical conclusion the familiar theory that the Greek City-State was a slave-state and Greek civilization based upon slave labour. If the theory is to stand we must hold with Bücher that practically every Greek who participated in that civilization was a slave owner and shared the characteristic Greek aversion to manual labour. But notice the contradictions in which it is involved. The Greek has leisure for politics and contemplation, but at the same time he is a capitalist supervising the labour of 'one or several' or 'many hundreds' of slaves, from whom he draws his income. He has a fundamental objection to manual labour, yet some of the finest monuments of his civilization are worked in marble, bronze, and terra cotta. Who built the Parthenon? If freemen, then they degraded themselves to the manual work of slaves; if slaves, then they were as civilized as the masters whose civilization they are supposed to be rendering possible. Even if we had no literature to help us, if we did not know that Greeks met daily, to the disgust of King Cyrus, to chaffer in the market-place and that their merchants penetrated from the Crimea to Marseilles, the remains of Greek architecture alone would suffice to destroy the fable that the Greeks were a race of unpractical contemplative æsthetics who kept a tribe of tame drudges to minister to their material needs.

We are forced, then, to the conclusion, that the conditions which are the natural result of a system of slave labour did not exist in Greece; in other words, that the Greek City-State was not a slave state.

Yet there is no doubt that the Greeks had slaves. It is difficult to be certain about the figures, but there is good ground for believing that Attica had a slave population of at least 100,000 out of a total population of something over a quarter of a million, and that in Chios (if not elsewhere) the proportion of slaves to free was still larger.<sup>1</sup>

1. The best recent discussions of the number of slaves in 5th century Attica are those of Meyer (*Forschungen zur alten Geschichte*, ii, p. 185 ff.) and Francotte (*L'Industrie dans la Grèce antique*, i, p. 179 ff.). Both fix a maximum of 150,000: Francotte's figure is 'between 75,000 and 150,000.' The figure given by Athenaeus out of Ctesicles (400,000 at the census of Demetrius of Phalerum), and first questioned by Hume, is now universally abandoned as untrustworthy. The salient passages are Thuc. vii, 27, 5, and, for Chios, viii, 40, 2. Meyer's figure for the total free population of Attica before the plague is about 210,000, but this is probably somewhat too high.

What is the explanation of the dilemma to which we seem to be reduced? It lies, I think, in the interpretation of the word 'slave.' Cairnes' conclusions follow irresistibly from his premisses; but it yet remains to be seen whether all or any of the Greek slaves were slaves in the economist's sense of the word.<sup>1</sup>

The crucial fact about a slave in the economist's sense of the word is that he has no motive for working, or indeed for living at all, because he himself and all that he produces belong to another. From this all the other results follow. A slave who has somehow or other been given a motive for working is therefore an entirely different being and occupies an entirely different position from a slave who has none. Such a motive can be given him in a number of ways: by allowing him to have a little property of his own, or to retain a small portion of the produce of his labour: or by placing him under a certain fixed arrangement in a position of responsibility; or, above all, by a conditional promise of freedom. But, however the motive is given, it creates a new class of labourer, who is far more closely allied to the wage-earners and craftsmen above him in the economic scale, than to the chattel-slaves below him. From the moment when a slave is allowed to own property or to make any engagement or contract with his master he ceases to be a chattel and becomes a human being: in legal phraseology, he ceases to be a thing and become a person. It is a long climb upwards from a few obols of pocket money and a position of trust as an assistant in a barber's shop in a low quarter of the Piræus to manumission and citizenship; but for the economist it is the first step on the ladder, the introduction of the motive to labour, which is all-important. A slave who can own property is serving his apprenticeship for freedom.<sup>2</sup>

It is necessary therefore to distinguish sharply between these two sorts of slavery, which it will be convenient to call chattel-

1. Classical scholars are not alone in failing to distinguish between different kinds of 'slavery.' 'On the 2nd of February, 1830, an Order in Council was issued to amend and bring into one law the various enactments concerning slaves in colonies subject to the King in Council . . . In this Order the same treatment was required for slaves thinly scattered over South African farms, as for those working in gangs on a West Indian sugar plantation.' Theal, *History of South Africa, 1795-1834*, vol. ii, p. 414 f. The Home Government made a similar mistake in allotting the compensation in 1834, after the Act of Emancipation.

2. Cf. Westermarck, *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, i., p. 671, "If slavery proper could be based upon a contract between the parties concerned I fail to see how to distinguish between a servant and a slave."



slavery and apprentice-slavery.<sup>1</sup> Both forms existed in the Greek City-State; but the evidence seems to show that apprentice slavery predominated. I believe that if the theory of apprentice slavery could be worked out in the way in which chattel-slavery has been analysed by Cairnes and others, we should at last be in reach of a solution of the contradictions which have so long beset this question.

Let us endeavour to make a tentative analysis of the conditions of apprentice slavery. It will be natural to start by comparing it with chattel slavery. Of the ten conclusions which we reached in that field how many remain? Obviously the first four, dealing with the characteristics of chattel-labour disappear; but some of the others remain. Apprentice slavery still involves a capital outlay on the part of the slave-master; it is still a risky speculation owing to possibilities of death or disease or escape or unemployment; and the slave still has the double function of working and breeding. On the other hand, it will not necessarily cause social unrest, or remain alien to the community; while the question whether, and if so, in what degree and directions, it interferes with non-slave production is obviously one that cannot be settled offhand. Here clearly are a number of open questions in which Cairnes' analysis will help us very little. It will be better to leave chattel-slavery aside and make a fresh start.

What is the position of a Greek slave-master who has purchased a cargo of barbarian slaves? His first business will be to separate the chattels from the apprentices: to discover which of his purchases can be induced or trained to work willingly on his behalf, and which are too dangerous, or too sullen, or too weak, or too stupid to become more than brute manual workers under strict supervision. Some of the chattel-slaves he may succeed in getting ransomed; some of them will probably not survive very long; most of the remainder will go to mines and mills and quarries, whither we cannot follow them at present. He is left with a pack of reasonably docile pieces of property. The males will probably for the most part be boys or lads: for the men of fighting age will have perished or been disposed of; and the females, though probably a little older, on the average, than the males, will few of

1. The Greek words *ἀνδράποδον* on the one hand and *οἰκέτης* and *παῖς* on the other seem to correspond in their usage to this distinction. *ἀνδράποδον* is formed on the analogy of *τετράποδον*.

them be beyond the prime of life, for there is no market for old women.<sup>1</sup>

The object of the slave-master as an economic man is to give his apprentices the maximum amount of motive for working while leaving them the minimum amount of profit from their work. He owns the entire produce of their labour; but by surrendering a portion of it he can increase the total amount. There is therefore a delicate balance between the increase in the amount surrendered and the increase in the total amount. The slave-master's object is to discover how much of the produce it will be profitable for him to surrender in each case. Clearly this is not a simple problem: and the answers will be very different in different cases. In some cases it may be profitable to aim at a very high quality of work for a very short period, and in others at a steady low level of work over the better part of a lifetime. But there is one point upon which Greek theorists about apprentice-slavery (I am speaking now of theory not of practice) seem to be generally agreed: that the only way to give an apprentice an adequate motive for working is to offer him some prospect of ultimate freedom. This is definitely stated by Aristotle<sup>2</sup> though it contradicts the rest of his theory of slavery, and less explicitly by Xenophon in the *Oeconomicus*,<sup>3</sup> while the author of the *Economics* attributed to Aristotle, in his short discussion of the subject (which is full of valuable hints and suggestions) goes further and says: "Slaves are willing to take trouble when freedom is the prize and the time is fixed."<sup>4</sup> In other words, it will pay our slave master better to make an arrangement with his apprentices pledging them their freedom after a definite term of years or a definite contingency than to keep them in a permanent state of suspense. Slaves working under such an arrangement have not indeed any legal security

1. 'Nearly the whole (slave-caravan) consisted of boys under fourteen . . . Boys are the most easily stolen from native villages in the interior and, on the whole, they pay the cost of transport best.' Nevinson, p. 121. The Greek formula after the sack of a city is: ἀπέκτειναν τοὺς ἡβώντας παῖδας δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας ἡνδραπόδοισαν. (Thuc. v, 32 and 116.)

2. *Politics*, 1330, a 32, quoted above. Compare Theal, ii, 420, the Acting-Governor of Cape Colony informs the Home Government that 'more than one plan for the gradual extinction of slavery had emanated from the proprietors themselves.'

3. v. 16: ἐλπίδων δὲ ἀγαθῶν οὐδὲν ἦττον οἱ δοῦλοι τῶν ἐλευθέρων δέονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅπως μένειν ἐθέλωσι.

4. 1344 v. 15: δίκαιον γὰρ καὶ συμφέρον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κεῖσθαι ἄθλον βούλονται γὰρ ποιεῖν ὅταν ἢ ἄθλον καὶ ὁ χρόνος ὠρισμένος.

for freedom; but they have the security of custom: for it is to the interest of both parties alike that such arrangements should be considered binding. It is a one-sided bargain: for the master alone has the power of saying when in his opinion, the slave's work and conduct have not come up to the specified level: but if the master is wise he will reserve this as a valuable coercive weapon only very rarely to be brought into use. The apprentice-slave's position will then resemble that of a prisoner under a fixed term of detention, who may have his penalty lengthened by breaking prison rules, or shortened by good conduct, but retains a reasonable measure of security, for his ultimate freedom.

Our slave-master then has an informal or perhaps even a formal labour contract with his slaves over a term of years.<sup>1</sup> Can we enter more closely into his calculations? There are several considerations which will lead him, if he can secure as good or nearly as good, a profit to shorten the period of apprenticeship. In the first place there are the risks of death or disablement or escape or unemployment; it is true that these risks are not nearly so great in the case of an apprentice as of a chattel: for chattel-slaves are apt to die (to use Mr. Nevinson's word) of sheer unhappiness;<sup>2</sup> it is true too that if a slave dies on the way to manumission his savings fall to his master. But there yet remains sufficient risk of loss to make the master (especially in the instability of Greek economic and political conditions) prefer quick to slow returns. Secondly, and this is more important, it is much safer to have an establishment of short term slaves than of long term slaves. The object of the slave-master is to bind his slaves to himself and to separate them from one another. Corporate feeling or the rudiments of Trade-Unionism among the slaves will

1. Many hundred Greek manumission inscriptions have come to light, and most of them are of the nature of contracts, liberation being conditional on the performance of certain engagements on the slave's part. Many of them seem to have been drawn up quite early in the slave's career, after he had approved himself in the first rigid period of apprenticeship. For examples see Appendix. A few of the more interesting inscriptions are collected in Dittenberger's *Selection*, vol. ii, numbers 835—869, and the Delphic inscriptions in Collitz: *Griechische Dialektinschriften*, vol. ii, numbers 1684 to 2343. They are dealt with in a recently published work *La Manomissione e la condizione dei liberti in Grecia*, by A. Calderini (Milan, 1908).

2. "The doctor had come up to pay his official visit to the plantation that day. 'The death-rate on this *voga*,' he remarked casually during the meal, 'is twelve or fourteen per cent. a year among the *serviçaes*.' 'And what is the chief cause?' I asked. 'Anæmia,' he said. 'That is a vague sort of thing,' I answered; 'what brings on anæmia?' 'Unhappiness [*tristeza*]' he said, frankly." Nevinson, p. 190. Compare Professor Gilbert Murray in *The exploitation of inferior races*, printed in *Liberalism and the Empire*, pp. 148-9.

reduce his hold over them and diminish the output. They must be kept as obedient and tractable as possible, with all their energy directed upon their work, and the ultimate reward of their work—liberation. In this respect a household or workshop resembles a factory of unorganized wage-earners who are paid by the piece. The slave's time not being his own, his work must always have been tested by the piece. Now a workshop of short term slaves continually being emptied and replenished will have far less corporate sense than a workshop of long term slaves; and the danger of organization among the slaves (encouraging them to be workshy or even rebellious) increases in proportion to the total number of slaves in the workshop, or in the community as a whole. It will therefore pay a slave-master, and a slave-owning community, to surrender some of the long term profits on their slaves as a species of insurance money. For the presence of an excessive number of slaves in a city or workshop at any given time reacts on their general docility, causes unrest, necessitates drastic measures of repression, and reduces their value by assimilating them, in treatment and sentiment, to chattels. This was noticed by Thucydides as being the case in the large slave market at Chios.<sup>1</sup>

All these considerations tend in favour of a short-term contract. There are of course counteracting considerations. The relation between a freedman and his former master is not an easy one; and where there are trade-secrets, and, still more, where there are domestic secrets involved, it may be highly unpleasant. Moreover the more skilful the slave, the more indispensable he will be likely to have made himself to his master. It is for this reason that masters generally tended to make a form of contract by which their freedman were still bound to render them certain services and endeavoured, so far as possible, to retain a hold over their activities.

Our representative slave master then will give his apprentices a definite pledge of freedom: and the period of service will tend to be a short one. How short, is a very complicated question. But it will never extend beyond, and will tend to fall some years short of the end of the workman's efficient period of labour. Can we analyse the slave-master's policy any further?

1. Thuc. VIII., 40, 2. *διὰ τὸ πλῆθος χαλεπωτέρως ἐν ταῖς ἀδικίαις κολαζόμενοι*. Thucydides apparently regards Chios, like Sparta, as a chattel-slave society. The ordinary Greek workshop, like the 'school' of an Italian painter, was of course on an entirely different scale from that of a modern factory or mill.

We have seen that his object is to maintain his apprentices' docility, and to concentrate their efforts upon his service. But there is one way in which, by ceasing to be mere wealth producing machines, they need not cease to do him service—by breeding. It seldom pays to allow chattel slaves to breed; but apprentice slaves must be treated as human beings, and they are therefore allowed to form definite unions and, within limits, to have families. The Greeks restricted their families by exposing undesirable infants: and this practice was no doubt carried further among slave families than among free; but it is clear from our authorities that it was customary for masters to allow household slaves to bring up at any rate small families of children.<sup>1</sup> These children, of course, were the property of the slave-master, and often form the subject of special stipulations in the manumission contract. From the slave-master's point of view, that is, a good slave possesses not only the individualistic virtues of thrift, sobriety, industry, obedience, and honesty, but also the capacity to breed and bring up thrifty, sober, industrious, obedient, and honest children for the service of his master.

Another very important point in the slave-master's policy in his exercise of control. He can control his apprentices by setting his own interpretation upon the contract. But he can do more than this. Firstly, he can reduce an apprentice to a chattel by sending him to the mines. This must have been a constant threat (as we see from the Comedians): but it can have been but rarely exercised, except in the case of incorrigibly idle, vicious, or cross-grained slaves;<sup>2</sup> for it injured both parties by reducing the slave's value. And a slave very rarely, if ever, came back from the mines. Secondly, there is control by corporal punishment which (to judge from Aristophanes) was freely exercised. Thirdly, there is control against escape by intermunicipal arrangement. City-States which had reciprocal treaty arrangements generally stipulated for the extradition of runaway slaves: and except in time of war, they had little chance of escaping capture. And even in wartime a foreign slave would only exchange one master for another. The 20,000 slaves, mostly apprentices, who escaped from Attica during the

1. *οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐξομνεύειν ταῖς τεκνοποιαῖς.* Ar. Oec. 1344, b, 17. *οἱ μὲν γὰρ χεῖστοι (οἰκέται) παιδοποιησάμενοι εὐνούστεροι ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶν.* Xen. Oec. IX. 5.

2. Strabo 562, describing some mines near Sinope says: *εἰργάζοντο μεταλλεύταις χρώμενοι τοῖς ἀπὸ κακουργίας ἀγοραζομένοις ἀνδράποδοις.*

occupation of Decelea merely glutted the slave market in Bœotia.<sup>1</sup> In all these ways the slave-master retains a control over his apprentices far more stringent and exacting than that of a modern employer over his wage-earners even if they are unprotected by combination, and even securer than the hold of an English master-craftsman in the Middle Ages, over his indentured apprentices, in the days when men could be punished for being workshy and every village provided stocks for runaways and vagrants.

Again, a slave master in making his contract with an apprentice will do his best to surrender his property rights very dearly. We can see this from some of the extant manumission decrees. A slave is not simply set free at the end of his term of service, he is allowed to buy his freedom. What does he buy it with? With the money which he has amassed during his years of service. In other words, the master surrenders, or partially surrenders, his claim over the produce of the slave's work for the future on condition of securing most, if not all, of that portion of his produce which he originally relinquished. The lot of a freedman under these conditions must have been an unenviable one. He was in a position of a worker who surrenders the savings of a lifetime at the approach of old age. Many of them must merely have exchanged slavery for a state of casual dependence upon their former masters. The master becomes a "patron" and the slave a "client."

Two more points may be noticed in the slave-master's policy. First that it is to his interest to give his apprentices as great a *feeling of freedom* as is compatible with retaining the produce of their labour. He will therefore try to increase their output by improving their morale and heightening their self respect. This is probably one explanation of the special festivals which we find arranged for slaves in some of the Greek cities and for the consideration with which we so often find them treated. They might wear the same clothes as the poorer citizens and even elbow their betters in the streets, as the old Oligarch complains they did at Athens, provided it encouraged them to work harder and they did not ask for an increase in their allowance.<sup>2</sup>

1. Thuc., vii, 27, 5, tells us of their escape, but their subsequent fate was unknown until they reappeared in the new historian lately discovered at Oxyrhynchus. See *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, vol v. Theopompus (or Cratippus), col. xiii, line 31.

2. [Xen.] *Αθ Πολ* i. 10: cf. [Ar.] *Oec.* 1344 b 19: *καὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις μᾶλλον τῶν δούλων ἔνεκα ποιεῖσθαι ἢ τῶν ἐλευθέρων· πλείονα γὰρ ἔχουσιν οὐπὲρ ἔνεκα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνομίσθη.*



Secondly the slave-master will endeavour as far as possible to make them forget their original nationalities and become Hellenes. The apprentices are, of course, all or nearly all barbarians, Lydians, Phrygians, Thracians, Syrians, Paphlagonians, and so on; but they must not be allowed to take a pride in their nationality. They must think themselves rather as passing through the novitiate of Hellenism with the ultimate hope of becoming full citizens with a place in the Tribe and the Clan, besides some of their own old compatriots.<sup>1</sup> Care was taken to prevent too many fellow-countrymen from collecting in the same household or workshop; the apprentices were often rechristened with pleasant Greek names and of course compelled to make Greek their only language.<sup>2</sup> Readers of the *Medea* will remember how Jason tells Medea with unconscious Hellenic arrogance, how thankful she ought to be to him for her introduction into the cultured atmosphere of Greece where her arts can be appreciated and her reputation spread abroad.<sup>3</sup>

Thou hast got

Far more than given. A good Greek land hath been  
Thy lasting home, not barbarity. Thou hast seen  
Our ordered life and justice, and the long  
Still grasp of law. Then all Hellas far and near  
Hath learned thy wisdom, and in every ear  
Thy fame is. Had thy days run on unseen  
On that last edge of the world, where then had been  
The story of the great Medea?

This is surely but a glorified sample of many a patriarchal address to a company of apprentices.

So much for the policy of the representative slave-master. What can we discover about the other party to the bargain, the apprentice slave himself? We leave aside for the present the question of his special occupations and aptitudes, and will consider only his general character and position.

In the first place he finds himself in a career where promotion is strictly and entirely by merit. If he works hard and shows capacity he can win his freedom in a few years; if he is lazy and obstinate he may die in captivity. This will sharpen his wits and make him steadier and more obedient; but, it will also serve, as

1. Compare the treatment of new boys at a public school and the taboos which custom sets upon their conversation.

2. [Ar.] Oec. 1344 v 18. *μὴ κτᾶσθαι ὁμοεθνεῖς πολλούς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.* So. Ar. Pol. 1330 a 26. Pages 311-7 in Vol. IV. of Collitz' *Dialekt-Inschriften* contains an interesting index of the slave names in the Delphic inscriptions, beginning with *Ἀβροσύνα* (Delicacy) and ending with *Ὠφελίων* (Little Helper).

3. Eur: *Med.*, 536 ff. (Professor Murray's translation).

has been already suggested, to cut him off from his fellows and make him selfish and grasping. He will tend to resemble the copy-book heroes of self-help; at best he will develop into a typical self-made man.

Secondly, he will be the outcome of a somewhat severe process of natural selection; and he will be selected for his economic value. He will therefore most probably be exceptionally skilful and enterprising in his particular branch of work, whether manual or intellectual. This will be still more marked among freedmen, who represent the selected from a selection, and accounts for the reputation for general efficiency which that class of the community always enjoyed in the ancient world. Ancient man, particularly the ancient Greek, was far from being a representative economic man: too many other interests entered into his life; but freedmen approximated far more nearly to the economist's standard, for they were selected for the possession of just those economic qualities and aptitudes.<sup>1</sup>

Thirdly, the apprentice slave will be tempted to shorten his period of service by working upon the feelings of his master. His master, as has been said, was not the impersonal owner of a large modern factory or business, but a capricious and excitable Greek with whom he was in daily contact. It is only natural that individual slaves should have endeavoured, by intrigue or by favouritism, to exercise influence over their masters. This could be done in many ways. A slave could make himself so indispensable in the conduct of his master's business as practically to be able to dictate his own terms. Or he could become the favourite of his master or his master's wife, and so win a commanding position. Or he could make himself the possessor of valuable information and so blackmail his master into a favourable agreement. All this opens a wide field for individual ingenuity and explains some of the familiar characteristics of the New Comedy slaves.

So far our inquiry has been purely hypothetical. In a concluding article an attempt will be made to verify or illustrate these too purely economic chains of reasoning from the vast but fragmentary evidence of Greek authors themselves.

A. E. ZIMMERN.

1. "Freedmen value freedom above all else; and these immigrants, who became free in coming to this free democracy, test Socialism, as else else, by the degree to which it guarantees liberty. To them liberty is not a means to equality or any other social end. There are, to them, no major considerations for which liberty may be impaired." *A year with the Americans*, xii (*Times*, Aug. 28, 1908.) This is good psychology, and explains why Plato needed to provide that no freedman might be richer than his former master (*Laws* 915 n).



## APPENDIX.

I append two typical manumission inscriptions from Dittenberger's collection:—

*Delphi 178-7 B.C. (Dittenberger, No. 848.)*

During the magistracy of Praxias at Delphi, in the month of Apellaios, Asandros, son of Menandros of Beroea, dedicates to the care of the Pythian Apollo, to be free, Euporia, his maidservant, on payment of 200 Alexandrian drachmae. She is to escort Asandros back to Macedonia and so be free. Witnesses: Menandros, son of Euphronios, Amyntas, son of Latos, Paramonos, son of Kallistratos.

*Delphi, 170—157 B.C. (Dittenberger, No. 858.)*

During the magistracy of Menestratos in Delphi, in the month of Amalios, when Euthudamos was in the sixth month of his Presidency of the Games among the Locrians at Physcos, Kallixenos, son of Euarchides of Myonia, sold to Apollo a male (*σῶμα ἀνδρεῖον*) named Sosos, by race a Gaul, at a price of six minae of silver, on the terms on which Sosos entrusted the purchase to the god, on condition that he should be free and inviolate from the hands of all men for all his life, doing what he would and escaping to whom he would. Sureties according to the deed: Emmenides, son of Dexicrates of Delphi, Polykritos, son of Kallixenos of Myonia. And if any man enslave Sosos let the seller Kallixenos and the sureties testify to the god's purchase; and if they fail to do so let them be fined according to the deed. And in the same way let all who happen to be by be at liberty to seize upon his person as a freeman (*συλῆοντες ὡς ἐλεύθερον ὄντα*) and go unpunished, subject to no trial or penalty. And Sosos is to pay back the share-money (*ἐράνον*) of forty minae which Amyneas, son of Charixenos collected, half of it standing in Kallixenos' name, until the whole share-money be paid out, and thus the purchase of the god be completed. And if he do not pay it back, Sosos and all his goods are to be liable to seizure by Kallixenos. And if Sosos die childless, all that he leaves is to fall to Kallixenos; and if Sosos give anything to anyone in gift during his life-time, the purchase is to be null and void. And Sosos is to complete all the orders (*ῥγα*) of Kallixenos, until the share capital is paid back. And if Sosos do not complete the orders as has been prescribed above the purchase shall be null and void, unless Sosos fall ill. And Sosos is to train a craftsman for Kallixenos, if Kallixenos hand over the apprentice (*Παιδάριον*) to Sosos. The purchase (took place) in the presence of Archon, son of Kallias, of Delphi and Erymandros, son of Kritodamos, Locrian of Myonia. Witnesses: Amyntas, Priest of Apollo, Theoxenos, Archon, and the following private citizens: Archon, son of Kallias, Mantias, son of Demochares, Archelas son of Demosthenes, Archon, son of Nikobulos, Delphians: Aleximachos, son of Damatimos, Damon, son of Theodoros, Amphissans.

MAGIC AND RELIGION.<sup>1</sup>

The relation obtaining between Magic and Religion has been variously understood. Most authorities hold that Magic preceded Religion, and that they are in some way genetically related. In the following pages we shall argue in support of two opinions: (1) the primary forms of Magic probably antedated Religion; (2) whether Magic antedated Religion or not, Religion arose independently of Magic; they are different in principle and independent in origin.

But the word Magic includes an almost endless number of practices so far quite inadequately classified. We cannot go on without first marking out at least its more prominent groups. And since the common bond of these practices is neither a common purpose (Magic serves to gratify every kind of desire), nor a common method (the magician's methods are literally numberless), but the non-personal nature of the power pressed into service, we shall make use of this last element as a means of classification. Three groups are thus obtained.

*Magic Classified.*—*Class 1* is characterised by the absence of any idea of a power belonging to the operator or his instrument and passing from either one of them to the object of the magical art. To this class belong many instances of so-called sympathetic Magic<sup>2</sup>; a good many of the taboo customs; most charms; the casting of lots, when a spirit or god is not supposed to guide the cast; most modern superstitions, those, for instance, regarding Friday, the number thirteen, horse-shoes, planting when the tide is coming in. In these instances the effect is thought of as following upon the alleged cause, without the mediation of a force

1. A chapter of a book soon to be published by A. Constable & Co., under the title, "The Psychological Origin of Religion," delivered in substance as part of a lecture before the Sociological Society.

2. Hang a root of vervain around the neck in order to cause the disappearance of a tumour; as the plant dries up, so will the tumour. If the fish do not appear in due season, make one of wood and put it into the water. Keep the arrow that has wounded a friend in a cool place that the wound may not become inflamed.

conceived as passing, let us say, from the warm arrow to the wound and irritating it. The idea of power is reduced here to its least possible complexity.

*Class 2.* A power, not itself personal, is supposed to belong to the magician, to his instrument, or to particular substances, and to pass into, or act upon, the object. Howitt relates how some native Australians begged him not to carry, in a bag containing quartz crystals, a tooth, extracted at an initiation ceremony. They thought that if he did so, the evil power of the crystals would enter the tooth and so injure the body to which it had belonged.<sup>1</sup> The potency of many charms is of this nature, while others have a fetichistic significance, *i.e.*, they involve the action of spirits, and so do not belong to this class. Rubbing oneself with, or eating the fat, or another portion, of a brave and strong man in order to make oneself courageous and powerful, belongs also to this second class, together with most instances of contagion-magic. So does, usually, the power defined in the following passage and the similar powers believed in and used in other than Melanesian populations, 'That invisible power which is believed by the natives to cause all such effects as transcend their conception of the regular course of nature, and to reside in spiritual beings, whether in the spiritual part of living men or in the ghosts of the dead, being imparted to them, to their names and to various things that belong to them, such as stones, snakes, and indeed objects of all sorts, is that generally known as *mana* . . . No man, however, has this power of his own; all that he does is done by the aid of personal beings, ghosts or spirits; he cannot be said, as a spirit can, to be *mana* himself . . . he can be said to have *mana*.<sup>2</sup>

*Class 3.* Perhaps a special class should be made of the cases in which the magician feels as if his will-effort was the efficient factor. This is often true of spells, of incantations, and of solemn curses. A man addressing the magical spear, saying, 'Go straight, go straight and kill him,' feels no doubt that, somehow, by the words in which quivers his whole soul he directs the spear on its errand of death.

Though Magic does not make an anthropopathic appeal it may, and frequently does, bring to bear its peculiar coercive virtue upon anthropopathic beings. It aims then at compelling souls, spirits or gods, into doing the operator's will, or in preventing them from

1. "Journal of the Anthropological Institute," xiii (1884), p. 456, quoted by Frazer.

2. Dr. R. H. Codrington, "The Melanesians" (Clarendon Press, 1891), p. 191.

doing their own. In necromancy, spirits are summoned by means of spells and incantations. In old Egypt the art of dealing coercively with spirits and gods reached a high development. Maspero, speaking of a strange belief regarding names, says, 'when the god in a moment of forgetfulness or of kindness had taught them what they wanted [the sacred names], there was nothing left for him but to obey them.'<sup>1</sup> At Eleusis, it was not the name but the intonation of the voice of the magician which produced the mysterious results.<sup>2</sup> But whether Magic acts upon personal or impersonal objects, its effective power is ever impersonal.

I would not give the impression in this attempt at classification, that the conceptions of the savage are clear and definite. I hold them to be, on the contrary, hazy and fluid. What appears to him impersonal one moment may suddenly assume the characteristics of a spirit. *Mana*, for instance, although usually an impersonal force stored into plants, stones, animals or men, assumes at times truly personal traits; it becomes the god himself. One should not be surprised to meet with cases that fall between rather than in the classes, for the sharp lines of demarcation it suits us to draw are not often found in nature.

And now we return to our two theses.

1. *The Probable Priority of Magic*.—Certain historical facts might be held to support the pre-religious origin of Magic. As one descends from the higher to the lower social levels, Religion dwindles and Magic grows. In the lowest societies of which we have extensive and accurate knowledge, the Central Australian tribes, Religion is represented by mere rudiments, whereas Magic is everywhere and always in evidence. I have had occasion in a preceding section to quote Howitt with regard to the slight rôle played by Religion among the South-East Australians. The presence of Religion in the lives of the tribes inhabiting the central portions of Australia is still less obvious. Frazer reflects the views of Spencer and Gillen, of Howitt, and probably of every recent first-hand student of that country, when he writes: 'Among the aborigines of Australia, the rudest savages as to whom we possess accurate information, Magic is universally practised, whereas Religion, in the sense of a propitiation or conciliation of the higher

1. "Etudes de mythologie et d'archéologie égyptiennes" (Paris, 1903), "Bibliothèque Egyptologique, ii, p. 298.

2. Foucart, "Recherches sur la Nature des Mystères d'Eleusis," "Mémoires de l'Institut," xxxv, 2nd part, pp. 31-32. Comp. Maspero, *ibid.*, p. 303.

powers, seems to be nearly unknown. Roughly speaking, all men in Australia are magicians, but not one is a priest; everybody fancies he can influence his fellows or the course of nature by sympathetic magic, but nobody dreams of propitiating gods by prayer and sacrifice.<sup>1</sup> If we may trust our knowledge of other savages, the general fact thus affirmed of the native Australians holds good with regard to every other uncivilised tribe.

But as the least civilised of existing tribes are far from being 'primitive' in the true sense of the word, it could be argued that Magic is, after all, the outcome of the corruption of a primitive Religion, of which almost nothing remains in the savage tribes of the present day. And so we shall have to rest our case not upon historical evidences, but upon considerations regarding the psychological nature of Magic and Religion, and upon analogies we may discover between them and certain facts observed in children and in adults of uncivilised races.

In his attempt to support the belief in the priority of Magic, Frazer, who has put every student of Religion in his debt by his monumental work, affirms its greater simplicity when compared with Religion. The opinion itself is tenable, but the defence of it, made as it is from the standpoint of the old English associationism, is unfortunately worthless. 'Magic,' he tells us, 'is nothing but a mistaken application of the very simplest and most elementary process of the mind, namely, the association of ideas by virtue of resemblance or contiguity,' while 'Religion assumes the operation of conscious or personal agents, superior to man, behind the visible screen of nature. Obviously the concept of personal agent is more complex than a simple recognition of the similarity or contiguity of ideas. . . . The very beasts associate the ideas of things that are like each other or that have been found together in their experience. . . . But who attributes to the animals a belief that the phenomena are worked by a multitude of invisible animals or by one enormous and prodigiously strong animal behind the scenes?'<sup>2</sup> It is undoubtedly true that the mind of man tends to pass from an object to others like it, or experienced at the same time, but this psychological fact does not in itself account for

1. "The Beginnings of Religion," *Fortn. Rev.*, lxxxiv (1905), p. 162. Comp. "Golden Bough," 2nd ed., i, pp. 71-73.

2. "The Golden Bough," 2nd ed., i, p. 70. Oldenburg ("Die Religion des Veda," Berlin, 1894) was first, I believe, in holding to a pre-religious magical stage of culture. But it is Frazer who first made a clear separation, not only between Magic and Religion, but also between Magic and belief in spirit-agents.

Magic. The mind of animals is regulated in a similar manner. In spring-time the sight of a feather makes the bird think of nest-building, and the smell and sight of his master's coat brings the master to the dog's mind. Yet animals do not practise the magical art. This fact should be sufficient to make one realise the insufficiency of 'a simple [mistaken] recognition of the similarity and contiguity of ideas' as an explanation of the origin of Magic. An animal might observe the colour-likeness between carrots and jaundice (not, however, unless practical dealings with them had attracted his attention to the colour), and 'coat' and 'master' might follow each other in a dog's mind. But in order to treat the coat as he would the master, and in order to eat carrots or give them to be eaten for the cure of jaundice, there is required, in addition to the association, the belief that whatever is done to the coat will be suffered by the master, and that the eating of carrots will cure the disease. It is the existence of these ideas with their motor and affective values and of their dynamic connection which makes Magic possible in beings subject to the laws of association. This fundamental difference between mere association of ideas and the essential mental processes involved in Magic, Frazer has completely overlooked. The difference may be further illustrated by the instance of a dog biting in a rage the stick with which he is being beaten. He is indeed doing to the stick what he would like to do to the man. But in attacking the stick he does not conceive that, although the stick is not the man, the injury done to it will hurt the man. His action is blindly impulsive, while the form of Magic in question involves generalisations and other mental processes not expressed by the laws of association.<sup>1</sup>

If magical actions cannot be deduced from the principle of association, they can at least be classified according to the kind of association they illustrate. For, although the various ideas brought together in Magic, in a relation of cause and effect, are frequently said to have come together by 'chance,' some of the conditions under which they have in fact become connected are expressed in the universal laws of association, namely, association by similarity or contrast, by contiguity or spatial opposition, and by emotional congruity or disparity. Whenever magical acts have been classified, it has been according to the principle

1. Comp. R. R. Marett, "From Spell to Prayer," "Folk-Lore, xv (1904), pp. 136-141.



of association.<sup>1</sup> But every kind of activity involving mental operations falls in some of its relations under the laws of association, hence the relative unfruitfulness of these classifications, hence also our attempt at grouping magical practices according to a factor of greater significance, namely, the nature of the power they involve.

2. *The Independence of Religion from Magic.*—The following psychological arguments appear to me to go a long way towards proving that *magical behaviour has had an origin independent of the animistic<sup>2</sup> belief*, and that some of its forms, at least, antedated it, and therefore also Religion:—

(a) The absorbing interest found by young children in the use of things, and their complete indifference at first to the *modus operandi*, point, it would seem, to a stage in human development at which the explanation of things is not yet desired. It is well known that long before a child asks 'how'? he wearies his guardians with the question, 'what for'?<sup>3</sup> He wants to know what things are good for, and, in particular, what *he* can do with them before he cares for an understanding of their origin, and of their mechanism. This keen interest in the production of results, this curiosity about the practical meaning of things, is apparently quite independent of any abstract idea of power. Since the child passes through a pre-interpretative stage, may we not admit a corresponding period in racial development during which no explanatory soul-theory, no animistic philosophy, is entertained? A mental attitude such as this would make Religion impossible, while it would provide the essential condition for a Magic of our first class.

(b) Children—and adult savages resemble children in many respects—like to amuse themselves by setting up prohibitions and backing them up with threats of punishment. 'If you do this,' they will say, 'that will happen to you.' The 'this' and the 'that' have usually no logical connection with each other, neither

1. The latest classification is probably that of Frazer in "Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship" (Macmillan, 1905), p. 54. A. van Gennep, in a review of that book in the "Revue de l'Histoire des Religions," liii, pp. 396-401, offers a somewhat different classification.

2. I use "animism" in the sense which Tylor gave it, i.e., a belief in the animation of all things by beings similar to the "souls" or "ghosts" revealed to the savage by dreams and other natural experiences.

3. The interested reader will find a summary of observations on this topic in Alex. Chamberlain's "The Child" (The Contemporary Science Series, 1900), pp. 147-148. See also Sully, "Studies of Childhood," p. 82.

is there in the mind of the child any thought of a particular kind of power, or agent, meting out the punishment. This kind of play is strikingly similar to a large number of magical practices. Can it not be regarded as the prototype of most taboo customs? In taboo there is usually no logical and no qualitative relation between the prohibition and the punishment. Neither is there, ordinarily, any notion of a particular agent carrying out the threat. It involves, it seems, nothing more than the assumption of a causal connection between two facts brought together by 'chance' association under the pressure of a desire for food or success at war, or for the enforcement of a rule of conduct.<sup>1</sup> The punishment announced is anything on the efficacy of which one may choose to rely. In Madagascar conjugal fidelity is enforced by the threat that the betrayed husband will be killed or wounded in the war; among the indigenous tribes of Sarawack, the belief is that the camphor obtained by the men in the jungle will evaporate if the women are unfaithful during the absence of their husbands, while in East Africa, the husband would, in the same eventuality, be killed or hurt by the elephant he is hunting.<sup>2</sup> The high sanction which the requirements of social life give to beliefs of this sort is readily understood.

(c) It is a fact of common observation that in passionate moments, men of every degree of culture act, in the absence of the object of their passion, more or less as if it was present. A man grinds his teeth, shakes his fist, growls at the absent enemy; a mother presses to her breast and talks fondly to the departed babe. The pent-up motor tendencies must find an outlet. To restrain every external sign of one's desires or intentions when under great emotional excitement is unendurable pain. By the bed of the loved sick, one must do something, however useless to him. Who shall say that we do not have in this natural tendency the origin of the large class of magical acts represented by sticking pins into, or burning an effigy? The less a person is under the control of reason, the more likely is he, not only to yield to promptings of this order, but also to be seduced by his wish into a belief in their efficacy.

If any one finds it difficult to admit that the savage can so easily be deceived, I would direct his attention to the well-known

1. See, for instance, many of the prohibitions included in the initiation ceremonies of the Australians in Spencer and Gillen, *loc. cit.*, chapters vii-ix.

2. Frazer, "Golden Bough," 2nd ed., i, pp. 29-31.



instances of children's self-deceptions. Most of them behave, at a certain age, as if their dolls were alive and, to all appearances, there are some moments when they think so. What they think at other moments is another matter. We need not suppose that the savage cannot take, at times, a critical attitude and perhaps undeceive himself. It is sufficient that at other moments, when under the pressure of needs or in the excitement accompanying ceremonies of considerable social significance or of much personal importance, he should be able to assume the attitude of the believer. The behaviour of certain mentally deranged persons throws some light on this point. Such a person may believe that his hands are always dirty and be constantly washing them. If reasoned with, he may perhaps be convinced that they cannot be dirty. Yet a few seconds later he will exclaim, 'But I feel they are dirty,' and return to the wash-basin. The savage is under the control of his impulses and feelings to a degree approaching that of the person instanced. In this connection, the effect of repetition, and of the tribal sanction obtained by magical customs, should not be overlooked. They tend to make doubt and criticism next to impossible.

What need is there in cases of this kind to introduce a middle term between the actions of the magician and their expected effect? None whatsoever. The thought of an efficient agent or power passing out of the magician or of his instrument to work upon the victim is no necessary part of this type of Magic.

(d) The belief at the root of a great variety of magical practices, that 'like' produces 'like,' may have arisen in still other ways than the one just indicated. Nothing is more common than the invisible passage of things, be they heat, cold, light, thunderbolt, odours, diseases, etc., from one person or object to another, either by contact or through space. The frequent instances of diseases spreading by infection among men, animals, and vegetables, seem in themselves sufficient to suggest the belief that 'like' produces 'like.' The idea of contagion must have appeared very early indeed. Now, as the savage is quite unable to distinguish between the different agencies involved in the variety of experiences of this sort, he cannot draw the line between the 'likes' that really produce 'likes' and those that do not, hence his very strange expectations. This class of Magic also is independent of the conception of an agent effecting the connection between the objects related as cause and effect.

Since Tylor wrote his memorable work, the doctrine of animism

has become classical. This passage from *Primitive Culture*,<sup>1</sup> 'What men's eyes behold is but the instrument to be used, or the material to be shaped, while behind it there stands some prodigious but half-human creature, who grasps it with his hands or blows it with his breath,' expresses, no doubt, fairly correctly, a very early philosophy of life. I would not object even to its being termed the earliest philosophy, provided it be granted that the progress of the human race was already well under way when it appeared. But when it is assumed, as it is by many, that the animistic conception of nature is necessary to, and antedates, the establishment of Magic, I must dissent and affirm that a very large number of magical practices neither presuppose, nor in any way involve, a belief in animism, and that there are good reasons for considering them original, *i.e.*, not corruptions of practices primitively implying that belief. So much I trust to have shown in the preceding pages.<sup>2</sup>

I do not in the least deny that none of the magical practices in existence are derived from actions of a different character. Many of the 'superstitions' of civilised countries have had a long history. Several of the marriage customs: for instance, the cutting of the cake by the bride, and the lifting of the bride over the threshold, are vestiges of actions once necessary or useful.<sup>3</sup> But it would be absurd to conclude from the existence of derived magical practices, that Magic, as a whole, is to be accounted for on a theory of 'lapsed intelligence.'

*Magic and Religion combine but never fuse.*—When ghosts and nature-beings have become mental possessions of the savage, one may expect the sphere of Magic to extend so as to include these unseen, mysterious beings. Why should not the magical power take effect upon ghosts and gods as well as upon men? The savage, like everybody else, is anxious to use every available means to secure his preservation and his advancement. Why then should he not use both Magic and the offering of food? From the moment Religion appears, until the efficiency of Magic is totally discredited, we may expect to find these two modes of behaviour associated in men's dealings with gods except, however,

1. Fourth ed. (1903), i, p. 285.

2. The word "naturism" should be adopted as a name for the pre-animistic and pre-religious stage of culture, a stage corresponding to the one through which a child passes before he inquires into hidden causes and mechanisms. See on this an excellent little book published in this series, "Animism," by Edw. Clodd, pp. 22-25.

3. Lord Avebury, "On the Origin of Civilisation" (3rd ed., 1875), pp. 113-114.

where the god is clearly thought of as a World-Creator. For the savage could hardly have the presumption of attempting to control a power he recognises as the maker of the human race and of the world. Here are two instances of the combination of Magic and Religion. 'In the Babar Archipelago, when a woman desires to have a child, she invites a man, who is himself the father of a large family, to pray on her behalf to Upulero, the spirit of the sun. A doll is made of red cotton, which the woman clasps in her arms, as if she would suckle it. Then the father of many children takes a fowl and holds it by the legs to the woman's head, saying, "O Upulero, make use of the fowl; let fall, let descend a child, I beseech you, I entreat you, let a child fall into my hands and on my lap." Then he asks the woman, "Has the child come?" and she answers, "Yes, it is sucking already." . . . Lastly, the bird is killed, and laid, together with some betel, on the domestic plate of sacrifice. . . .'<sup>1</sup> In this ceremony prayer and sacrifice to a god are associated with magical practices of a mimetic and sympathetic character. In a large number of ceremonies, the god is dealt with religiously in order to secure from him 'power,' and then Magic is added to make the power effective. In old Egypt one of the formulas according to which the help of gods was secured began with an appeal to them under their popular names. It was a prayer which they were free to heed or to neglect. Then followed, in order to compel them to act, an adjuration introducing the mystical names, 'those written at birth in their heart by their father and mother.'<sup>2</sup> The magician not only claimed the power to force the gods to do his bidding, but also, in case of disobedience, to punish them, even by destruction. Remnants of magical dealings with gods are found even in the Christian Religion, if we are to believe the authors quoted by Frazer.<sup>3</sup> Magic and Religion are so closely interwoven in the life of peoples of low culture that some authors have affirmed the impossibility of separating them. Their affirmation need not be contradicted unless it be intended to mean that originally they were one and the same thing. However closely interwoven they may be, Magic and Religion remain distinct, as in the above instances. One might say, borrowing the language of the chemist, that they do not form compounds, but only mixtures.

1. "Golden Bough," i, p. 19.

2. Maspero, loc. cit., pp. 298-299.

3. Amelie Bosquet, "La Normandie romanesque et merveilleuse" (Paris et Rouen, 1845), p. 308.

*What did Magic contribute to the making of Religion? Frazer's Theory.*—Our conclusions are, so far, that Magic has had an independent origin, that it very probably antedated Religion, and that they associate for common purposes without ever fusing, for they are referable to different principles. Are we, then, driven to the opinion that even though Magic should have antedated Religion and been often combined with it in common undertakings, it has, nevertheless, contributed in no way to the establishment of Religion? That conclusion is not unavoidable. Frazer's conception presents an alternative which, however, we cannot accept. As he recognises not only a fundamental distinction, but even an opposition of principle between Magic and Religion, he cannot think of allowing the former a positive influence in the establishment of Religion. Yet he admits a genetic relation between them: it is, according to him, the recognition of the failure of Magic that is the cause of the worship of gods. 'I would suggest,' writes Frazer, 'that a tardy recognition of the inherent falsehood and barrenness of Magic set the more thoughtful part of mankind to cast about for a truer theory of nature and a more fruitful method of turning her resources to account.' When man saw that his magical actions were not the real cause of the activity of nature, it occurred to him that, 'if the great world went on its way without the help of him or his fellows, it must surely be because there were other beings, like himself, but far stronger, who, unseen themselves, directed its course and brought about all the various series of events which he had hitherto believed to be dependent on his own Magic. . . . To these mighty beings, whose handiwork he traced in all the gorgeous and varied pageantry of nature, man now addressed himself, humbly confessing his dependence on their invisible power, and beseeching them of their mercy to furnish him with all good things. . . . In this, or some such way as this, the deeper minds may be conceived to have made the transition from Magic to Religion.'<sup>1</sup> Several obvious objections may be raised against this view. I would remark first of all that Frazer does not discredit the sources of the belief in ghosts and in nature-beings mentioned in the preceding section: sleep and trances, apparitions; the impulse to personify great and startling natural phenomena the idea of creation. His hypothesis of the origin of Religion is, therefore, superfluous, unless he could show that the transition from Magic to Religion took place in the manner he suggests

1. Loc. cit., i, pp. 75-78.

before the experiences and reflections we have named had given rise to the idea of god.

The assumption on which Frazer's hypothesis rests, namely, that sagacious men of wild races persuaded themselves and their fellows of the inefficiency of Magic, seems clearly contradicted by the history of the relation of Magic to Religion, and also by the psychology of belief. On the latter ground, he may justly be accused of attributing neither enough influence to the will to believe nor to the support it receives from the many apparent or real successes of Magic. These successes, with the help of the several ways of accounting for failures without giving up the belief,<sup>1</sup> were in my opinion sufficient to support a belief in the efficiency of Magic until long after the birth of Religion. Is not that the conclusion we must draw from the recent spread of the spiritualistic movement, not only among the untutored, but even among representatives of our higher culture? The late gains of spiritism have been made despite numberless failures, the repeated discovery of deception, and the satisfactory scientific explanation of a large proportion of the alleged spiritistic facts, and thanks merely to a desire to believe, and to a few questionable facts not readily explained by accepted hypotheses. To suppose that before ghosts and nature-beings had been thought of and made great enough to exercise a practical influence upon men's conduct, there had existed, in the barbarous circumstances implied in the supposition, persons so keenly observant, so capable of scientific generalisation, and so free from the obscuring influences of passion as to be able to reject the many instances of apparent success of Magic, is to posit a miracle where a satisfactory natural explanation already exists.

In *Magic and Religion*, Andrew Lang directs a vigorous and successful attack upon Frazer's hypothesis.<sup>2</sup> A part of his argument, based on generally accepted historical data, is summarised in this passage: 'If we find that the most backward race known to us believes in a power, yet propitiates him neither by prayer nor sacrifice, and if we find, as we do, that in many more advanced races in Africa and America, it is precisely the highest power which is left unpropitiated, then we really cannot argue that gods

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2. Chap. iii.

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2. Chap. iii.

were first invented as power who could give good things, on receipt of other good things, sacrifice and prayer.'<sup>1</sup> He remarks, in addition, that although one would not expect people who had recognised the uselessness of Magic and turned to gods, to continue the development of the magical art, yet, in order to find the highest Magic one has to go to no less a civilisation than that of Japan, where gods are plentiful.

Although the hypothesis that gods and Religion are the consequence of the recognition of the failure of Magic, must be rejected, it does not follow that two modes of activity in the service of common purposes, as are Magic and early Religion, do not act upon each other in many ways. If Magic was first in the field, we may believe that the satisfaction it gave to man by its results, apparent and real, and in providing him with a means of expressing his desires, tended to retard the establishment of any other method of securing the same ends. The habit of doing a thing in a particular manner always stands more or less in the way of the discovery of other ways of doing the same thing. So that Magic was, in these respects, a hindrance to the making of Religion. There is, however, a grain of truth in Frazer's hypothesis. Had Magic completely satisfied man's multifarious desires, he would, in all probability, have paid but scant attention to the gods, for it is in times of trial that man turns to them. It was thus greatly advantageous to the making of Religion that the inadequacy of Magic should have been felt. Moreover, Magic exercised, in ways mentioned before, a very considerable influence on the general mental growth of savage populations; in this sense also it may be said to have helped Religion.

In a penetrating comparison of Magic with Religion, Marett<sup>2</sup> points out how easily our third class of Magic—Spell-Magic—assumes 'the garb of an affair between persons,' and thus approaches very close to Religion. But even when Magic involves the 'projection of an imperative will,' the fundamental difference between the two modes of behaviour remains quite distinct. In ancient Peru, when a war expedition was contemplated, they were wont to starve certain black sheep for some days and then slay them, uttering the incantation, 'As the hearts of these beasts are weakened, so let our enemies be weakened.' If this utterance is to be regarded as expressing an attempt to project the operator's

1. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

2. R. R. Marett, "From Spell to Prayer," "Folk-Lore, xv (1904), pp. 132-165.



'will' upon the enemies, we are clearly in the realm of pure Magic. But if it is to be understood as addressed to a personal being, it is a prayer, and then we deal with an instance of the combination of Magic with Religion.

*Magic and the Origin of Science.*—A common opinion has it that Magic and not the mechanical type of behaviour is the precursor of science. Before bringing this chapter to a close, we shall try and determine in what sense this statement is to be understood.

The reader will remember that after discriminating roughly, in the introduction, the three modes of behaviour observable in man, I added that the anthropopathic behaviour becomes Religion when it is directed to gods, and the mechanical becomes science when the principle of quantitative proportion it implies is definitely recognised. Frazer, who sets forth in his great book the magical origin of science, may stand as the representative of that theory. 'Magic,' he tells us, 'is next of kin to science,' for science 'assumes that in nature one event follows another necessarily and invariably without the intervention of any special spiritual or personal agency. Thus its fundamental conception is identical with that of modern science; underlying the whole system is a faith, implicit, but real and firm, in the order and uniformity of nature . . . his power [the magician's], great as he believes it to be, is by no means arbitrary and unlimited. He can wield it only so long as he strictly conforms to the rules of his art, or to what may be called the laws of nature as conceived by him . . . Thus the analogy between the magical and the scientific conception of the world is close. In both of them the succession of events is perfectly regular and certain, being determined by immutable laws, the operation of which can be foreseen and calculated precisely.'<sup>1</sup> Upon this I observe, first, that the acknowledgment of a fixed relation between actions or beliefs and their results is not peculiar to Magic; it is implied also in Religion and, more perfectly, in mechanical behaviour. Salvation is by the right practice, or by the right faith, or both. The gods cannot be approached and conciliated in *any* way; worshipper, no less than magician, has to conform to a definite ritual. In certain not entirely barbarous communities salvation or damnation are held to follow, respectively, belief or disbelief in no less than thirty-nine articles! So that 'definite and

1. Loc. cit., pp. 61-62. In the third volume (pp. 458-461), a change seems to have taken place in the author's opinion. What it amounts to, I cannot exactly make out.

certain succession of events,' their determination 'by immutable laws' to the elimination of caprice, chance, or accident, are expressions which apply, on the whole, as well to Religion as to Magic. These phrases do not denote a kinship of Magic to Science which could not be claimed also by Religion.

Turning to another side of the matter, we observe that Frazer finds it convenient to minimise in this connection the considerable share of the personal, *i.e.*, of the capricious, the incalculable, in Magic. The personality of the magician introduces an indeterminate and undeterminable factor about which enough has been said in preceding sections. Nothing could be in more direct antagonism to the scientific attitude than these two factors: the influence accorded to the personality of the magician and the belief in occult powers belonging to particular objects and events. So that it is truer to the facts to say that the fundamental conception of science, so far from being identical with that of Magic, is absent from it. For the essential presupposition of science—the one that differentiates it alike from Magic and from Religion—is the acknowledgment of definite and constant *quantitative* relations between causes and effects, relations which completely exclude the personal element and the occult. If that scientific presupposition is absent from Magic and from Religion, it is implicitly present in mechanical behaviour. The savage is nearer the scientific spirit and its method when he constructs a weapon to fit a particular purpose, or when he adjusts his bow and his arrow to the direction and the strength of the wind, than when he burns an enemy in effigy, abstains from sexual intercourse to promote success in the hunt, or exorcises diseases.

What Magic shares with science is not an acquaintance with the fundamental principle we have named, but the desire to gain the mastery over the powers of nature and the practice of the experimental method. The experimentation of Magic is, however, so crude and so unconscious that it can hardly be assimilated to the modern scientific method. If anyone was to turn to history for an argument in support of the thesis defended by Frazer, and point out that the alchemist is the lineal ancestor of the scientist, the sufficient answer would be:—

(1) Historical succession does not imply continuity of principle. Although Magic, Alchemy and Science form an historical sequence, the fundamental principle of the last is not to be found in the others.

(2) The clear recognition of the principle of fixed quantitative relation is, whenever and wherever it appears, the birth of Science and the death of both Magic and Alchemy. This last fact demonstrates clearly the fundamental enmity of these arts to the scientific principle. The discovery of that principle was probably almost as much hindered by the false notions and the pernicious habits of mind encouraged by Magic, than furthered by the gain in general mental activity and knowledge which it brought about. Magic, no more than Religion, encourages the exact observation of external facts, but rather self-deception with regard to them.

J. H. LEUBA.

## SOCIOLOGICAL APPLICATION OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HERD INSTINCT.

In the July number of the SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW I attempted to describe some of the more obvious psychological consequences of the fact that man is essentially a gregarious animal. It was shown that the gregarious mental character is evident in man's behaviour not only in crowds and other circumstances of actual association, but also in his behaviour as an individual, however isolated. The conclusions were arrived at that man's suggestibility is not the abnormal casual phenomenon it is often supposed to be, but a normal instinct present in every individual, and that the apparent inconstancy of its action is due to the common failure to recognise the extent of the field over which suggestion acts; that the only medium in which man's mind can function satisfactorily is the herd, which therefore is not only the source of his opinions, his credulities, his disbeliefs, and his weaknesses, but of his altruism, his charity, his enthusiasms, and his power.

The subject of the psychological effects of herd instinct is so wide that the discussion of it in the former article, in spite of some prolixity, covered only a comparatively small part of the field, and that in a very cursory way. Such as it was, however, it cannot be further amplified here, where an attempt will rather be made to review some of the practical corollaries of such generalisations as were sketched there.

In the first place, it must be stated with the strongest possible emphasis that deductive speculation of this sort finds its principal value in opening up new possibilities for the application of a more exact method. Science is measurement, but the deductive method may indicate those things which can be most profitably measured.

When the overwhelming importance of the suggestibility of man is recognised our first effort should be to obtain exact numerical expressions of it. This is not the place to attempt any exposition of the directions in which experiment should proceed, but it may be stated that what we want to know is, how much suggestion can do in the way of inducing belief, and it may be guessed that we shall ultimately be able to express the force of suggestion in terms of the number of undifferentiated units of the herd it represents. In the work that has already been done, chiefly

by Binet and by Sidis, the suggestive force experimented with was relatively feeble, and the effects consequently were rendered liable to great disturbance from the spontaneous action of other forces of suggestion already in the mind. Sidis, for example, found that his subjects often yielded to his suggestions out of "politeness"; this source of difficulty was obviously due to his use of pure individual suggestion, a variety which theory shows to be weak or even directly resisted.

The next feature of practical interest is connected with the hypothesis, which we attempted in the former article to demonstrate, that irrational belief forms a large bulk of the furniture of the mind, and is indistinguishable by the subject from rational verifiable knowledge. It is obviously of cardinal importance to be able to effect this distinction, for it is the failure to do so which, while it is not the cause of the slowness of advance in knowledge, is the mechanism by which this delay is brought about. Is there, then, we may ask, any discoverable touchstone by which non-rational opinion may be distinguished from rational? Non-rational judgments, being the product of suggestion, will have the quality of instinctive opinion, or, as we may call it, of belief in the strict sense. The essence of this quality is obviousness; the truth held in this way is one of James's "*a priori* syntheses of the most perfect sort;" to question it is to the believer to carry scepticism to an insane degree, and will be met by contempt, disapproval or condemnation, according to the nature of the belief in question. When, therefore, we find ourselves entertaining an opinion about the basis of which there is a quality of feeling which tells us that to enquire into it would be absurd, obviously unnecessary, unprofitable, undesirable, bad form or wicked, we may know that that opinion is a non-rational one, and probably, therefore, founded upon inadequate evidence, that it is, therefore, a belief which may prove injurious to that capacity to foretell which is science.

Opinions, on the other hand, which are acquired as the result of experience alone do not possess this quality of primary certitude. They are true in the sense of being verifiable, but they are unaccompanied by that profound feeling of truth which belief possesses, and, therefore, we have no sense of reluctance in admitting enquiry into them. That heavy bodies tend to fall to the earth and that fire burns fingers are truths verifiable and verified every day, but we do not hold them with impassioned certitude, and we do not resent or resist enquiry into their basis; whereas in such a question as that of the survival of death by human personality we

hold the favourable or the adverse view with a quality of feeling entirely different, and of such a kind that enquiry into the matter is looked upon as disreputable by orthodox science and as wicked by orthodox religion. In relation to this subject, it may be remarked, we often see it very interestingly shown that the holders of two diametrically opposed opinions, one of which is certainly right, may both show by their attitude that the belief is held instinctively and non-rationally, as, for example, when an atheist and a Christian unite in repudiating enquiry into the existence of the soul.

A third practical corollary of a recognition of the true gregariousness of man is the very obvious one that it is not by any means necessary that suggestion should always act on the side of unreason. The despair of the reformer has always been the irrationality of man, and latterly some have come to regard the future as hopeless until we can breed a rational species. Now the trouble is not irrationality, not a definite preference for unreason, but suggestibility, that is, a capacity for accepting reason or unreason if it comes from the proper source.

This quality we have seen to be a direct consequence of the social habit, of a single definite instinct, that of gregariousness; the same instinct which makes social life at all possible and altruism a reality.

It does not seem to have been fully understood that if you attack suggestibility by selection, and that is what you do if you breed for rationality, you are attacking gregariousness, for there is at present no adequate evidence that the gregarious instinct is other than a simple character and one which cannot be split up by the breeder. If, then, such an effort in breeding were successful we should exchange the manageable unreason of man for the inhuman rationality of the tiger.

The solution would seem rather to lie in seeing to it that suggestion always acts on the side of reason; if rationality were once to become really respectable, if we feared the entertaining of an unverifiable opinion with the warmth with which we fear using the wrong implement at the dinner table, if the thought of holding a prejudice disgusted us as does a foul disease, then the dangers of man's suggestibility would be turned into advantages. We have seen that suggestion already has begun to act on the side of reason in some small part of the life of the student of science, and it is possible that a highly sanguine prophetic imagination might detect here a germ of future changes.



Again a fourth corollary of gregariousness in man is the fact expounded many years ago by Pearson that human altruism is a natural instinctive product. The obvious dependence of the evolution of altruism upon increase in knowledge and inter-communication has led to its being regarded as a late and a conscious development—as something in the nature of a judgment by the individual that it pays him to be unselfish. This is an interesting rationalisation of the facts because in the sense in which 'pay' is meant it is so obviously false. Clearly altruism does not at present, and cannot, pay the individual in anything but feeling, as theory declares it must. It is clear, of course, that as long as altruism is regarded as in the nature of a judgment, the fact is overlooked that necessarily its only reward can be in feeling. Man is altruistic because he must be, not because reason recommends it, for herd suggestion opposes any advance in altruism, and when it can the herd executes the altruist, not of course as such, but as an innovator. This is a remarkable instance of the protean character of the gregarious instinct and the complexity it introduces into human affairs, for we see one instinct producing manifestations directly hostile to each other—prompting to ever advancing developments of altruism, while it necessarily leads to any new product of advance being attacked. It shows, moreover, as will be pointed out again later that a gregarious species rapidly developing a complex society can only be saved from inextricable confusion by the appearance of reason and the application of it to life.

When we remember the fearful repressing force which society has always exercised on altruism and how constantly the dungeon, the scaffold and the cross have been the reward of the altruist, we are able to get some conception of the force of the instinctive impulse which has triumphantly defied these terrors, and to appreciate in some slight degree how irresistible an enthusiasm it might become if it were encouraged by the unanimous voice of the herd.

In conclusion, we have to deal with one more consequence of the social habit in man, a consequence the discussion of which involves some speculation of a necessarily quite tentative kind.

If we look in a broad general way at the four instincts which bulk largely in man's life, namely, those of self-preservation, nutrition, sex and the herd, we shall see at once that there is a striking difference between the mode of action of the first three and that of the last. The first three, which we may, for convenience

and without prejudice, call the primitive instincts, have in common the characteristic of attaining their maximal activities only over short periods and in special sets of circumstances, and of being fundamentally pleasant to yield to. They do not remain in action concurrently, but when the circumstances are appropriate for the yielding to one, the others automatically fall into the background, and the governing impulse is absolute master. Thus these instincts cannot be supposed at all frequently to conflict amongst themselves and the animal possessing them alone, however highly developed his consciousness might be, would lead a life emotionally quite simple, for at any given moment he would necessarily be doing what he most wanted to do. We may, therefore, imagine him to be endowed with the feelings of free-will and reality to a superb degree, wholly unperplexed by doubt and wholly secure in his unity of purpose.

The appearance of the fourth instinct, however, introduces a profound change, for this instinct has the characteristic that it exercises a controlling power upon the individual from without. In the case of the solitary animal yielding to instinct the act itself is pleasant, and the whole creature, as it were body and soul, pours itself out in one smooth concurrence of reaction. With the social animal controlled by herd instinct it is not the actual deed which is instinctively done, but the order to do it which is instinctively obeyed. The deed, being ordained from without, may actually be unpleasant, and so be resisted from the individual side and yet be forced instinctively into execution. The instinctive act seems to have been too much associated in current thought with the idea of yielding to an impulse irresistibly pleasant to the body, yet it is very obvious that herd instinct at once introduces a mechanism by which the sanctions of instinct are conferred upon acts by no means necessarily acceptable to the body or mind. This, of course, involves an enormous increase of the range through which instinct can be made use of. Its appearance marks the beginning of the multifarious activities of man and of his stupendous success as a species, but a spectator watching the process at its outset, had he been interested in the destiny of the race, might have felt a pang of apprehension when he realised how momentous was the divorce which had been accomplished between instinct and individual desire. Instinctive acts are still done because they are based on "*a priori* syntheses of the most perfect sort," but they are no longer necessarily pleasant. Duty has first appeared in the world, and with it the age-long conflict which is described in the memorable

words of Paul: "I delight in the law of God after the inward man; but I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members."

Into the features and consequences of this conflict it is now necessary for us to probe a little further.

The element of conflict in the normal life of all inhabitants of a civilised state is so familiar that no formal demonstration of its existence is necessary. Even in childhood the process has begun. The child receives from the herd the doctrines, let us say, that truthfulness is the most valuable of all the virtues, that honesty is the best policy, that to the religious man death has no terrors, and that there is in store a future life of perfect happiness and delight. And yet experience tells him with persistence that truthfulness as often as not brings him punishment, that his dishonest playfellow has as good, if not a better, time than he, that the religious man shrinks from death with as great a terror as the unbeliever, is as broken-hearted by bereavement, and as determined to continue his hold upon this imperfect life rather than trust himself to what he declares to be the certainty of future bliss. To the child, of course, experience has but little suggestive force, and he is easily consoled by the perfunctory rationalisations offered him as explanations by his elders. Yet who of us is there who cannot remember the vague feeling of dissatisfaction, the obscure and elusive sense of something being wrong which is left by these and similar conflicts.

When the world begins to open out before us and experience to flow in with rapidly increasing volume, the state of affairs necessarily becomes more serious. The mental unrest which we, with a certain cynicism, regard as normal to adolescence is evidence of the heavy handicap we lay upon the developing mind in forcing it to attempt to assimilate with experience the dicta of herd suggestion. Moreover, let us remember, to the adolescent experience is no longer the shadowy and easily manipulable series of dreams which it usually is to the child. It has become touched with the warmth and reality of instinctive feeling. The primitive instincts are now awake and finding themselves baulked at every turn by herd suggestion; indeed even products of the latter are in conflict among themselves. Not only sex, self-preservation and nutrition are at war with the pronouncements of the herd, but altruism, the ideal of rationality, the desire for power, the yearning

for protection and other feelings which have acquired instinctive force from group suggestion.

The sufferings entailed by this condition are commonplace knowledge, and there is scarcely a novelist who has not dealt with them—usually with the complacent sentimentalism so common with those who have been through the same struggle and learnt nothing from it. It is, of course, around matters of sex and of religion that the conflict is most severe, and while it is no part of our purpose to make any detailed survey of the condition, it may be of interest to point out some of the more obvious significances of this localisation.

Religion has always been to man an intensely serious matter, and when we realise its biological significance we can see that this is due to a deeply ingrained need of his mind. The individual of a gregarious species can never be truly independent and self-sufficient. Natural selection has ensured that as an individual he must have an abiding sense of incompleteness, which, as thought develops in complexity, will come to be more and more abstractly expressed. This is the psychological germ which expresses itself in the religious feelings, in the desire for completion, for mystical union, for incorporation with the infinite, which are all provided for in Christianity and in all the successful sub-varieties of Christianity which modern times have seen develop. This need seems with the increasing complexity of society to become more and more imperious, or rather to be satisfiable only by more and more elaborately rationalised expressions. The following is a representative passage from a recent very popular book of mystical religion:—"The great central fact in human life, in your life and in mine, is the coming into a conscious vital realisation of our oneness with the Infinite Life and the opening of ourselves fully to this divine inflow." It is very interestingly shown here to what lengths of rationalisation may be forced the consequences of that yearning in us which is identical with the mechanism that binds the wolf to the pack, the sheep to the flock, and to the dog makes the company of his master like walking with God in the cool of the evening.

Did an opportunity offer, it would be interesting to enquire into the relation of the same instinctive impulse to the genesis of philosophy. Such an attempt would, however, involve too great a digression from the argument of this essay.

That sex should be a chief field for the conflicts we are discussing is comprehensible not only from the immense strength of the impulse and the fact that it is a mode of man's activity which herd

suggestion has always tried to regulate, but also because there is reason to believe that the sex impulse becomes secondarily associated with another instinctive feeling of great strength, namely, altruism. We have seen already that altruism is largely antagonised by herd tradition, and it is plausible to suppose that the overwhelming rush of this feeling which is so usually associated with sex feelings is not primarily sexual in quality, but secondarily associated therewith as being the only outlet through which it is allowed by the herd to indulge manifestations of really passionate intensity. If this were so it would clearly be of great practical importance should the rational method ever come to be applied to the solution of the problems for the sociologist and statesman which surround the relations of the sexes.

The conflicts which we have been discussing are of course by no means limited to the period of adolescence, but are frequently carried over into adult life. To estimate the extent to which this occurs and to understand how the apparent calm of normal adult life is attained, it is necessary to consider the effects upon the mind of these processes of contention.

Let us consider the case of a person caught in one of those dilemmas which society presents so abundantly to its members—a man seized with a passion for some individual forbidden to him by the herd, or a man whose eyes have been opened to the vision of the cruelty which everywhere lies close below the surface of life, and yet has deeply ingrained in him the doctrine of the herd that things, on the whole, are fundamentally right, that at bottom the universe is congruous with his moral feelings, that the seeming cruelty is mercy and the apparent savage indifference divine long suffering. Now, what are the possible developments in such a tormented soul?

It is clear that four outcomes are possible. The conflict may end through the subsidence of either antagonist. Years, other instincts or grosser passions may moderate the intensity of ungratified love or take away the intolerable sharpness from the sight of unmerited and unmeaning pain. Again, scepticism may detect the nature of the herd suggestion and deprive it of its compelling force.

Thirdly, the problem may be shirked by the easy mechanism of rationalisation. The man may take his forbidden pleasure and endow a chapel, persuading himself that his is a special case, that at any rate he is not as bad as X, or Y, or Z, who committed such and such enormities, that after all there is divine mercy, and he

never beat his wife, and was always regular with his subscriptions to missions and the hospitals. Or, if his difficulty is the ethical one, he will come to see how right the herd view really is; that it is a very narrow mind which cannot see the intrinsic excellence of suffering; that the sheep and cattle we breed for eating, the calf we bleed to death that its meat may be white, the one baby out of four we kill in the first year of life, that cancer, consumption and insanity and the growing river of blood which bathes the feet of advancing mankind, all have their part in the Increasing Purpose which is leading the race ever upwards and onwards to a divine consummation of joy. Thus the conflict ceases, and he is contented to watch the blood and the Purpose go on increasing together and to put on flesh unperplexed by the shallow and querulous scruples of his youth.

Of these three solutions that of scepticism is unquestionably the least common, though the impression that this is not the case is created by the frequency of apparent scepticism, which, in fact, merely masks the continuation of conflict in the deeper strata of the mind. A man the subject of such submerged conflict, though he may appear to others, and, of course, to himself, to have reached a secure and uncontested basis of stability may, after a period of apparently frictionless mental life, betray by unmistakable evidence the fact that conflict has continued disastrously below the surface.

The solutions by indifference and by rationalisation or by a mixture of these two processes are unquestionably the methods by which is established the great class of normal, sensible, reliable middle age with its definite views, its resiliency to the depressing influence of facts and its gift for forming the backbone of the State. This triumph of herd suggestion over experience and over altruism has clearly the advantage of establishing existing society with great firmness, but it has also the consequence of entrusting the conduct of the State and the attitude of it towards life to a class which their very stability shows to possess a certain relative incapacity to take experience seriously, a certain relative insensibility to the value of feeling and to suffering and a decided preference for herd tradition over all other sources of conduct.

Early in history the bulk of mankind must have been of this type, because experience being still relatively simple would have but little suggestive force, and would therefore readily be suppressed by herd suggestion. There would be little or no mental conflict, and such as there was would be readily stilled by comparatively simple rationalisations. The average man would then be happy,



active and possessed of an inexhaustible fund of motive and energy; capable of intense patriotism and even of self-immolation for the herd. The nation consequently, in an appropriate environment, would be an expanding one and rendered ruthless and formidable by its intense unshakeable conviction of its divine mission. Its blindness towards the new in experience would keep its patriots narrow and fierce, its priests bigoted and bloodthirsty, its rulers arrogant, reactionary and over-confident. Should chance ordain that there arose no great environmental change rendering necessary great modifications, such a nation would have a brilliant career of conquest as has been so often demonstrated by history.

Amongst the first-class powers to-day the mentally stable are still the directing class, and their characteristic tone is discernible in national attitudes towards experience, in national ideals and religions and in national morality. It is this possession of the power of directing national opinion by a class which is in essence relatively insensitive towards new combinations of experience; this persistence of a mental type which may have been adequate in the simpler past, into a world where environments are with amazing rapidity daily becoming more complex; it is this survival, so to say, of the waggoner upon the footplate of the express engine, which has made the modern history of nations a series of such breathless adventures and hairbreadth escapes. To those who are able to view national affairs from an objective standpoint it is obvious that each of these escapes might very easily have been a disaster, and that sooner or later one of them must be such.

Thus far we have seen that the conflict between herd suggestion and experience is associated with the appearance of the great mental type which is commonly called normal. Whether or not it is in fact to be regarded as such is comparatively unimportant and obviously a question of statistics; what is however of an importance impossible to exaggerate is the fact that in this type of mind personal satisfactoriness or adequacy, or, as we may call it, mental comfort, is attained at the cost of an attitude towards experience which greatly affects the value to the species of the activities of minds of this type. This mental stability then is to be regarded as, in certain important directions, a loss; and the nature of the loss resides in a limitation of outlook, a relative intolerance of the new in thought and a consequent narrowing of the range of facts over which satisfactory intellectual activity is possible. We may, therefore, for convenience, refer to this type as the resistive, a name which serves as a reminder of the exceedingly important fact

that, however "normal" the type may be, it is one which falls far short of the possibilities of the human mind.

If we now turn to a consideration of the mental characteristics of the constituents of society other than those of the resistive type, we shall find a common quality traceable, and another great type capable of broad definition. We must at once, however, guard ourselves against being misled by the name normal as applied to the resistant into the supposition that this type is in a numerical majority in society. Intellectually unquestionably of inferior value, there is good reason to suppose that in mere numbers it has already passed its zenith, as may be gathered from the note of panic which what is called the increase of degeneracy is beginning to excite.

Outside the comfortable and probably diminishing ranks of the "normal," society is everywhere penetrated by a steadily increasing degree of what we may call in the broadest possible way mental instability. All observers of society, even the most optimistic, are agreed that the prevalence of this mental quality is increasing in an alarming way, while those who are competent to trace its less obtrusive manifestations find it enormously more widespread still.

The subject is so vast and difficult that further consideration of it will be easier if we enter first upon the mechanism by which mental instability seems to be produced and illustrate its prevalence incidentally.

When the twenty years just past come to be looked back upon from the distant future, it is probable that their chief claim to interest will be that they saw the birth of the science of abnormal psychology. That science, inconspicuous as has been its development, has already given us a few generalisations of the very first rank in wideness of validity and importance of application. Amongst such, perhaps the most valuable is that which has taught us that certain mental and physical manifestations which have usually been regarded as disease in the ordinary sense are due to the effects upon the mind of the failure to assimilate the experience presented to it into a harmonious unitary personality. We have seen that the stable-minded deal with an unsatisfactory piece of experience by rejecting its significance, by the process, that is to say, of exclusion. In the minds we are now considering such exclusion cannot occur, and the unwelcome experience persists as an irritant, so to say, and ultimately produces more or less of that "mental disintegration" of which mental instability is a consequence. In other words abnormal psychology has been able to

show that mental disintegration is the consequence of mental conflict. Now we have already seen that a gregarious animal, unless his society is perfectly organised, must be subject to lasting and fierce conflict between experience and herd suggestion. It is clear, therefore, that abnormal psychology has disclosed the fact that the manifestations of mental disintegration are not diseases of the individual in the ordinary sense at all, but inevitable consequences of man's biological history and exact measures of the stage now reached of his assimilation into the gregarious life. The manifestations of mental disintegration were at first supposed to be of comparatively rare occurrence and limited to certain well-known "diseases," but they are coming to be recognised over a larger and larger field, and in a great variety of phenomena, which, although undesirable and often disastrous, are usually still regarded as normal, or at any rate inevitable.

This field includes a part of insanity, how much we cannot even guess, but certainly a very large part; it includes the group of conditions described as functional diseases of the nervous system, and, finally, it includes that vast group of the mentally unstable which, while difficult to define without detailed consideration, is sufficiently precise in the knowledge of all to be recognisable as extremely large.

It would be totally impossible here to attempt any review of this vast medley of states of disintegration, but it will be obvious, even to those least familiar with the facts, that such states are common enough to cause a thrill of apprehension in the most optimistic. A few words of comment, however, must be added. To the layman insanity seems to appear as a compact and definable disease, whereas in fact it is an inextricably confused congeries of states of which the only common characteristic is that the victims of it speak or act in ways different to a variable extent from the average of the herd. Within its boundaries therefore is abundant room for conditions such as we are discussing. In the second group is included the condition daily becoming more and more familiar to the layman as nervous exhaustion or nervous breakdown; even in the severer grades this state is probably as common as any disease whatever. It inflicts upon its victims, as is well known, practically no direct danger to life, but it converts what should be gaiety and confidence and strength into an insupportable nightmare, and in so doing as surely deprives the state of its best treasure—a working citizen—as if it had eaten away his flesh with the comparative humanity of its dreadful rivals consumption and cancer. In

addition moreover there are many slighter grades of the same condition which are greatly more frequent still, and while they are scarcely recognised as abnormal, do not the less certainly take away from life that gusto which is the only possible basis for useful work. Furthermore, conditions which at first sight give rise to no suspicion of being acquired injuries to the mind, when they are looked at in the light of the facts we have been considering, reveal themselves as being scars inflicted by conflict as certainly as are some forms of insanity. Characteristics which pass as vices, eccentricities, defects of temper, peculiarities of disposition, come when critically examined to be explicable as minor grades of mental disintegration, although on account of their great frequency, they have been looked upon as normal, or at any rate in the natural order of things.

Few examples could be found to illustrate better such conditions than alcoholism. Almost universally regarded as either, on the one hand, a sin or vice, or on the other hand, as a disease, there can be little doubt that in fact it is essentially a response to a psychological necessity. In the tragic conflict between what he has been taught to desire and what he is allowed to get, man has found in alcohol, as he has found in certain other drugs, a sinister but effective peacemaker, a means of securing for however short a time, some way out of the prison house of reality back to the Golden Age. There can be equally little doubt that it is but a comparatively small proportion of the victims of conflict who find a solace in alcohol, and the prevalence of alcoholism and the punishments entailed by the use of that dreadful remedy cannot fail to impress upon us how great must be the number of those whose need was just as great, but who were too ignorant, too cowardly, or perhaps too brave to find a release there.

We have seen that mental instability must be regarded as a condition extremely common, and produced by the mental conflict forced upon man by his sensitiveness to herd suggestion on the one hand, and to experience on the other. It remains for us to estimate in some rough way the characteristics of the unstable, in order that we may be able to judge of their value or otherwise to the state and the species. Such an estimate must necessarily be exaggerated, over-sharp in its outlines, omitting much, and therefore in many respects false. The most prominent characteristic in which the mentally unstable contrast with the "normal" is what we may vaguely call motive. They tend to be weak in energy, and especially in persistence of energy. Such weakness may translate

itself into a vague scepticism as to the value of things in general, or into a definite defect of what is popularly called will power, or into many other forms, but it is always of the same fundamental significance, for it is always the result of the thwarting of the primary impulses to action resident in herd suggestion by the influence of an experience which cannot be disregarded. Such minds cannot be stimulated for long by objects adequate to normal ambition; they are apt to be sceptical in such matters as patriotism, religion, politics, social success, but the scepticism is incomplete, so that they are readily won to new causes, new religions, new quacks, and as readily fall away therefrom.

We saw that the resistive gain in motive what they lose in adaptability; we may add that in a sense the unstable gain in adaptability what they lose in motive. Thus we see society cleft by the instinctive qualities of its members into two great classes, each to a great extent possessing what the other lacks, and each falling disastrously below the possibilities of human personality. Which class may be the more dangerous to the race it is not our purpose here to enquire; both unquestionably *are* dangerous, both are preventible, and we may add, there can be no doubt which is increasing. The effect of the gradual increase of the unstable in society can be seen to a certain extent in history. We can watch it through the careers of the Jews and of the Romans. At first, when the bulk of the citizens were of the stable type, the nation was enterprising, energetic, indomitable, but hard, inelastic, and fanatically convinced of its divine mission. The inevitable effect of the expansion of experience which followed success was that development of the unstable and sceptical which ultimately allowed the nation, no longer believing in itself or its gods, to become the almost passive prey of more stable peoples. At the present time Japan is perhaps of all nations the one in fullest possession of mental stability. Fortunately for her, she has been able to adopt and use Western things, without as yet being penetrated by what would be, to her, the poison of Western ideas. Should she realise the enormous advantage she possesses in the mental stability of her citizens, she has before her a career of almost unlimited expansion until the time shall come when she too must travel past zeniths however splendid, along the path to declension and doom.

In regard to the question of the fundamental significance of the two great mental types found in society, a tempting field for speculation at once opens up, and many questions immediately arise for discussion. Is, for example, the stable normal type

naturally in some special degree insensitive to experience, and if so, is such a quality inborn or acquired? Again, may the characteristics of the members of this class be the result of an experience relatively easily dealt with by rationalisation and exclusion? Then again, are the unstable naturally hypersensitive to experience, or have they met with an experience relatively difficult to assimilate? Into the discussion of such questions we shall here make no attempt to enter, but shall limit ourselves to reiterating that these two types divide society between them, and are both full of sinister significance to the future of the race.

#### GREGARIOUSNESS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN.

Thus far we have attempted to apply biological conceptions to man and society as they actually exist at present. We may now, very shortly, enquire whether or not the same method can yield some hint as to the course which human development will take in the future.

As we have already seen reason to believe, in the course of organic development when the limits of size and and efficiency in the unicellular organism were reached, the only possible access of advantage to the competing organism was gained by the appearance of combination. In the scale of the metazoa we see the advantages of combination and division of labour being more and more made use of, until the individual cells lose completely the power of separate existence, and their functions come to be useful only in the most direct way and through the organisms of which the cells are constituents. This complete submergence of the cell in the organism indicates the attainment of the maximum advantages to be obtained from this particular access in complexity, and it indicates to us the direction in which development must proceed within the limits which are produced by that other access of complexity—gregariousness.

The success and extent of such development clearly depend on the relation of two series of activities in the individual which may in the most general way be described as the capacity for varied reaction—the essential characteristic of the unicellular organism and the solitary animal—and the capacity for communication—the essential characteristic of the cells of the multicellular organism and the units of a gregarious species. The process going on in the satisfactorily developing gregarious animal is the moulding of the



varied reactions of the individual into functions beneficial to him only indirectly through the welfare of the new unit—the herd. This moulding process is a consequence of the power of inter-communication amongst the individual constituents of the new unit. Inter-communication is thus seen to be of cardinal importance to the gregarious, just as was the nervous system to the multicellular.

Moreover, in a given gregarious species the existence of a highly-developed power of reaction in the individual with a proportionately less developed capacity for communication will mean that the species is not deriving the advantages it might from the possession of gregariousness, while the full advantages of the type will be attained only when the two sets of activities are correspondingly strong.

Here we may see perhaps the explanation of the astounding success and completeness of gregariousness in bees and ants. Their cycle of development was early complete because the possibilities of reaction of the individual were so small, and consequently the capacity for inter-communication of the individual was relatively soon able to attain a corresponding grade. The individual has become as completely merged in the hive as the single cell in the multicellular animal, and consequently the whole of her activities is available for the uses of the state. It is interesting to notice that considered from this aspect, the wonderful society of the bee, with its perfect organisation and its wonderful adaptability and elasticity, owes its early attainment of success to the smallness of the brain power of the individual.

For the mammals with their vastly greater powers of varied reaction the path to the consummation of their possibilities must be enormously longer, more painful and more dangerous, and this applies in an altogether special degree to man.

The enormous power of varied reaction possessed by man must, it is clear, render necessary for his attainment of the full advantages of the gregarious habit, a power of inter-communication of absolutely unprecedented fineness. It is clear that scarcely a hint of such a power has yet appeared, and it is equally obvious that it is this defect which gives to society the characteristics which are the contempt of the man of science and the disgust of the humanitarian.

We are now in a position to understand how momentous is the question as to what society does with the raw material of its minds to encourage in them the potential capacity for inter-communication

which they undoubtedly by nature possess. To that question there is but one answer. By providing its members with a herd tradition which is constantly at war with feeling and with experience, society drives them inevitably into resistiveness on the one hand, or into mental instability on the other, conditions which have this in common, that they tend to exaggerate that isolation of the individual which is shown us by the intellect to be unnatural and by the heart to be disastrously cruel.

Another urgent question for the future is provided by the steady increase, relative and absolute, of the mentally unstable. The danger to the state constituted by a large unstable class is already generally recognised, but unfortunately realisation has so far only instigated a yet more desperate blow at the species. It is assumed that instability is a primary quality, and therefore only to be dealt with by breeding it out. With that sinister indifference to the mental side of life which is characteristic of the mentally resistant class, the question as to the real meaning of instability has been begged by the invention of the disastrous word "degenerate." The simplicity of the idea has charmed modern speculation, and the only difficulty in the whole problem has come to be the decision as to the most expeditious way of getting ride of this troublesome flaw in an otherwise satisfactory world.

The conception that the environment must be modified if the body is to survive has long been recognised, while the fact that the mind is incomparably more delicate has scarcely been noticed at all. We assume that the disorderly environment with which we surround the mind has no effect and are ingenuously surprised when mental instability arises apparently from nowhere; but although we know nothing of its origin our temerity in applying the cure is in no sense daunted.

It has already been pointed out how dangerous it would be to breed man for reason, that is, against suggestibility. The idea is a fit companion for the device of breeding against "degeneracy." The "degenerate," that is, the mentally unstable, have demonstrated by the mere fact of instability that they possess the quality of sensitiveness to feeling and to experience, for it is this which has prevented them from applying the remedy of rationalisation or exclusion when they have met with experience conflicting with herd suggestion. There can be no doubt as to the value to the state of such sensitiveness were it developed in a congruous environment. The "degeneracy," therefore, which we see developed as a secondary

quality in these sensitive minds is no evidence against the degenerate, but an indictment of the disorderly environment which has ruined them, just as the complacent catchword associating insanity and genius tells us nothing about genius but a great deal about the situation into which it has had the misfortune to be born.

Sensitiveness to feeling and experience is undoubtedly the necessary antecedent of any high grade of that power of intercommunication which we have seen to be necessary to the satisfactory development of man. Such sensitiveness however, in society as it now is, inevitably leads merely to mental instability. That such sensitiveness increases with civilisation is shown by the close association between civilisation and mental instability. There is no lack, therefore, of the mental quality of all others most necessary to the gregarious animal. The pressing problem which in fact faces man in the immediate future is how to readjust the the mental environment in such a way that sensitiveness may develop and confer on man the enormous advantages which it holds for him, without being transformed from a blessing into the curse and menace of instability. To the biologist it is quite clear that this can only be effected by an extension of the rational method to the whole field of experience, a process of the greatest difficulty, but one which must be the next great variation in man's development if that development is to continue to be an evolution.

Outside this possibility the imagination can see nothing but grounds for the completest pessimism. It needs but little effort of foresight to realise that without some totally revolutionary change in man's attitude towards the mind, even his very tenure of the earth may come to be threatened. Recent developments in the study of disease have shown us how blind and fumbling have been our efforts against the attacks of our immemorial enemies the unicellular organisms. When we remember their capacities for variation and our fixity, we can see that for the race effectually and permanently to guard itself against even this one danger are necessary that fineness and complexity of organisation, that rendering available of the utmost capacity of its members, against which the face of society seems at present to be so steadily set. We see man to-day instead of the frank and courageous recognition of his status, the docile attention to his biological history, the determination to let nothing stand in the way of the security and permanence of his future, which alone can establish the safety and happiness of the race, substituting blind confidence in his destiny, unclouded faith in the essentially respectful attitude of the universe

towards his moral code, and a belief no less firm that his traditions and laws and institutions necessarily contain permanent qualities of reality. Living as he does in a world where outside his race no allowances are made for infirmity, and where figments however beautiful never become facts, it needs but little imagination to see that the probabilities are very great that after all man will prove but one more of nature's failures, ignominiously to be swept from her work-table to make way for another venture of her tireless curiosity and patience.

W. TROTTER.

## THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PUBLIC BUSINESS ENTERPRISE.\*

The most serious difficulties in State Socialism are connected with the political structure of the State. Can a government conduct a number of large complex business operations with the requisite economy, efficiency and honesty? Though the competition of private profitmongers may involve much waste of power by needless duplication and the friction of industrial war, while a sweating economy may injure its employees, the normal conduct of such businesses, it is maintained, will be energetic and economical and the public will get most of the gain of industrial improvements in a fall of prices. Even when the virtual monopoly of one large company or combination has displaced competition the desire of the management to earn high profits will maintain most of the former incentives to efficiency and progress, and in many instances, at any rate, considerations of maximum net profits will induce the management to supply a sound article at a low price.

But when the State has taken over such a business, though it may be theoretically possible to maintain many of the former stimuli to efficiency, the vital question whether they will actually be maintained will be one of political integrity. Will it be possible to ensure that the public managers, upon whose personal control the efficiency of the business operations will chiefly depend, will do their duty to the public with the same honesty and zeal which they displayed when working in the interests of private capital, and will they secure from the rank and file of the public employees an efficiency nearly equal to that obtained from ordinary wage earners? In an ordinary joint stock company engaged in trade the body of shareholders in proportion to their respective interests exercise the right of electing directors: these directors control the general policy of the business and appoint the management, making it responsible for the detailed efficiency of the business structure, and enforcing this responsibility by the power of dismissal. Underneath this form of business democracy a practical oligarchy often exists, one or two directors with the manager virtually determining the conduct of the business, with very little interference from the body of investors. But taken as

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a whole this business system has worked well, securing honesty, economy and efficiency: there is sufficient conscious identity of interests between shareholders, directors, management and employees to support an effective co-operation of activities.

Take a railroad or an electric engineering works from this business form and put it under the operation of the State or Municipality. The nominal structure undergoes very little change. Instead of the shareholders you have the body of taxpayers or ratepayers, the electorate is responsible for financing the business as the shareholders were before: they elect representatives to sit in Parliament or in the City Council, part of whose business it is to see that this railroad or engineering works is properly managed in the public interest: these representatives, or a Committee of them, appoint the management and act as directors; the permanent officials who actually administer the public works are public servants whose duty it is to run the business for the benefit of the body of citizens.

Why should not such a public business be as efficiently managed in the public interest as the company was in the interests of the shareholders? Theoretically, there is no necessity why the State should equalise the payment for all sorts and qualities of workers, or should cease to apply the stimuli of personal gain in salary and position which are found effective under private enterprise. But practically, it is contended, these stimuli will not be so effectively applied. The removal of the profit-making motives will in various ways slacken the human energy which drives the organism (or mechanism); there will be less efficient co-operation between the parts, and definite corruption may set in, introducing motives of secret illicit gains.

Such is the charge against State Socialism. Let us examine it in the light of known facts and probabilities.

Though, as we see, there is an analogy between the structure of a public and of a joint stock business, certain differences must be recognised. If an electric lighting business is taken over by the Town from a Company, it is true the citizens become the shareholders, taking their gain not in dividends but in good and cheap lighting, the Committee of the Council take the place of the Board of Directors, representing the interests of the civic shareholders: the management is under the general control of the Committee, as formerly under that of the Directors, and the ordinary worker in the business holds his appointment and receives his pay in the same way as before.



But when we regard the operation of the business as a complex arrangement of motives operating in the wills of the various co-operating agents, we note the following changes. The shareholders who elected directors had a power of election strictly proportionate to the number of their shares and the gain they expected to receive: those with a considerable stake at issue would command a majority of votes and could elect directors in whom they placed confidence, and could determine the large issues presented to them at the yearly or half-yearly meeting. These men with the large personal stake would give some close study to the conduct of the business: some of them would become directors, or would have had other experience in this line of business. So far as the nature of the business enabled control to be exercised by the shareholders, that control would be wielded by those possessing a substantial interest and some amount of business knowledge and skill. When the business was municipalised, the control of the citizen-shareholders would be differently distributed. There would be no individuals among them with an incentive of personal gain corresponding in strength to that of the large shareholders. Though cheap good lighting would confer more gain upon some than upon others, all would have an equal voice in electing the Council that appointed the Committee. Nor is the popular control apportioned with any regard to the amount contributed to the upkeep of the business through the rates. A big ratepayer has one vote along with the little ratepayer. Thus on the appeal to material self-interest there appears a greatly diminished security for effective control on the part of the shareholders. There are no shareholders to whom the efficient management of the lighting means a substantial increase of their personal income, and the few large consumers who stand to gain or lose any substantial amount by the good or bad management of the public lighting are fully aware that their votes count for very little among the general body of the ratepayers; to most of them the difference between dear and cheap, good and bad, electric light is not a matter of great urgency. Moreover the issue is only one among a large tangle of issues presented at an election, so that at no time is the real intelligence and interest of the body of ratepayers focussed upon the question of lighting policy.

There is one other factor of considerable importance in municipal and state socialism. If the whole profit or product of the public undertaking, *e.g.*, the municipal lighting, were divided among the rate or tax payers, even upon an equal basis, all mem-

bers of this public would have some personal interest in its economical and efficient management, the interest represented by their rates and taxes. But, it is contended, part of the profit or product, the use of the public lighting, goes to people who pay no rates or taxes. Although these latter many have no votes and no voice in public management, the part of the public product which goes to them for nothing is *pro tanto* a diminution of the gains of the citizen-shareholders and diminishes their incentive to improve the public work. If 40% of the citizens pay, or think they pay, virtually the whole of the rates which support street-lighting, the benefits of which the other 60% enjoy as much as they, will they be disposed to pay for so good a lighting system as if they were going to get the whole benefit themselves?

Bearing in mind these differences between shareholders as dividend-receivers and as citizen-ratepayers, we cannot fail to recognise that a transfer from private to public enterprise involves some loss of effective control on the part of those for whose benefit the business is run, so far as selfish personal interest is a motive force. Unless, therefore, some public spirit and intelligence can be evoked and educated to counteract this loss, a waste of efficiency in management accrues.

So much for shareholders. Now for directors. Will the Committee of the Council set to control the Lighting do it as well as the Board of Directors under the private régime? *Primâ facie* it is unlikely that they will, if we confine our attention to the play of interested motives. In the first place, there is a substitution of unpaid for paid services, and although many paid directors do little for their money, the payment must be considered a real stimulus to the output of effective energy, and the substitution of unpaid Councillors would seem to indicate a loss. When we add that, in the case of a company, the chairman, and sometimes other directors, do often make the affairs of the company the chief concern of their working hours, while it is rare that the chairman or other committee members under the Council can afford to give their full time and best energies to work which after all must usually be supplementary to the profession or business by which they earn their livelihood, we appear by municipalising a business to have weakened appreciably the control exercised by the elected representatives of the shareholders. This loss, however, is not essential to the socialistic system. There is no reason why the Chairman and even the Committee should not be paid on the same scale as that on which the Directorate of the Company was paid.

So far as Chairmen or Vice-Chairmen are concerned this is sometimes done, as the history of the London County Council testifies. This economy belongs to the larger issue of the payment of representatives. Here, however, the substitution of public spirit for private gain, as a motive for effective work, is easier and has been more manifest than at the lower stage which we discussed.

There are various kinds of public and private motives which in many departments of municipal and state work do visibly evoke industry and energy of mind from Mayors, Chairmen of Committee, and many other elected persons taking a reponsible part in the administration of important public businesses.

These motives are not always clean, and some as we shall see, are subject to grave anti-public distortions: but they do often yield a far more effective power of public government than is consistent with a purely self-regarding theory of business economy.

It is often urged, and with much force, that in these arts of government, as in all the finer and humaner arts, the very best creative and progressive work is got by appealing to the unselfish disinterested love of work and of humanity, an appeal which is actually blurred and enfeebled when under a private profit-making company great personal gain is held out as the main incentive to all effort. Moreover, it may be maintained, that in public elective institutions there is some considerable chance of getting into the Council, and from the Council into the Committee, any man out of the whole population who is willing and able to contribute some such great disinterested service—a better chance than if the business were kept in the restricted circle of a group of private investors.

In London government we can very easily illustrate this consideration. If, for instance, the technical and elementary teaching professions in London had been left to competing private enterprise, it is exceedingly unlikely that such able, enlightened and essentially creative minds as those of Mr. Sidney Webb and Mr. Graham Wallas would have been able to make the large steady contribution to the progress of our great Metropolitan community which they have made.

Every considerable city has its history brightened by not a few similar instances of able public-spirited men who, as citizens, have given better services than could be bought by a private profit-making company. But under our present system of competitive industry there can be, and are, very few who are in a position to afford to do such work. It will be one of the chief tasks of

progressive Socialism to secure such conditions for an expanding proportion of the population as shall enable these disinterested social instincts to become operative in the public service. To this point I shall return later.

At present, keeping closely to our analysis of the structure and working of a Municipal Lighting Committee, or other public business, it must, I think, be acknowledged that some loss in technical efficiency of control is incurred by substituting a Committee, appointed as most Committees are appointed, for the Directorate of a Company. Even setting aside all questions of corruption or jobbery, less regularity of attendance, less energy, less knowledge of the business in question may usually be expected in a Committee than in a Directorate. There are cases, however, where this may not hold. Most railroad directors in this country know less of railroading than would a Standing Committee appointed by Parliament. If this is so, it will have some necessary reactions on the permanent officials to whom the real concrete and detailed conduct of the business is entrusted. As a result of the substitution of a political for a distinctively economic system of control, they will 'have a freer hand.' Their masters in the Committee of the Council will be less able to 'interfere' than the directors under whom formerly they served, for both the incentive to interfere will be less and the knowledge making interference effective will be less. This will rest, not chiefly on the considerations already named, but upon the fact that the personnel of the Committee will be much less stable than that of the Directorate, shifting with party and other expediencies. If, as often happens, a different Chairman comes into office every few years, the control of the Council over the permanent officials is necessarily weakened. This virtually means that instead of the Council controlling and directing the permanent officials, the latter 'manage' the Council, suggesting or imposing the policy which is best or most convenient for them. This may mean a very efficient and enlightened policy, if an able, public-spirited or ambitious man gets into the saddle as head of the permanent staff. So many a town owes much to a masterful Town Clerk or a go-ahead Borough Surveyor. But it is an uncontrolled or inadequately controlled bureaucracy, subject to all the dangers which attend this mode of government: the essential defect being that no *real* part is taken in this department of policy or administration by the people or their representatives.

Normally the condition I have described will mean that the

Borough Surveyor and the manager of the Electric Lighting Works will have their own way with a minimum of control from the Council: not only current details of management but policy of development and its finance will be largely in their hands. A very important factor in the situation is that these high officials will be securer in their office and their salary than under a company, where, if dividends went very wrong, they were in danger of displacement. So long as they do not get violently at loggerheads with the Committee and the Council or commit some very flagrant act of indiscretion, their tenure of office, with a rise of salary not closely related to economy of management, is tolerably safe, safer than any post in the ordinary business world outside.

In our preliminary discussion of incentives under public enterprise we assumed that this security with other loss of direct selfish stimulus would tend towards torpor, conservatism and slackness. This, I think will be the normal result. But there will be exceptions when it will seem to act in the opposite direction. Where an ambitious borough official gets the bit in his teeth, he may seek free scope for his energy and ambition by a reckless go ahead experimental policy, which he enjoys and for which the town pays. This peril of bureaucracy is confronted on a larger scale in great State departments. A magnificent bureaucrat, with a masterful, expansive and resourceful personality, seeing the chance of translating his inspirations and aspirations into concrete realities at the public expense, may plunge into all sorts of dubious novelties.

If it be admitted that these risks of undue conservatism and torpor on the one hand, or reckless experimental plunging on the other, flow from an insufficiently controlled bureaucracy, it is evident that their consequences will be felt all through the public business, affecting in various degrees all the employees and their capacities of effective co-operation in the public service.

In considering the relative efficiency of officials under private and public enterprise, however, one point of considerable importance must not be ignored. The assumption that the profit-seeking character of private enterprise will lead to a better selection of administrative ability requires qualifications. Where private capitalism has attained its highest structural development, efficiency of administration is often notoriously injured by an abuse of patronage in appointments and promotion of officials and even of subordinate employees. This is particularly true of those great branches of industry where amalgamation has gone so far as to

exclude effective competition. In our railways and great banks, for example, the influence of directors and large shareholders is habitually used to procure appointments and to obtain promotion. If these services were nationalised our Civil Service examination system would certainly raise the level of ability among the higher grades of employees, and if this system of appointment were extended to our local Civil Services a similar gain might attend the socialisation of some at any rate of those municipal services which remain in private hands.

But, bearing in mind the manner in which most public appointments are 'jobbed' by town councils and other local elected bodies, we are not entitled to make large present claims on this account as any set-off against the 'patronage' system under private enterprise.

The general trend of this analysis of the structural changes of industry involved in socialisation indicates several perhaps considerable wastes in controlling and co-ordinating power due to the working of the political method of control of the productive forces, and that this net waste might be disastrous, unless the new public possession generated a new public spirit and new methods of popular control which should counterbalance or prevent this loss of social energy.

But all this is closely connected with a graver charge against Socialism which must now be discussed. 'Substitute public for private enterprise: a double process of corruption is generalised. The dishonest use of political power is made possible and profitable in innumerable ways: party politics will be rapidly adapted to purposes of private gain, and an elaborate system of 'graft' will spread over the whole body of the public industries. Socialism will be a vast spoils system: the struggle between capital and labour which now goes on will be transferred from competitive industry to the political arena where it will rage more destructively than ever with organised bodies of public employees using their votes, not as citizens for public purposes, but as wage-earners to extract higher pay and superior conditions of employment for themselves and their particular trade. Candidates will be returned to Parliament and to other public bodies not as independent persons, not even as party delegates, but as 'kept' politicians tied to a particular trade, and primarily devoted to seeing that this trade improves its 'pull' upon the public purse.' You have, it is suggested, the beginnings of this vicious system already operating, in the organised pressure brought by unions of teachers, postal



employees, arsenal workers upon members of Parliament and the Government to get preferential conditions of employment for themselves at an increasing expense to the taxpayers. Even now, where the organisations are strong enough, they are constantly trying to interfere with the most economical administration of the public work in which they are engaged, endeavouring not merely to raise their wages, shorten their hours, and to secure pensions which make their conditions of individual employment preferable to those in private businesses, but also to secure an excessive amount of employment for their particular branch of the public service, and practically to insist upon a permanency of work and salary for the maximum number of employees. The influence of members of Parliament and of other political bodies is used to secure appointments to obtain advancement and to prevent dismissals. The worst effect is seen in the appointment and promotion to the higher and more important administrative posts of men chosen for political reasons who are not fully competent.

If these evils are visible in a State where not more than  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the workers are public employees what will be the case where the proportion has advanced to 10, 20 or 40 per cent., where all the railway servants, miners, dockers and other large groups of organised workers are put upon the public roll? The great mining districts of the North, the Midlands and South Wales; such railway towns as Rugby, Crewe and Derby, would no longer return members of Parliament to assist in the general work of making and administering laws in the general interests of the nation; even the interests of party would yield place to the narrowest form of trade individualism, and knots of men would sit in Parliament pledged to devote themselves to the supreme end of securing for the workers in a particular industry a bigger pull upon the public purse in pay, pensions or other advantages. As Socialism advanced further, politics would more and more degenerate into the cockpit of sectional industrial strife, each national trade seeking to advance itself at the interests of the nation as a whole. Every town would be a Chatham or a Plymouth, and the public good would disappear in favour of a number of competing private goods. Incidentally the realignment of political forces and issues would lend itself to a fiscal policy of Protection, as politics became more and more a game of pulls between groups of producers, each of which would be urgent to maintain for its members the largest volume of employment at the highest wage and would insist on taxing or prohibiting imports which might impair this policy.

In this indictment of progressive Socialism there are two chief counts which, though connected, are distinguishable. That upon which I have dwelt presupposes the working of party politics upon lines with which we are familiar in this country. Great organisations of public employees, by political pressure, might exert a tyranny over the general body of the public, exacting an excessive pay for an insufficient service. But there is another even graver danger, illustrated in the spoils system of America, where the entire structure of the democratic institutions of the nation has been perverted by the dishonest disposal of public offices. A chief business of an American Congressman or Senator in the eyes of his constituents is to secure assistance to local interests by tariffs, contracts, appropriations or other grants of public money or special measures of protection : in the eyes of the local members of the party which elected him his chief business is to secure for them lucrative offices. This habitual use of the public resources to feed local, party and personal interests has so corrupted the party organisations and the entire machinery of democracy in America that the intelligent will of the people does not flow upwards from the electorate, expressing itself in legislation and administration based on sound public policy : it is pumped down from above by party bosses, themselves the creatures of great business corporations, who mould the government of the country in accordance with the will of their paymasters, disposing of the public offices to evoke the necessary party activity out of the rank and file of the minor party politicians who manipulate in detail the popular votes. Though the people reserves some 'kick,' some power of independent judgment, expressed in occasional revolts against the tyranny of the machine, this constitutes a very real and grave evil in American democracy. Now, though the system by which in America the great majority of offices change ownership with every change of party government, might not be adopted here (and is certainly inconsistent with effective Socialism), it is evident that advancing Socialism must leave large numbers of new offices at the disposal of Government and great opportunities for securing the goodwill of large bodies of voters by improving the conditions of their employment.

The individualist represents that any party government under a popular franchise must succumb to these temptations, and that here, as in America, the party system will become a highly elaborated machine financed by capitalistic interests seeking a protective tariff and other large spoils for themselves and using the

socialised services as instruments for assuaging discontent and buying votes. The forms of democracy will survive: the spirit will have disappeared: a vast system of public corruption will have been established for which the unorganised non-socialised consumers and taxpayers will have to pay.

Such is the charge. What is the reply? In the first place, an appeal to facts turns somewhat the edge of the attack. Do our existing socialised services display these terrible corruptions? Are our postal employees and public teachers able to exert this tyranny, plundering the public purse for their private gain, and are these services administered ineffectively by reason of political pull? It is evident that they are not, and that the unions of these employees do not exert the injurious power which in theory they might appear to possess.

Again, supposing, as is doubtless the case, that there is a tendency for the State, after taking over a private industry, to yield to the representations of the employees and to raise the wages and otherwise improve their conditions—such improvement of conditions, as we have seen, is not necessarily, or even normally, a public loss. On the contrary, within certain limits it is a public gain. The claim that the State should be a "model employer" does not merely rest upon the view that it should set a good example and can afford to do so because it has the public purse out of which to pay. It rests on the economic principle that sweating, or any terms of employment injurious to the worker and the efficiency of his family, are a social injury entailing waste in the economy of public resources. Put concretely, it may be said that a large part of the higher wage bill under Socialism would be a public profit, not a loss, a wise economy and not a dole or bribe.

But, it will be retorted, granting the validity of this margin for levelling up, the demands of public employees will not stop there. They will be continually asking for more and will use political pressure to get it. So long as they are numerically a small proportion of the electorate they cannot tyrannise much. But if the State employed 20 or 40 per cent. of the workers, many electoral districts would be entirely in their hands: they would become the dominant force in party politics and would work the machine for their private gain.

It is no use meeting this objection by imputing to the groups of socialised workers a new and lofty spirit of social morality which will enable them to resist temptations to abuse their power. That spirit must be a slow growth; we cannot assume in advance its effective

operation. It is safer to admit that they will try to use their power to get for themselves all they can. But how much can they get? Let us assume that Socialism was advanced so far that 10, 20 or even 40 per cent. of the workers were employed by the State, in a variety of public industries, the members of each of which sought to get as much as possible for itself out of the public purse. Either the several public industries would form separate unions, each playing for its own hand, or they would federate and form a single force in politics. In the former case it is evident that their power would be strictly limited. Even the largest public industry, say the railway workers, would form a small minority in the whole electorate, and though through their predominance in certain centres they might bring strong pressure to bear, where political parties were closely balanced, any attempt to raise their economic position much above the level of other public workers would arouse resentment among the latter as well as among the general public who would have to pay for the 'favouritism' accorded to the railway workers.

Those who think such jealousy would be a negligible factor can know very little of the workers of this country. There is more force in the suggestion that a powerful combination of employees in the various public services might use their voting power with great effect to extract excessive pay and other advantages for their collective enjoyment by manipulating party politics. This in truth is a grave menace in a socialising State which has not developed its representative system along truly democratic lines. Under our present artificial party system (artificial in that it represents no clear actual cleavage of thought, sentiment, or even interests), it is possible for a very small compact energetic minority in a constituency, devoted to some single issue such as temperance, anti-vaccination or the like, to extort a pledge from one or both party candidates to support legislation: if a sufficient number of successful candidates have given such pledges, the course of legislation in a so-called representative assembly may be vitally influenced by what is the will, not of the public, nor of a majority, but of a small minority.

Small groups of keen politicians have in this manner often exercised an influence quite disproportionate to their numbers in matters where their policy is dictated by purely disinterested motives. Will not local and national groups of miners, railway men or municipal employees utilise this flaw in our representative system far more keenly and effectively in order to extort legislative

or administrative measures fraught with direct material advantage to themselves? It would be idle to assert that public spirit or contentment with the good conditions of their employment, will deter them from such a profitable course.

Some practical Socialists are so alive to this danger as to advocate the disenfranchisement of all public employees. But that is to remedy one disease by introducing a worse one. The larger the advance of Socialism the graver the injury such disqualification would inflict upon democratic government. That 10 or 20 per cent. of the citizens should be deprived of the right and duty of contributing to government because they were paid public servants would be a mutilation of the representative system. The fact that they will indisputably tend to use their voting power more for their private advantage, if they find that they can do so, than for the public good, is no reason for disenfranchising them. It is, however, a reason for so reforming the representative system as to deprive them of the power effectively to abuse the franchise. The real danger which we have described consists in the power of a compact minority to obtain a representation which is excessive, to impose its will as if it were the will of a majority, upon an elected assembly. A sufficient remedy consists in proportional representation, accompanied in certain cases of critical importance by a referendum. Proportional representation is no mere fad, not a mere improvement of our existing mode of representation: it is the only method by which the 'tyranny of Socialism' can be averted. Under our present misrepresentative party system the danger of an organisation of the public services using the public as their milch-cow is a very real one. Well-organised unions of miners, railway workers, postal employees, etc., would, when they got practice, use the party machines to get far better wages and far softer jobs than fall to the body of outside employees; and such capitalistic interests as still survived (for remember I am not dealing with a completely Socialistic State) would buy their support for their own political designs through the party bosses.

But once set our systems of election upon a properly proportionate basis, no body of public servants, owning special interests, could impose upon the Government a policy unduly favouring these interests. If railroads and mines were nationalised strong centres of these industries would return some members chosen chiefly to safeguard these special interests in ways which might sometimes conflict with the wider interests of the nation. But it is right and proper that these important interests should be given a

fair amount of this direct representation, that there should be some men who can speak with authority and experience of the special needs of special groups of workers. Even if Socialism had gone so far that 20 or more per cent. of the electorate were public employees, this would not give them any of that power to work the party machine, and so to loot the public purse, which would be possible, and I think probable, under the vicious system of representation which prevails at present in this country.

The real peril of advancing Socialism, the fear of a corrupt use of political power, is not a vice of Socialism itself, but one which Socialism discovers in our crude realisation of democratic methods. The individual voter must be educated and trained to use his individual judgment by the larger choice of candidates and the liberation from party trammels which a rational reform of electoral methods will bring.

There is no other way of making Socialism safe than by making democracy real, *i.e.*, by securing representative assemblies which are just and accurate reflections of the will of the electorate and by testing by direct appeal that general will in all important cases where representation fails.

J. A. HOBSON.



## DISCUSSIONS.

## THE MORAL EDUCATION CONGRESS.

## I.

The danger is great that with doubts about theology should come misgivings about morality and consequent feebleness and perversity in moral reaction. Everywhere, for this reason, voices are heard in this sceptical age demanding an independent basis for ethics in order that a man's morality should not suffer by its connexion with religion. This position is re-inforced by the contention that our period has become peculiarly conscious of the supreme importance of right conduct and that it applies this standard, almost to the exclusion of any other, in politics, in education, in science, in art, and in private and social life. Hence it is very generally believed that to this intellectual and emotional factor is principally due the widespread interest in Moral Education, as exemplified, for instance, in the remarkable success of the First International Moral Education Congress, recently held in London.\*

This analysis of the situation seems to me very incomplete, and if the *Sociological Review* would invite discussion on the subject, it might materially contribute to throw light on an important contemporary problem.

I would suggest that the emphasis on Moral Education and the demand for Systematic Moral Instruction are due to that large and irresistible group of forces which we conveniently distinguish by the words "modern civilisation," and not just to one social factor or another.

Broadly speaking, the international situation a little over a century ago was as follows. The vast majority of persons lived in villages, and seldom left them; interests and responsibilities were practically confined to the village; most of the villagers had no voice in the management of the village, the county, or the country; news from a distance was slow in arriving, and interest in it was artificial rather than real seeing the want of a vital connexion between the village and the world. In a word, men lived on a rural plane.

We are living now on an international plane. A large part of the population dwells in towns, and not only is travel to distant places rapid and frequent, but the movement of population from locality to locality and from country to country is a decided feature of the times. Through the utilisation of steam and electricity villages and countries have been brought near to each other, the telegraph, for example, almost annihilating distance; hence the

\* *Papers on Moral Education*, edited by Gustav Spiller. David Nutt., London, 5s. net. *Record of the Proceedings*, David Nutt, London, 1s. net.

development of international commerce on an unprecedented scale, each place receiving the products of the farthest lands. Simultaneously the democratic trend in politics became more and more noticeable. Accordingly to-day the total absence of constitutional government is a rarity, and not only have most men the vote, but women will soon have it, too. Even the Orient, which was supposed to be unalterably absolutistic in government, has offered us recently the gratifying spectacle of one nation after another—Egypt, India, Japan, China, Persia, Turkey—demanding a Constitution and in many cases obtaining it. Rapid transit and rapid news have, however, not only led to a close contact between the individuals of the several nations, but between the nations themselves. Hence village politics have gradually given way to national politics and this to international politics, and men are consequently almost as sensitive to-day concerning what happens a thousand miles away as to what happens next door.

The growing intercourse between nations and the evolution of democratic government are not the only signs of our period. The progress of science during the last century has developed in men a novel sense, the sense of causation, a sense which is providing mankind with a new view of the world, and making us see things far more steadily than our forefathers saw them. Whilst science, by its international character, has forged a further link between the nations, it has at the same time played havoc with ill-founded beliefs. It examined the facts of nature and discovered that they contradicted many assumptions in the holy scriptures of the various races, it studied these scriptures and found them wanting in self-consistency while startlingly agreeing with each other as to ethical aspirations; and in analysing current religious views of human nature, it was led to affirm that man is primarily a social being and, therefore, far from indifferent to the suitability or unsuitability of his environment. Hence the rigid orthodoxy of a century ago has become impossible to-day, and a freer and friendlier relation towards those of other faiths prevails.

These numerous changes have transformed the spirit of the period. Distinctions of class, of nation, of race, of religion, and of education, have lost much of their ancient sting, and a humaner tone is everywhere discernible which expresses itself most completely in the difference between the old "Offenders will be prosecuted" and the new "Your co-operation is requested in. . ." The almost total disappearance of cruel sports, the kindly treatment of the insane, the nearly complete abolition of corporal punishment, and the growing respect for the sensibilities of the young, are other facets of the same fact.

Finally, if the interpretation put forward here is correct, the experience of the last century has given a deeper meaning to the conception of human solidarity. The Stoic definition of man, as a being ruled by large considerations and wide sympathies in contradistinction to the lower animals that act mainly on impulse and have narrow sympathies, is proving, on closer analysis, even from a biological point of view, to be strictly scientific. In other words, to be a man, in the scientific sense of the term, is to be an ethical man. He who is governed by passing considerations and

narrow sympathies should be consequently regarded as undeveloped or imperfectly evolved.

The meaning of the phrase "modern civilisation" is, then, clear, I think. Men largely live in towns, travel much, and do not restrict their dwelling place to any locality or country; commerce and industry have been internationalised and the Press, mainly through the telegraph, has created a living (though somewhat ill-balanced) interest in what is done anywhere on the globe; village politics have been displaced by national and international politics, for which, owing to the form of the suffrage, the responsibility is general; the advance of science has enlightened men's minds regarding metaphysical religions and strengthened the belief in universal causation; the spirit of the age has become humanitarian; and, lastly, the striving after an ethical ideal is being more and more accepted as the fundamental fact in history and, therefore, in human life.

## II.

It is only after having made the above analysis that we can fairly understand, I think, why clerical and anti-clerical governments alike (twenty-one governments were represented at the Congress) are coming to be engrossed in the problems of Moral Education apart from theology. The movement of populations and the growth of large towns have destroyed the religious uniformity which formerly existed in localities, and the acquaintance with other religions, the progress of science, and the humanitarian spirit have contributed to the same end; the developments of industry and democracy have made schools universal; and, lastly, the plane on which we are living demands of us immeasurably more than it demanded of our forefathers whose outlook was in the main bounded by the village in which they lived and died, and in which alone their interest centered.

Whilst few children went to school and the schooling was indifferent in quality, whilst religious agreement was the rule in any locality and the horizon of duty scarcely extended beyond the family life and the ordinary village transactions, theological ethics and theologically controlled schools fairly met the needs of the times. After the enormous developments of the last century the situation has radically altered, and the Church, once the teacher of the nation, has become the greatest stumbling block to educational advance, because it has not yet recognised that a democracy dwelling on an international plane cannot allow its schools to be governed by conceptions and methods only appropriate to a far less advanced age. The School belongs now by right to the trained teacher and to the professional educationist, and whether it is a question of Physical, Intellectual, or Moral Education in schools, it is these naturally who must determine what is to be done. The problem of sound methods of instruction, of humane and effective discipline, of the nature of the curriculum, and of our general system of schools and education, can only be solved by

the most patient study unhampered by pedagogical traditions which are insensitive to criticism.

Naturally, therefore, the responsibility for the education of our children has been almost entirely taken over by the nation, and the prominence formerly given to theological instruction and conceptions has not only ceased in the schools, but nearly altogether also in denominational establishments. It is not surprising, then, that governments, being face to face with the new situation, have ceased to concern themselves with the religious instruction given, have dispensed with theological conceptions in the ordinary curriculum, and have consciously laid more and more stress on moral training and moral instruction, while in view of the international character of men's responsibilities, the substance of the current theological ethics (which is strongly personal and other-worldly in tendency) was displaced by an ethics which has mainly a social and international background. This change of front, has meant that the Church owing to new circumstances, has automatically ceased to supply the teachers as it before, when the time came, ceased to furnish the statesmen, lawyers, and relief-officers of the world.

So far as moral training alone was concerned the path was unobstructed, and a number of Governments (including England, Austria, France, Hungary, Italy, Portugal) have, therefore, emphasised its importance in their respective Education Codes. The further step of laying stress on the utilisation of the various subjects in the curriculum for ethical ends, was also taken without any difficulty. Still, whenever it has become a question of introducing systematic moral instruction, the Church has usually cried halt, contending that it already supplies this instruction in the religious lesson and that Moral Instruction is impossible except in connexion with theological teaching.

The present position is thus a painful one. The international plane of responsibility on which we are moving, requires that the children should be prepared for action on this plane. This can only be accomplished by systematic moral instruction—a conscious and conscientious thrashing out of current ethical problems—by methods which are pedagogically sound; and in the place of this carefully planned instruction the Churches generally offer a series of theological lessons in which not much more than one-fifth is of ethical importance, and where references to civic duties and natural motives are decidedly lacking. The School is thus ruled by two systems of ethics, the one supplied by the nation and the other by the Churches. This state of things cannot continue much longer. More and more it is felt that intellectual education is no substitute for moral education and that the State must as completely control the latter as the former. The chief aim of the School is now universally agreed to be the formation of character, and yet, by a strange paradox, the religious lesson, which is neither an integral portion of the school curriculum nor is inspected, which scarcely contains a solid nucleus of what the State wishes and ought to teach, and which lesson may or may not be given or followed, is supposed principally to achieve this end. Anxious as the nation must be to live at peace with the Church, it cannot remain much

longer a party to keeping the School inefficient, especially on the ethical side, through the present dual control. The whole international situation demands nothing more imperatively and more urgently than a thorough system of physical, intellectual and moral education; but while the School has to serve two masters, there is not the faintest hope of this need being satisfied. The ethical conceptions and motives which rule the civilised world must also rule our schools if men and women are to be formed who will play a worthy part on the national and international stage. Only the inculcation of clear and definite ideas will accomplish this, and therefore moral instruction, even in denominational schools, must become a separate subject in every curriculum. The wonder is not that the State of to-day should wish to give this instruction, but that the Church of to-day should question the reasonableness of the claim.

Are, then, all requirements satisfied when the School trains the child morally and gives direct and indirect moral instruction? Not if, in the present writer's opinion, we do full justice to the new situation. An increasing body of persons exists which holds that the history of the human race is an evolution from anarchy or formlessness to organisation or order, culminating ultimately in a Parliament of Man and a Federation of the World. If this be so, the history of the race must be interpreted in ethical terms, while if we focus human life we shall probably find the ethical factor—the organising one—supreme and all-pervading. We are, then, driven to the conclusion that every lesson in the curriculum should be primarily an ethical lesson; but this is not the place to defend this position, which I am merely concerned to state.\* The realisation of this conception of the curriculum is at any rate not a question for urgent consideration.

I explain thus the wide-spread interest shewn in the First International Moral Education Congress (which was initiated by the International Union of Ethical Societies) as being due to the radical transformation which the whole civilised world has undergone during the last hundred years, and I would suggest that the near future, owing to the pressure of the total situation, is bound to witness the introduction into all schools of separate moral and civic instruction and the removal of religious teaching from State schools.

GUSTAV SPILLER.

\* The present writer develops this subject to some extent in a paper contributed to the Moral Education Congress. (See *Papers on Moral Education*.) He also discusses fully the subject of systematic moral instruction in a work which is now passing through the press. (Report on Moral Instruction (theological and non-theological) and Moral Training in the Schools of Seventeen Countries. Watts & Co. London.)



## OXFORD AND WORKING CLASS EDUCATION.\*

One evidence of the growing self-consciousness of the people during the nineteenth century is the movement towards adult education, which was manifested in many and varied forms. In the first chapter of the Report of the Joint Committee of University and Working-Class representatives the story is briefly told, how the interest of workpeople in their own education "waxed and waned, leaped forward and sank back, as the hopes kindled by other movements awoke them to new possibilities, or distress and disappointment made them sceptical of any kind of progress." When one considers against what terrible economic difficulties the people strove throughout the century, it may well excite wonder that education as such was ever seriously contemplated. For not only were political discontent and "bread-and-butter" ambition prompting causes of these movements, but religion and cooperation and Christian socialism—ideals in which it is probable that the altruistic instinct dominates the egoistic—inspired in their season the demand for higher education. But these movements were nearly all hampered by two serious difficulties, the early termination

"of the school life of the working classes, and the dissociation of the efforts of workpeople from co-operation with the Universities. The former is now under the consideration of the Consultative Committee of the Board of Education. With the latter it is the object of this Committee to deal. Though adult education has throughout the nineteenth century received much support and encouragement from individual University men there has till recently been no regular machinery for enabling Universities to ascertain the special needs of the working classes as voiced by their representatives, and little organized effort on the part of workpeople to claim the Universities as a common national possession."

It is to the Workers' Educational Association that we must credit the alliance between academic and working-class opinion. But let us leave for a moment this Association. The Report itself goes on to discuss the endowments of the University and Colleges of Oxford, and their history and purpose, in a chapter that is scrupulously fair to Oxford. The Oxford University Extension movement is discussed, and we are warned not to comprehend in our judgment upon it the parallel movements of Cambridge and London. For all that it is made reasonably clear that the Extension system "has not supplied the education desired by workpeople." Its financial administration alone is enough to prevent that.

The primary importance of the Report consists in its presentation of the relation between Oxford and workpeople, and here it is necessary to explain that the newer universities have already, through the Workers' Educational Association, been brought into connection with the working-class movement towards higher education. This Association is a federation of more than a thousand organizations, including more than four hundred Trade

\* Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1s. net.



Unions, a hundred adult schools, and various other political and educational organizations, almost entirely workpeople's. It has succeeded in arousing the interest of the workers in higher education, in bringing them more closely into contact with the existing facilities for higher education, or providing itself such facilities, and last and best, in giving voice to the educational demands of organized Labour.

It is through this federation that the demand of Labour has been made vocal. Its history shows a startling rate of development; it is not six years old, yet, counting the membership of the various affiliated societies, it represents at least as many adults as there are in London. These are the people who now make a demand "for the further cooperation of Oxford in the systematic teaching of historical, economic and other liberal subjects." Of the two blent causes of this demand, as stated in the fourth chapter of the Report, there can be no doubt that the growth of state-supported education is far and away less important than the increased interest in social problems. The Trades Unions' education policy as formulated in the resolution of 1908 demands as "essential to the well being of our future citizens a national system of education under full popular control, free and secular, from the primary school to the University."

In the Report, we read, it is demanded

"that all Universities should be organized, not as a matter of favour, but as a matter of right and social expediency, in such a manner as to be regularly and easily accessible to all sections of the country. The information which has been put before us shows clearly that workpeople will not be content with any substitute for University education, however excellent, which assumes that they will be unable to enter the Universities themselves. What they ask is that the Universities of the country should be treated as the apex of a single educational system, of which the foundation is the primary school."

Here, of course, the motives are mixed, but the whole character of labour's claim, and the terms in which methods and consequences are discussed, make it abundantly clear that the demand is a political one, and that citizenship is given an importance transcending that of scholarship. It is not that scholarship is despised; far rather is it true that there is an aspiration after some vaguely defined ideal of social life and social service; and this aspiration is so strong, and the faith in the ennobling and guiding power of education is so great, as to create a largely artificial gulf between the individual and the social points of view. Those who have met the workpeople know this well.

What is proposed—and here we are not concerned with the administrative details—"is the establishment of Tutorial Classes beyond the limits of the University. "The Committee recommends

"That it is desirable to organize systematic teaching in certain selected centres extending over a period of not less than two years.

"That this teaching should take the form (a) of lectures (with classes), but more particularly (b) of class work as distinct from lectures, each class to consist, as a rule, of not more than thirty students.

"That it is desirable that in the future qualified students from the Tutorial Classes should be enabled regularly and easily to pass into residence at Oxford, and to continue their studies there.

"That the teachers be given an academic status in Oxford by being employed regularly as lecturers for a College or for the University.

"That a Standing Committee of the University Extension Delegacy be constituted to deal with the education of workpeople both in and outside Oxford, whose duty it shall be to take steps for the carrying out of the recommendations made in this report, and to take all other steps for establishing or strengthening any connection between Oxford and the working classes which may from time to time appear desirable.

"That the Committee consist of not less than five, nor more than seven representatives of the University nominated by the University Extension Delegacy, and of an equal number of representatives of working-class institutions and organizations, appointed through the Workers' Educational Association.

"That the Committee have its own Secretaries, and conduct all correspondence between Oxford and working-class centres where tutorial classes are established, or lectures given under its auspices."

This Committee, be it noted, is already in existence, and has already appointed teachers under the scheme.

"We recommend the establishment by the University of a Special Department, whose duty it shall be to collect information as to educational movements in this country and abroad, to enquire into the needs of new classes of students, and to issue reports from time to time. We think such a Department would render valuable service in guiding the policy of the University and Colleges upon all matters which concern the Secondary Schools, and other parts of our educational system, especially those affecting the working classes."

Such is the scheme. Workpeople who are thoroughly determined to work seriously should have, it is proposed, university teachers and university prospects, in classes not exceeding thirty; they are to study subjects bearing on citizenship. The teacher is to live in the midst of them, know them and their work, and as far as possible, their homes too. It is thought—and the thought is just enough—that the profit will be mutual, that the teacher will vivify his own abstractions, and know the life of practice more fully, while for the pupils he will try so to order and arrange and supplement their very real knowledge as to make it "eusynoptic." Democracy and philosophy are to learn, each of the other, and the distinction between the academic and the working-class point of view, where it appears and endures, is to be made a difference between real men and real minds, rather than a difference between environments.

For this scheme there can be nothing but praise. It demands for its success that working men should be keen; they are known to be so. It demands also that the right teacher should be chosen for them—and this is a matter of no slight difficulty, for the teacher must be a man at once of high ability and of deep sympathy. He should command at least the respect of scholars, and at the same time the friendship of workers. The Report puts the case so very clearly that we can venture on a rather lengthy quotation:—

"We attach the greatest importance to the selection of the teacher or tutor, and consequently to the precise definition of his duties and status. His first duty will naturally be to assist the class in its course of study by the delivery of lectures, and we propose that he should give twenty-four lectures per session to each class. At the same time the delivery of lectures will not be the most important or difficult part of his work, nor that which will absorb most of his time. He will be required to become personally acquainted with the students under him, and, if possible, to see them outside the class, in their homes or elsewhere. In dealing with their papers, he must not only "correct" them, but must make full comments and criticism, and supplement these by interviewing the students individually, or in groups of three or four together. He should find time to guide their reading, appreciate and sympathize with the point of view from which they approach the subject, and, in short, act as far as possible the part of an Oxford tutor who is dealing with honour students in such a subject as History or Philosophy. He should assist the local body in organizing a preparatory class to lead up to the tutorial class, and help the teacher of this preparatory class with his advice. Finally, he should, as far as possible, make himself acquainted with the industrial conditions of the locality or localities in which he is stationed."

"It is obvious that if these duties are to be adequately performed, the teacher must be a man with sound academic qualifications. He is not required to address large audiences, but he must have sufficient self-possession to be able to express himself clearly to critical listeners, and to handle the questions put to him in the hour's discussion which follows the lectures. But he must not only be able to guide and stimulate his students; he should also have sufficient knowledge of working-class life and habits of thought to be able to understand the lines along which students have reached their conclusions, and see the unstated assumptions from which their questions start. It too often happens that a teacher with a good knowledge of his subject and the gift of expression fails almost entirely when confronted with a working-class audience, because he has started from a point of view so different from theirs as to make it impossible for the minds of students and teachers ever to come into real contact with each other. The things he regards as important have seemed to them trivial, and he has never really touched the problems upon which their minds are exercised, perhaps never read the books through which alone they have approached the subject. Every teacher of economics, for example, who has lectured to a working-class audience, must have been for the moment at a loss when confronted with unfamiliar formulae on the lips of men to whom they seem exactly to answer all their problems. In the same way, working-class audiences who listen for the first time to economics being taught by a University man have an uncomfortable feeling of being played with by a clever dialectician."

"It is desirable, therefore, that in appointing the teacher of the tutorial classes, attention should be paid, not only (a) to their academic qualifications, as at present, but also (b) to their experience of industrial conditions among the working class. Though we do not desire to lay down any general conditions of appointment to be universally applied, we think that, as a rule, teachers should be selected from those who have had previous experience of teaching workpeople either at Ruskin College, or at Social Settlements, or in connexion with the Workers' Educational Association, or in some other way, and should satisfy the standing committee that they possess the desired qualifications."

There can be no doubt whatever that, if the right teachers be forthcoming, this scheme contains tremendous possibilities. The suggestion that they should be University Teachers as well as

Class Tutors, is a brilliant one, for it will ensure that they keep in touch with two worlds, the world of learning and the world of work, and that they impart to either world the lesson learnt in the other. At the same time, the climax of the scheme is the plan for the admission of chosen workpeople to Oxford, and this is obviously the point round which criticism surges. The objection from the academic party can perhaps be safely put on one side, but that from certain representatives of organised labour cannot be disregarded. In point of fact, it is part of the larger question of University Reform, but it admits discussion on its merits. Even so, those who know the student world of the university must confess that the difficulties are exaggerated. It is a very democratic world—a real man is accepted on his manhood, in most colleges, by most "sets." There have been workpeople in the university for a generation. How many of them can point to serious "snobbishness"? The men who are worth knowing will not patronize but welcome workpeople; with the others we have no concern.

But will the workman himself be "spoiled"? Will he forsake the fellowship of his "class," forget his parentage, perpetuate the "ladder" instead of demonstrating the case for the "highway"? It may be there is some danger of this, but it surely is a slight danger. Only that workman who was worth little to his fellows at the beginning will be worth less to them at the end of a course. Such as it is, it is rather the danger of a little education, along certain existing lines, than that of a determination and effort to learn, enduring over a longer period, occupied with deeper thought, and inspired by the will to serve. The Committee itself was aware of the danger, and perhaps even exaggerated it. Full provision is made that the character of the student shall be known, and that his own friends shall approve his opportunity, and that he shall return to service with and for them.

"We have already expressed an opinion that the demand for University education made by workpeople is not so much for facilities to enable their children to compete successfully with members of other classes for positions of social dignity and emolument, as to enable workmen to fulfil with greater efficiency their duties which they owe to their own class, and, as members of their class, to the whole nation. There can therefore be no doubt that, with some exceptions, the working-class students who go to Oxford will at the end of their two years of study return to the towns from which they came, and continue to work at their trades. To those who do this their education will be a means, not only of developing their own powers of enjoyment, but of enabling them to exercise an influence for good in the social life of their factory and town."

"At the same time there is a large and rapidly increasing number of positions of great responsibility which are held by workpeople, and for the most efficient discharge of which it is essential that they should have a means of obtaining the best education which the country can offer. The working-class demand that higher education should not separate the student from his own people must not be taken to imply that it is desired that he should necessarily return to the bench or machine at which he worked before going to Oxford, but that he should in one capacity or another use his education in the service of his fellows."

There follows an analysis of the working-class organizations of the country.

"Most of these organizations employ paid officers, men who are daily discharging duties of the utmost responsibility and delicacy, and which make demands on their judgment of men and knowledge of economic and political principles as great as, or greater than, those made on the Civil Servant in India or this country. The district secretary of the engineers or boiler-makers who is met by economic arguments as to the effect of machinery, arguments which he sometimes cannot easily answer, but which yet in the face of his daily experience he cannot accept; the textile operative who is required to gauge the results of foreign competition and its bearing on hours and wages; every official who has at once to convince educated opponents of the justice of his contentions, and to persuade large bodies of men to postpone immediate gains to the higher good of the community, knows that he and his class are hampered in their decisions by their lack of knowledge of economic science, and of the experience of other countries and other ages. The education which Oxford can give by broadening his knowledge and strengthening his judgment, would make him at once a more efficient servant of his own society, and a more potent influence on the side of industrial peace. The working classes are quick to recognize the advantage of being officered by men of education."

The last two appendices in the report are very important. The first gives suggestions for the study of literature and history and citizenship, using these words in their largest significations. The second is little short of an inspiration. It bears the signatures of A. E. Zimmern, a Fellow and Tutor of New College, and J. M. Mactavish, a member of the Independent Labour Party and of the Town Council at Portsmouth. It consists of "suggestions compiled by two members of the Committee on political subjects of current interest, not with the object of dogmatizing, but in order to illustrate the manner in which such subjects can be approached in the light of general ideas, and to suggest questions which may lead on to further study and reflection."

Among the questions suggested are many that cut deep :—

- "Is not the use of the intellect in politics enervating?"
- "What are the differences between a good candidate and a good member?"
- "What are the limits of publicity and secrecy in government deliberations?"
- "Should the elementary school be made the school of all classes?"
- "Is competition the best stimulus for new ideas?"

Deliberation on these abstractions of principle is far from useless. It may not determine particular cases, but it does form the political philosophy of thinking men, and so influence elections and government. The growing importance of municipal citizenship makes it necessary that some such questions as these should be considered, not, of course, with any expectation of their solution.

It should be noticed that "it is intended that the whole scheme shall benefit the education of working women as much as the education of working men. There are several women students in the classes now at work." This is a matter of importance, and we understand that in the general work of the W.E.A. the women



participate with the men in whatever is done, as well as have certain classes for themselves. It is hardly necessary to do more than mention this, of course, though it is as well that Oxford should recognize that in the class demanding higher education the women stand on the same footing, and shall enjoy the same advantages, and earn for the same work the same recognition as the men. Perhaps no educational document of recent years suggests such large possibilities for the future. If what it represents is actual, and what it advises is practical (and it is all but certain that such is the case), we have a new social and educational power. In a sense both labour and university are on their trial. The one has to prove the sincerity and the permanence of her demand: the other must prove her sense of responsibility and justice, her consciousness of high endeavour, and what is perhaps hardest yet most just to say, her teachableness. There can be no question as to the need, among the students of a cloistered economics and a cloistered philosophy, for living knowledge of economic conditions and of the majority's modes of thought. Exact knowledge can be got from books and tables of statistics. Living knowledge can only come from sympathy and friendship. At the same time the hand-worker needs to learn to rise at times above particulars into the world of ideas, to take larger views, and to envisage present-day minutiae in the long-drawn pageant of history. If these two, the scholar and the workman, can be introduced to one another, and cement a fellowship, we can hope for much.

F. W. KOLTHAMMER.

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### NOTE ON TOWN PLANNING.\*

#### ABSTRACT.

#### I.

Mr. Burns' Town Planning Bill contains far more than a contribution to the housing problem, more than provision for the better planning of suburban extensions. Its serious consideration raises the largest questions of modern life. It compels everyone who is in any way responsible for the future of his town—and who is not?—to enquire into his town—past, present, and possible. What has been its particular origin and its development through past vicissitudes and recent phases of growth up to the present? What of this in all its aspects—beginning with its geographical situation and region, the advantages and disadvantages of this, its position and relief, its communications by land and water, its natural resources and the mode of utilisation of them, by industry and commerce? Of its population, too, we have to know far more than the mere numbers—all that existing census, directory and registrar, town clerk, health officer, and other colleagues can supply, and more.

\* Abstract of a paper "On Town Planning and City Design—in Sociology and in Citizenship," read to the Sociological Society, October 27th, 1908.



A Town Plan, too, is a forecast—one of the most vast and comprehensive forecasts imaginable. How then shall anyone consent to, much less draft or criticise, such great general schemes of his town's future as a whole without investigation into the growth of its parts and elements in detail? Thus his enquiries must go on, ever enlarging; correspondingly demanding fresh knowledge of details of all kinds. Thus he must ask the geologist what of subsoil? the meteorologist what of climate? prevailing winds? and so on; and such questions of natural science are but simple compared to the enquiries he must put before the social economist.

The making of a Town Plan is thus no simple matter of rule and square, capable of being sketched out offhand for the Streets or Buildings Committee of each Town Council, and then settled for execution—as the Draft Bill as yet too lightly permits—as soon as it can get through an inspection at Whitehall. It is no mere matter of civil engineering even at its ablest, nor as some think, of architecture—homely and stately—of park-making, avenued and free. It is not something which can be simply constructed by a municipal official, and inspected by a government one. It must be the expression of all the elements, all the processes, all the aspects of a unique social individuality, and must either express a social progress towards the types of City life which are the supreme blossoms of civilisation in history, or else embody, as our present towns so largely do, tendencies which are the very opposite of all these, and so reproduce the past's decay.

Model buildings may be piled up at the centres, and new suburbs may be patched on at the circumference, and often both with advantage: yet Town Planning is more than any such immediately necessary Town Patching: it begins with Civic Survey, and it works towards City Design. But Civic Survey is the very stuff of the Social Sciences, which are all lagging until this advances anew, while City Design involves the growing co-ordination of all the arts—arts of utility and of beauty alike, of health and of education, of material and moral progress. It is statesmanship in the concrete: the day of abstraction and oratory is ending, and the lucid grasp of the one, the power and passion of the other, have now to be applied to a task more than Augean, more than Promethean—that of Amphion, that of the City-builders of old.

## II.

Every new Bill raises with it its own crop of sociological questions, each new Act opens up specific opportunities and dangers; but this Planning Bill is exceptional, in our generation at least, as peculiarly arousing all the questions of social life and of civic action at once; of raising in short the whole issues of Civilisation, and these in a form which tends peculiarly to determine that of the opening future. The opportunity is thus one for sociology to use to the full, and this not merely towards the extension of its own field, but even in the interests of the preliminary sciences also. Hardly anyone nowadays knows or realises the

contempt and opposition, both in Parliament and out of it, and above all by the self-styled "practical man," to the national adoption of the Geological Survey begun a century ago and more by a few individual geologists, mostly members of the Geological Society. But this soon justified itself, through a gain alike to science and to practice, beyond its promises, beyond all statistical reckoning. It is now the turn of the as yet isolated workers in social and civic survey, and of the Sociological and kindred societies to take up the analogous place upon the fighting line, and to press upon our communities, alike urban and rural, and their representatives in Municipalities, County Councils and Parliament, the need and urgency of organising and unifying the Sociological Survey of Great Britain, in town and country alike.

This interaction and interdependence of town and country has lately been pointed out by Sir Horace Plunkett in his Presidential Address to the Agricultural Section of the British Association at Dublin; and the urgency of such a twofold enquiry, thus recognised by one of the most practical of living statesmen, must soon become more widely known.

It is therefore time for both sociologist and citizen to be preparing to utilise their opportunities. First the actual opportunity afforded by the Town Planning Bill. In this respect the Cities Committee of the Sociological Society are preparing a detailed summary giving particulars of the methods of City Survey, and are submitting this, condensed into a Schedule of Enquiries necessary to the preparation of a Town Planning Scheme, to those responsible for the present Bill in Parliament, and to municipal bodies.

### III.

Furthermore this Cities Committee has been able to arrange in the first place through Museum Curators, Librarians, etc., and now also through other correspondents, sometimes Mayors or Councillors, for the holding of temporary Exhibitions of such materials as are already in existence or can speedily be brought together, *e.g.*, maps, plans, relief-models, engravings, and photographs, and original designs and objects illustrative of the past, present and possible development of various cities. At Leicester and elsewhere preparations for such an exhibition are well advanced, and experience already shows that the committee necessary for this work also becomes a recruiting agency alike for sociological enquiries and for active citizenship.

The city counsellor thus increasingly appears beside the councillor; and while these are happily united often in the same person, it is evident that in the work of such civic committees there opens a new field of training and activity from which Councils may be recruited, and to which retiring mayors and members may also usefully return with detailed experience and with broadened views.

The exhibitions thus being arranged also obviously afford germs for a Civic Museum where this does not exist, or enrichment for collections already begun. The fuller utilisation and development of museums as homes not only of past learning and art, but of these in fuller interaction with the city's life, is thus no unrealisable Utopia.

## IV.

Yet we need more than local exhibitions, city by city. Our island cities, like American ones, have for the most part grown up in age-long isolation from the great and beautiful cities of the Continent, for the widened culture which our innumerable tourists have brought back from these has rarely been applied towards their stimulus and improvement. Yet the opposite difficulty has long been arising here, and is now obvious in America, that of a too crude and hasty adoption of city plans, inspired, not by local life, by love or knowledge, but by imitation of the costly and meretricious pomposities of great continental capitals. Haussmann's Paris, the Ecole des Beaux Arts, modern Berlin and Vienna have in this respect a widening influence upon their annually increasing multitude of visitors from America and Britain; and already the visitor to almost any important city of these islands must see this influence. For this increasingly threatens us with dreary perspectives and conventional ornament, relieved only by occasional extravagances, and is thus, as with the least artistic sense and training any one can see for himself, even uglier than the as yet prevalent industrial squalor and garishness of our poorer quarters or even than the featureless monotony of our respectable ones. In a word, an immediate danger in America, and in Britain also, is to repeat the mistakes of the French city improvers of the Second Empire, and the corresponding developments of Berlin, Strasburg, etc.

For this new danger also there is one remedy, and only one—that of instituting the Civic Survey. For its immediate result is to bring out into clear and public view the individuality of its town—manifest from its position and from its past (and this even in so-called new cities) and still latent, however incrustated by neglect or overlaid by importation. That each townlet, still more each city, has its own personality is no doubt too much forgotten, both there and at its dominant capital. Yet that this uniqueness of character is not less but more defined than in the individual is manifest, and he who in any city forgets or never discovers how deeply his city has stamped itself upon his whole mental experience and outlook is thereby the more plainly its very cockney; and there are such cockneys in every city.

The problem for solution, which each city has increasingly to face, is thus to conserve and to express its Local Individuality, its uniqueness and character, yet to reconcile this with a full and increasing participation in the material appliances, and the immaterial advantages of other cities, in short at once to live its own life and this more and more intensely; yet to be also in the great world, and this more and more fully also.

The essential problem is thus to discern the distinctive character and spirit of our city, small or great—Chelsea or Westminster, Dunfermline or Edinburgh, Galway or Dublin; and to collaborate and plan and work towards a City Design which shall increasingly express and develop all that is best in this; and here, as in individual life, we may best correct faults by developing qualities. Town Plans which omit this individual point of view—and where as yet has this been sufficiently considered?—are not even adequate

as Town Patches, and may soon be Town Calamities, arresting development by stifling local character.

This difficulty can also be met by correspondingly farther extension of Civic Survey and Civic Service, but now not only individual and regional, but also comparative, comprehensive. Thus a great American seaport would not copy the modern defects of Berlin if it knew the best, say, of Hamburg and Lubeck, old and new; nor would Edinburgh and many another of our cities have sacrificed so many of its main historic assets so lightly had it been in adequate touch with Nuremberg or Rothenburg, with which it might well have rivalled.

## V.

The local Civic Exhibition has thus a second use, that of preparing a smaller exhibit of its essentials and of lending that to an Inter-Civic Exhibition—national, and still better international—such as the *Congrès et Exposition de l'Art Public* in Paris in 1900, or such as has since been held more than once in Germany, as also at St. Louis in 1904, and in each case with success and result, should now be held in London; or failing that, say in Edinburgh or in Manchester. Finally, each local exhibition has a third task, that of selecting from the large inter-civic collections such material as may be of service to itself, as for example or for warning.

The creation of such a "Towneries" is thoroughly adapted to London, and would be for its interest in every sense, while its impulse to citizenship, here and throughout the land, the empire, the world, could not but be great. Such an exhibition, with its presentment of Cities Beautiful, ancient and modern, past, present, and future, might well be the most attractive, and the most directly and widely useful of International Exhibitions.

Town Planning would thus increasingly be stimulated as City Design; while Sociology would be advanced into a concrete and comparative science of the actually most important and characteristic Societies—Cities—which it has too long practically overlooked. Furthermore, all would bear fruit in a revival of citizenship, which needs "no mean city" for its due expression.

P. GEDDES.

## REVIEWS.

## MUNICIPAL DECADENCE AND REFORM.

English Local Government: The Manor and the Borough. By Sidney and Beatrice Webb. 2 vols. 25s. net. Longmans & Co.

In choosing to devote themselves and their staff of assistants for eight years to collecting, sifting and elucidating all the available data relating to English local government from 1689 to 1835 Mr. and Mrs. Webb would seem to have undertaken a history of the decline and fall of local government in England. The subject has never before been thoroughly examined, though it well deserves the attention of politicians and sociologists. A philosopher quite ignorant of English history will learn with astonishment that a people, whose freedom (according to a poet-laureate) has slowly broadened down from precedent to precedent, nevertheless allowed their municipal councils, which had reached a fair measure of vigour and autonomy in the 16th century, to relapse into the mould and corruption of the Napoleonic age. Even those who are well read in our history are rather puzzled to understand why the epoch between Henry the Eighth and William of Orange should have been marked by such an expansion of the power of the House of Commons and by such a contraction of local self-government in the English towns. While parliament was crushing the king the king was corrupting and stifling the municipal boroughs. Unfortunately Mr. and Mrs. Webb begin at 1689, when the active work of corrupting and destroying our local self-governing institutions was consummated. The glorious revolution tied the royal hands; but the mischief was already done; and a Select Parliament, determined to hold fast by its own privileges and pocket boroughs, its lucrative sinecures, its ample and various opportunities of jobbery, and its elaborate system of mutual bribery and corruption, was neither fitted nor disposed to undertake the restoration of municipal self-government. If the select bodies, which had inherited the names, dignities, and perquisites of municipal corporations, were swept away and genuinely representative councils revived by a fresh application of democratic principles, what would happen to parliamentary boroughs? An unreformed parliament could not and would not re-establish local self-government. And so it happened that the reform of municipal corporations had to wait until after the reform of the House of Commons. The great franchise bill of 1832 was followed by the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835. Thus, it will be seen, the subject chosen by Mr. and Mrs. Webb is not really "the decline and fall" (for the decline occurred before their period begins) but the decadence of English Municipal Councils and other local institutions. These two volumes are concerned only with Manors and Boroughs, and as the manorial courts, even at the beginning of the eighteenth century, were obsolescent and their

functions comparatively trivial—for the Justices of the Peace ruled the counties—it is permissible to concentrate attention upon the municipal corporations. Of these about two hundred existed in 1689, though many of them only deserved the name because they possessed some of the external marks and kept up some of the forms and ceremonies that had once been coupled with real functions of local government. A common seal, a Mayor, aldermen, councillors, a borough bench of justices, a beadle or two, a town hall perhaps or a market—these and other distinguishing marks might enable one to say that such and such a town or village was incorporated and that such and such another was not. But no one, from the Commissioners appointed in 1833 to report on the subject to Mr. and Mrs. Webb, has ever been able to frame a satisfactory definition of a Municipal Corporation. The great bulk of these Corporations in the period under review “exercised their jurisdictions over insignificant populations, in what were scarcely more than villages, whilst some of the most notorious among them were already at that date nothing but archaic survivals kept alive only by their privilege of returning members of parliament. To the historian of parliamentary representation the latter are of interest. To the historian of local government they are irrelevant.” Our authors, therefore, being unable of course to examine the individual charter and history of each of these corporations, have selected for special examination and description the municipal government of living and growing urban centres where there were duties to be fulfilled and problems to be solved, though they have included among these “types” the small port of Penzance in Cornwall and the small market of Morpeth in Northumberland. “But we have taken most of our examples from the great ports, such as Bristol and Liverpool; from the lesser ports and fishing havens, such as Ipswich and Berwick-on-Tweed; from the ancient industrial centres, such as Norwich and Coventry; and from inland towns destined to great manufacturing development, such as Leeds and Leicester. And we have reserved for our most exhaustive treatment the greatest and most important of them all, the Corporation of the City of London, which from historical, political and economic standing alike, sums up and exemplifies in itself all the factors that constituted the Municipal Corporation of the eighteenth century.”

Here is certainly a fine, and, at first sight, a most attractive field for the historian of society—the great towns of England from the Restoration to the Revolution. We think of that wonderful chapter at the beginning of Macaulay's history where the towns of England as they were at the outbreak of the Civil war are brought visibly before the eye of the mind. But if the reader expects to enjoy these chapters as he enjoyed that he will be disappointed. The imagination of a great artist stored Macaulay's capacious memory with everything that had colour and life. He never overloaded his canvass with details that would have distracted the eye and spoiled the picture. Mr. and Mrs. Webb do not fail in comparison, because they do not enter for the race. The prize they seek to win is that awarded to the conscientious and scientific investigator who excludes what is not within his strictly limited subject however thrilling, and includes whatever belongs and pertains thereto however dull. The style and method of our authors may be illustrated by an extract from the section of Penzance, a singularly favourable specimen of corporate administration:—

“The little group of twenty-one of the principal fishermen and traders who dwelt round the harbour of Penzance, almost at the extremity of the



County of Cornwall, had been incorporated by a charter of James the First in 1614 under the title of Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the Borough of Penzance, which was then described as 'an ancient vill and port.' Lying 'snug and warm' towards the sea it was shut off by a high hill all round the side to the landward, and its little community appears early to have won a position of complete independence from the Lord of the Manor of Alverton and the officers of the extensive parish of Madron. . . . In 1663 the borough was made a 'coinage town' or place where tin was 'coined'—that is stamped as having paid duty—a mark of royal favour which tended to render it one of the principal ports of shipment of what was then the most important product of the county. In 1689 we find practically the whole government of this flourishing little port, of which the population may probably have been two or three thousand, in the hands of its municipal corporation, which owned the pier and the market, appointed all the officers and was responsible not only for the Gaol, the Watch and the Water Supply, but also for paving and cleansing the streets, doing whatever maintenance of the highways was required and even paying the expenses of [Anglican] worship. . . . The government was in the hands of the Mayor for the time being and the eight other Aldermen, the twelve assistants known apparently as "Little Aldermen" being summoned only at the annual election of Mayor and whenever a vacancy in their own number had to be filled by cooption."

During the eighteenth century the close corporation built a pier, constructed a reservoir, erected lamp-posts, supported a grammar school, paid a curate and raised the Mayor's allowance to £100 a year. After 1820 they got into financial difficulties; but there seems to have been no personal corruption, and on the whole Penzance stands out as the brightest example of local government by a close corporation.

It is when we turn to the larger municipalities that we begin to realise the pitiable plight from which our towns were rescued by the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835. The Leeds Corporation rigidly exclusive of Whigs and Dissenters, provided the town with a bench of magistrates, and that is about all. After 1750, local services such as street paving and lighting and water supply were obtained by private Acts of Parliament, and the appointment of a locally elected body of commissioners. On p. 422 Mr. and Mrs. Webb write, I think, in far too complimentary a style of "the advantages given to Leeds" by the "honest dignified and absolutely pure administration" of "the little knot of wealthy Tory Churchmen who formed the Corporation." I am sure that a similar body of Whigs and Dissenters would have found it hard to earn this historical commendation, and indeed one can show from the context that the writers have allowed historical partisanship to bias judgment. For on the same page one reads:—"The Town Council was indeed *fully justified* in its dignified protest to the Municipal Corporation Commission that the Leeds Corporation had been proved free from all taint of corruption and malversation, and that the magistracy appointed under its charter has ever performed its duties honestly, fearlessly and independently *to the satisfaction of the inhabitants at large.*" The words italicised seem to me to be sufficiently refuted by the following passage from the very next page:—

"There had, by 1815, gradually come to be a number of residents of wealth, capacity and energy, who found themselves excluded from any share in the government of their own borough. Their resentment

at their exclusion was heightened by the contemporary increase in the Poor Rates, by the restrictive regulations required in a rapidly growing town, and by the traditional secrecy of the magistrates' proceedings. Between 1818 and 1833 the excluded classes were ably led by men inspired in the faith that those who paid the rates ought as a matter of principle to control the expenditure of those rates. We have already told the tale in our own chapter on the Parish of the Swamping of the Vestry by the Radical Dissenters, the election of Churchwardens by their own party, and their successful struggle with the magistracy to get control over poor relief and highway administration. In 1826, after an Amending Act, they dominated the Paving Commissioners, the Mayor and Aldermen gradually ceasing to attend."

It is therefore clear, from the facts lucidly stated by Mr. and Mrs Webb on page 423, that the Leeds Corporation was not "fully justified" (p. 422) in declaring that it had performed its duties "to the satisfaction of the inhabitants at large." If the words used had been "to the satisfaction of a small minority of the inhabitants" they would have been true; as it is they are false. How wide was the dissatisfaction and how deep the discontent is proved by the fact that a majority of the inhabitants at large elected Dissenters to serve as Churchwardens and Church Overseers, and by the further fact that after the Municipal Corporations Act had converted the Town Council from a close into an elective body the Radical Dissenters controlled it for thirty years.

To see the close corporations at their worst the readers of this volume must turn to the account of Coventry and Bristol (then the two dirtiest towns in England), and for the association of moral and political depravity with commercial enterprise and efficiency to the record of Liverpool, where the corporation spent enormous sums (contributed mainly by Quakers and Dissenters) in the defence of the slave trade and in subsidising the local branches of the Established Church. Yet such was the prevailing sloth and corruption in municipal affairs that Mr. and Mrs. Webb describe the unreformed corporation of Liverpool as "an energetic, large minded and, on the whole, popular body"; for, while it spent £10,000 out of the corporation funds in opposing Clarkson and Wilberforce, and £10,000 a year in building new churches, decorating old ones, endowing clergymen and supplying the orthodox with sacramental plate and wine, the Town Councillors were large minded enough to spend part of the public income "not on themselves personally, but on the widening of streets, the provision of markets and the maintenance of public buildings." Moreover, even in regard to the slave trade they are excused because "they firmly believed that the very existence of their town depended on its continuance." And we are told accordingly that they "came very well out of the searching investigation" of 1833 and may be said to have "acted up to the highest moral standard of the time." Surely the highest moral standard of the time was far higher than Mr. and Mrs. Webb are willing to allow, after their immersion in the depressing records of these demoralised municipal cliques. It is unnecessary to do more than read this volume and to contrast the unreformed with the reformed corporations to understand what a vast debt England owes to the Philosophical Radicals and to the great Whig Statesmen who carried in the teeth of such widespread opposition the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835. Strange to say our authors do not seem to enjoy this conclusion—the chief one that can be drawn from their profound and comprehensive researches.

F. W. HIRST.

## PERSONALITY AND EVOLUTION.

**INDIVIDUALISM AND AFTER.** The Herbert Spencer Lecture, delivered at Oxford on the 29th May, 1908. By Benjamin Kidd. The Clarendon Press. 1s.

**THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERTY.** By E. F. B. Fell. Methuen & Co. 5s. net,

In this lecture Mr. Kidd represents the tendency of our time as consisting in a general movement of the Western mind towards a more organic conception of Society. Individualism—social, political and economic—was the necessary outcome and expression of the whole revolt against authority, supported by biological theories which exalted the self-sufficiency of the individual. But was the Spencerian application to society of the theory of evolution “distorted by the attempt to interpret both evolution and social life through the theories of individualism?” Or, to put the question in another way, have we still to recognize that this individualism has “no final meaning in itself, and that its real significance lies in the fact that it is the doctrine of a transition period, preparatory to a more important stage upon which we are already entering?”

An affirmative answer seems, in the first place, to be indicated by the existing tendencies in the State or in all States. The processes of Parliaments are everywhere, even against the will of parties, adding to State functions. But secondly, and far more important, there is discernible everywhere a slow and gradual movement of the social mind towards a more organic conception of society. This is shown—probably unconsciously—in the change of economic view and practice, with regard to labour and capital alike; in “the assertion of the passion for nationalism against the cosmopolitan ideals of the early Victorian period;” and in the increasing perception of “the importance in the evolution of the world of the ideas which make society more organic in the sense of subordinating present to future.” For it must be admitted that “the ruling meaning of the social process lies in the causes which are rendering society increasingly organic by subordinating the units to the meaning of the whole and the present to the meaning of the future.”

To put the answer in a more popular form: if the past age can be called the age of the Americanisation of the world, “the next age will probably be also the age of the Germanisation of the world.” And the conclusion thus reached is regarded as justifying the view that Spencer’s position was really the culmination of an old order and the starting point of a new development.

In the lecture of which the above is a rough outline Mr. Kidd has certainly traced, in a very interesting way, some tendencies in the social process which most of us have to admit, perhaps reluctantly, are dominant at present. But his treatment is open to one objection. His attention seems to be fixed upon the Social process as something which completely dominates the human individual. It is true that he finds the significance of the process in “the ideas and integrating conceptions of the human mind, hitherto mainly represented in the great systems of religion . . . that furnish the principles round which the process of social evolution centres.” But it appears nevertheless to be *mere* evolution: “for it is not so much the human mind which is constructing the social process; it is the social process which is constructing the human mind.”

Now this view does not touch that transcendental individualism which is as much opposed to the individualism of Spencer and his followers as to the socialism (organic or other) by which the latter is now being superseded. If we turn to a book like Mr. Fell's "Foundations of Liberty" we find a position which Mr. Kidd's arguments cannot shake because they do not touch it at all. This position Mr. Fell calls "Personalism." It is based upon the assumption that man is not chiefly or merely a social animal. His social nature and relations do not exhaust his meaning, for these are subordinate to his extra-social or divine relations. Consequently all social action is relative to the claims of the true person, or to the unfolding content of a personality which is essentially more than the individuality of a mere social being. By this content all neighbour-relations are ultimately determined, and social evolution is the material process which the personality uses for the fulfilment of its own purposes. And the subordination of unit to whole and to process is only a mode of conditioning, necessary of course up to a point, but requiring to be kept in bounds by the demands of the person for its essential liberty. Mr. Fell does, we think, carry his argument too far in the direction of denying the compatibility with the conception of liberty of much which seems, as Mr. Kidd says, to be a necessary tendency of the social process. That is to say, Mr. Fell is biased in favour of certain empty conditions of liberty as against an organic social dependence which is probably itself a condition and not a hindrance.

If it be retorted that Mr. Fell's view rests upon a claim which is invalid, and is merely an instance of the religious impulse exalting itself above the social process which produced it and made it what it is, then the answer is obvious. Even putting aside his assumption of divine relationship as the chief element in personality, the fact remains that personality does actually raise its head against the social process, and conditions the latter in conformity with its own requirements as a personality. This is the admission grudgingly made by Huxley. It is, further, an admission which must in some form be made by every thinker who finds in ideals or purposes the true forces of social change. And this amounts to saying that the increasing organic conception on which Mr. Kidd insists is only one side of the paradox of social development, which, on its other side, must admit an increasing assertion of true individual liberty against the claims of the necessarily (and rightly) tightening bonds of social control.

E. J. URWICK.

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"THE INWARD LIGHT." By H. Fielding Hall. Macmillan & Co., London, 1908.

Readers of Mr. Fielding Hall's "The Soul of a People"—and they have been many—will be glad to return with him to Burma, its scenery and its faith. The new volume is conceived on a somewhat different plane from its predecessor, but it naturally shares many of the same qualities. There is the easy limpid style, the very simplicity of which, however, tends to become mannered. There is the profound sympathy with the life of the people, the loving intimate familiarity with their homes, their occupations, their festivals, their sufferings. More exquisite than before, perhaps, is the series of nature-pictures, the little scenes so delicately set in harmonies of river and field, woodland and mountain, which are finely biased with great themes of thought. Only very rarely

does some phrase like "the day died in scarlet agony," applied to a sunset, jar by undue vehemence. The story of the book is extremely simple. An English official is thrown from his pony and breaks his leg. He is found unconscious and is carried to a little Buddhist monastery. There the monks tend him—there is a lovely chapter afterwards on "That great Gift of Charity"—and he stays long with them. From away down the river Gallio and the Doctor come to see him. He will not listen to proposals for removal. He remains, observes, ponders, and learns to love the ways of Nature and the simple lives of men. A score of chapters tell the slow education of his soul.

The book is a study of Buddhism as Mr. Fielding Hall interprets it. The Western reader is at once at a disadvantage for he does not possess Mr. Hall's rich experience. Mr. Hall candidly admits that when he wrote his first book he "thought the creed said one thing and the people believed another." He thinks differently now; but he can only explain the change of view on general grounds. "I know now that this is never so. All the beliefs of a people—any people—are a whole." He protests against the isolation in which Buddhism is treated by European scholars as though students like Oldenberg or Rhys Davids had not laboriously sought to realise the complex of beliefs out of which it sprang. And by insisting on viewing it as complement to Hinduism, rather than as a reaction against it, he gives a picture of it which may be true to modern Burma (though that is not easy to believe), but which cannot be accepted as a real presentation of the Founder's meaning. Mr. Hall's main thesis is that Buddhism teaches the presence of a boundless immanent Life forever flowing through the universe, and the slow progress of the soul through a series of existences to ultimate union with it. This life manifests itself in all forms of beauty, happiness, truth, righteousness. That there are conceptions analogous to these in some forms of Buddhism, is no doubt the case. But the noble figures of the Buddhas of Infinite Life and Infinite Light (Amitâyus and Amitâbha) do not belong to the early faith, and are entirely inconsistent with the famous Four Truths which are the basis of doctrine in the Burmese Pali Canon. There is a pathetic conversation with an old Burman warrior who has come out to choose a spot in which to bury his dead wife. "When you can find that," he says to the Englishman, "which is the sea, the sky, the air, the earth and all things, in which is king and soldier and monk, which is both man and woman, which is the universal, then will it contain all truth and do all things." Gotama however, never talked about "the Universal." That was one of the ontological conceptions which he strove to dismiss from view, in order to concentrate the believer's aim on the practice of righteousness. And it may be doubted whether a Burman leader of guerilla bands would have talked about it, even in declining years when his wife lay dead in his house.

The fact is that this book really offers an interpretation of the world which the writer has reached after long thought, founded on the general conception of pantheistic immanence. It is expounded with great earnestness and charm. But in reaction against the training of his youth Mr. Hall seems often unjust to the religion of the West. Contravening his own principle that Buddhism must be studied not in its historical texts but in the life of a nation, he persists in identifying Christianity with the limitations of certain official creeds. The variety of aspects of truth presented in a great sacred literature like the Bible is ignored (has Mr.



Hall ever read Psalm CIV ?). And modern religion, under the influence of teachers like Spinoza and Goethe, Wordsworth and Emerson, to name no more, is almost wholly out of sight. One quotation from Wordsworth introduces Chapter IV.; but the whole picture of Western thought in contrast with that of the far East is one-sided. And where Mr. Hall does employ Western analogies, the effect is not always happy. What English student (once more, trained on the Four Truths) will recognise in the Buddha "a Darwin of the Soul"? Of course the author explains that by "Soul" he does not mean something which passes from form to form with conscious memory of its past. But he does mean something which possesses a continuity of evolution till it is blended at last with the light and life of the whole. And that is a conception which does not appear to be within the limits of the faith which affirms that all existence is suffering, and conscious life has, strictly speaking, no duration beyond each passing moment.

J. ESTLIN CARPENTER.

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"MOTHER EARTH: A PROPOSAL FOR THE PERMANENT RECONSTRUCTION OF OUR COUNTRY LIFE." By Montague Fordham; with a preface by J. A. Hobson. Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co., pp. 168. 5s.

Mr. Fordham's essay goes a good way towards meriting Mr. Hobson's commendation of it as a "large, bold, comprehensive, and genuinely organic reform." It endeavours to survey our agricultural industries as a whole; it discusses the questions of wages, prices, transport, rents, the systems of land-holding and employment, and the organisation of credit; it formulates a scheme into which all discernible present developments,—such as co-operative and collectivist trading—are more or less dove-tailed. It also contains proposals for the practical advancement of its ideas by the foundation of Land Clubs, for which the Small Holdings Act, 1907, provides a definite point of departure. The future, which Mr. Fordham adumbrates, is not unlike that sketched by many other thinkers on the subject,—collectively held land, collectively organised credit, transport, and dealing; culture carried on to a considerable extent on a small scale by individuals working within these limits; the countryside fertilised by the influx of a new type of artisans and craftsmen working similarly. Mr. Fordham has done a great deal, considering the brevity and intelligibility of his book, to put fairly before his readers the many steps involved in an attempt to realise this programme.

Mr. Fordham realises more clearly than some land reformers the limits of the benefit which co-operation can bring to agriculture, and consequently he lays more stress on State intervention. The weakest point in his theory is his conception of the "fair price," which it is to fix for products. He makes this almost the key-stone of his collectivist trading. It implies, of course, what a legal minimum wage does not, a closed market, and many of the drawbacks of ordinary Protection. For what does a "fair price" mean? A price which will pay the producer. But what producer? Obviously the answer in Mr. Fordham's head is "the producer in England." The consumers of eggs, butter, bacon, cheese, etc., are, in the last resort, to pay more for those articles in order that they may be produced within these islands. The slurring of this point is the chief grievance we have against the book. It is made worse by phrases such as Mr. Hobson's that "our land is not poor but rich," and Mr.



Fordham's pleas against wasting our "natural wealth." For "poor," "rich," "wealth," are in these applications relative terms. If we can with a given amount of labour in England obtain fewer agricultural products by producing them ourselves than we could by making something else and buying them, then our land *is* poor, in the economic sense, and we are *not* wasting our natural resources if we let it go out of cultivation. The agriculturist, who would have us pay more for our food in order that agriculture may survive, ought frankly to face this. He can only really support his plea by showing that the survival, not merely of country life, but of agricultural occupations, confers special physical or moral benefits which the nation would be wise to pay for. Very likely this can be shown; but Mr. Fordham and his fellows should direct their attention to showing it much more unmistakeably than they do.

R. C. K. ENSOR.

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"REPORT ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN IN THE UNITED KINGDOM."

By Constance Smith. Published for the British Association for Labour Legislation by the Twentieth Century Press, 1908. 6d.

MISS CONSTANCE SMITH has drawn up a most able short report on the Employment of Children, in answer to the list of questions prepared by the International Labour Office. The information is of a depressing and unsatisfactory nature, shewing that on a reasonable estimate, about half-a-million children under 14 are still working for wages, some as half-timers, some under exemption as having passed the required standard, others working early or late or both in home work or in various irregular occupations, such as delivering milk or newspapers, and attending school between times. The question of abolishing half-time and raising the age of exemption from school attendance is now engaging the attention of a Departmental Committee. It is obvious that these questions will involve consideration also of the causes, moral and economic, that impel parents to send their children to work so early. It will also be interesting to discover how far the high death rate of men in certain occupations is a contributory cause of child labour, by compelling families prematurely deprived of the natural bread-winner to depend for support on the earnings of children.

B. L. H.

## OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS.

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### THE GHENT SYSTEM OF INSURANCE AGAINST UNEMPLOYMENT.

[Bulletin of the Bureau of Labour, Washington, May, 1908. Article "Unemployment in European Countries."]

The failure or small measure of success attending the attempts of municipalities in Switzerland and Germany to establish and maintain schemes of public insurance against unemployment gives importance to a system, originating in Ghent in 1900, which has been widely adopted throughout Belgium and is now spreading into other countries. The central idea is that a State or Municipality grants a subsidy to a trade union or other association of workers proportionate to the amount of its unemployed benefit.

The following are the main provisions of the Ghent scheme. The various communes, constituting the City of Ghent and its suburbs, contribute towards a central public fund, administered by a Committee elected every three years. Upon this Committee sit 10 persons appointed by the communal council of Ghent, 3 of whom must be communal councillors and 5 must be members of the workmen's unions or associations: the suburban communes have each a single representative and the burgomaster or his alternative presides.

The municipal fund is devoted, partly to subsidising the trade union benefits, partly to augmenting the individual savings made to meet unemployment among unorganised workers. The subsidy to the unions is to be proportionate to the amount of their unemployed benefit, but "the unemployed benefits shall not be increased by more than 100 per cent., nor be granted to one member for more than 60 days, nor amount to more than 1 franc per day." Strikes and lockouts, illness and other physical incapacity for work are to be excluded from this use of the unemployment fund.

Trade unions or other associations which desire a subsidy "shall report each month the number and amount of benefits which they have paid, and must submit annually the balance sheet of their operations, as well as forward their by-laws and regulations," and the committee shall audit the accounts, pledging themselves not to divulge any information thus obtained.

Workmen or salaried employees not belonging to a trade union can also obtain a subsidy; either as the *bonâ fide* possessors of a saving's account they can obtain the same subsidy to the savings they withdraw for unemployment as is accorded to the trade union benefit, or they may organise a separate system of provision against unemployment which shall be recognised by the committee of the fund.

Any unemployed person refusing employment indicated by the committee shall be excluded from participation in the benefit, the committee placing itself in close communication with public and private agencies for finding employment.

The scheme began operation in August, 1901, and has grown considerably, 33 unions having used its assistance and several thousand men receiving subsidies. In its practical working it is found that trade unions are the only associations making use of it. Every Belgium town over 40,000 inhabitants (except Verviers) had adopted the scheme by last winter, and several of the Provinces are working it. It is being

introduced into France, Denmark, Italy, Switzerland, Scandinavia and Germany. The French modification of the system is interesting. A national fund was voted in 1905 to assist unions having insurance funds, the money being paid to the union itself not to the individual member, on the condition that such union be confined to one trade, have not less than 100 members, that these members pay an out-of-work due, and that the union handles the fund without charge. In 1905 further modifications were made, reducing the qualifying size of a union in certain cases to 50 members, and permitting communal grants to be made in certain classes of communes.

J. A. H.

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#### REPORT ON CHANGES IN RATES OF WAGES AND HOURS OF LABOUR IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1907.

This Report traces the change in the wages of certain classes of workpeople, apart from any change in average earnings. These are affected by variations in the extent and nature of employment, and it is only in the long run that rates of wages and earnings are identical.

Comparative statistics for the years 1896—1907 show that there was (1) a net increase between 1896 and 1900; (2) a net decrease between 1901 and 1905, the former year marking the lowest point; and (3) a substantial rise in 1906 and 1907, which has more than counterbalanced the previous loss. Preliminary figures for the first half of 1908, however, show a net decrease of £16,247 per week, whereas, in the corresponding period of 1907, there was an increase of £115,170.

Between 1904 and 1907 the rise in wages is correlated with a fall in the percentage of unemployment.

The textile and clothing trades are noticeable as maintaining an increase in each year of the period of depression, although that increase is but slight in 1904. In 1906 and 1907 there were substantial increases in both these trades.

The large increase in aggregate wages in 1907 was almost entirely due to advances in the coal mining industry, but, with the exception of 1902, each year in the period of depression had shown a decrease in the weekly amount earned by miners.

Owing to the special circumstances of the employment of railway servants, it was found more convenient to estimate changes in *earnings*, arising out of

- (a) Real changes in the scales of pay.
- (b) Ordinary advances under existing scales.
- (c) Overtime or short time.

The first week in December was selected for each year, and the comparison shows that earnings in 1907 were higher than in any of the previous years.

The net effect of all the changes in hours of labour was a reduction of 79,000 hours weekly in 1907. The majority of the workpeople affected belonged to the building and textile trades. Comparative figures for the last ten years show considerable variation. 1903 was the minimum, and 1902 the maximum year of reduction. In the latter year, a reduction of one hour per week in the textile factories affected over a million workers.

D. SHENA POTTER.

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#### MOVEMENTS OF PEOPLES.

##### EMIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION FROM AND INTO THE UNITED KINGDOM IN THE YEAR 1907.

Statistics relating to immigration and emigration are avowedly somewhat imperfect as they are derived at by a balancing of the movement of passengers of all classes, and this balance up to the end of 1907 was only derived from voluntary

returns which were known in some ways to be incomplete. Subject to this understanding the figures may be taken to show a net outward movement of 341,316 persons from this country to non-European countries—the highest figure on record. Of these the British and Irish emigrants numbered 235,092. The net inward movement from Europe amounted to 113,385.

The movements of emigration for thirty years are well shown in a chart. Starting from 60,000 in the year 1878 the figure rose rapidly till it nearly touched a quarter of a million in 1883, thence with several fluctuations it descended to a minimum of less than 40,000 in 1894, and from then to 1901 fluctuated round 60,000. Since that year it has risen rapidly to 235,000.

It is of interest to compare the corresponding movements in Continental countries during the last ten years. We give the figure for the first and last year of the decade 1897—1906 for each country in thousands.

Country.	1897.	1906.
Norway.....	4.6	21.9
Sweden.....	10.3	21.6
Denmark.....	2.2	8.5
German Empire.....	24.6	30.7
Holland.....	.7	2.5
Belgium.....	.5	3.6
France.....	(No information available.)	
Portugal.....	21.1	27.9
Spain.....	50.0	44.4
Italy.....	174.5	523.0
Switzerland.....	2.5	5.2
Austro-Hungary.....	39.0	313.1

These figures, however, it should be remembered give the movement to places out of Europe only. With them it is interesting to compare the table of immigration of aliens into the United States which extends over thirty years and exhibits very marked fluctuations rising from 138,000 in 1878 to 788,000 in 1882, falling with considerable fluctuations to 444,000 in 1889 and to 229,000 in 1898, from which year it has risen almost continuously to 1,285,000 in 1907.

#### STATISTICAL ABSTRACT RELATING TO BRITISH INDIA, 1897-8 to 1906-7.

This well-known compilation, now in its 42nd number, comprises 270 pages of closely-packed statistics which afford a quantitative measure of the multifarious activities of the Government and the people of India, during the past 10 years—a period of transition and of special anxieties. With a contents-list of 217 subjects, under 35 headings, it is impossible here to do more than lay stress on the value of the volume (in conjunction with the previous issues) to the student of economics and of sociology. The tables on Population and Vital Statistics demand preliminary study though the Birth and Death rates, owing to defective registration, have rather a relative than an absolute value, as useful for inter-provincial comparisons, or as an index of the ebb and flow of life in the same area in different years and seasons.\* For the rest, the interest lies in the results arising from the impact of diverse capacities, standards and ideals; in the signs of the development of a new order consequent on the

\*The Vital Statistics of the Jail population, under skilled supervision, afford a suggestive contrast (p. 42).

opening-up of the country to the great world-movement. The rapid extension and success of the Railways (p. 132) which were thought at first to be a doubtful venture, and which later, seemed likely to prove a powerful solvent of caste bonds, have, so far, rather served to diffuse the spirit of orthodoxy and to renew the vigour of Brahmanism. Again the co-operative movement (p. 210), promoted by Government during the last 2 or 3 years, appears to have stimulated latent forces of energy and responsibility which promise a regeneration of the whole life of the people on the land, and this not merely in the economic sphere.

The predominance of the agricultural interest (p. 15) in the welfare of the country will be brought home by the results of the recent comparatively restricted famine in the United Provinces. The area involved was 66,000 sq. miles with a population of 30 millions; the actual loss of food grains, due to the defect of the rains, is calculated at £28 millions stg., or sufficient to feed the population of the whole province for nine months, while the relief afforded amounted to £2½ millions (see also p. 67). The two other even more extensive famines which have marked the decade under review must also be taken into account in judging the situation presented in the tables. In sum, these exhibit a great increase in trade and commerce, in the use of the post and telegraphs, in remittances by money orders and in savings-bank deposits; while the rise in urban wages, the expanding revenue under excise, stamps and income-tax all indicate in their degree a steady progress under adverse conditions. The one class that gives rise to anxiety in this transition period is that of the unattached agricultural labourers, who have multiplied beyond the needs of the land, and who thus are keeping wages low, while prices rise and while cash wages are superseding the old system of payments in grain at each harvest. It is in this class that the problem of poverty centres, for the solution of which we must look to the development of the other resources of the country of which this volume bears witness. The steady and increasing application of capital to the organization and development of industry,—and in particular of native capital, in hands and brains as well as hoards,—is one main condition of the removal of disabilities, which are largely the outcome of the altered conditions operating upon a society still in the bonds of immemorial customs, which had their root and justification in a different stage of civilization.

#### REPORT OF THE INSPECTOR UNDER THE INEBRIATES ACTS 1879—1900 FOR THE YEAR 1907 [Cd. 4342].

The report deals with details concerning institutions certified and licensed under the Inebriates Acts. Comment is withheld in view of the fact that a departmental committee has been appointed to enquire into the working of the Acts and to define matters of policy. During the year 1907, 493 persons were sentenced to detention under the Acts and admitted to Reformatories. Of these, 65 were men and 428 were women. Of the whole number, 400 were sentenced under section 1 of the Act, that is, were convicted for offences to which drunkenness was a contributing cause. For neglecting children, 319 convictions are recorded; for attempting suicide, 29; for larceny, stealing, receiving, 31; assault, 8; malicious damage, 4; other offences claim only one or two each. A table showing age of admission gives the following totals for nine years; 16-21 years, 42; 21-30 years, 518; 30-40 years, 1,112; 40-50 years, 765; 50-60 years, 231; 60 upwards, 102. Of the totals for nine years, 393 could neither read nor write; 1,337 could read and write imperfectly; 908 could read and write well; 132 were of superior education. Of the women admitted, 380 were single, 693 were married or widowed. In the two classes 71·1 per cent and 19·8 per cent, respectively were childless. The average number of children to each

woman was .5 for single, and 4.5 for married women. The average numbers, excluding childless women, were 1.9 and 6. The percentages of child deaths to total number of children born were 58.2 and 46.8 respectively.

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INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR LABOUR LEGISLATION :  
BRITISH SECTION.

[Report for the year 1907-8.]

Report on the Administration of Labour Laws in the United Kingdom, published by the British Section of the International Association for Labour Legislation.

International Labour Legislation, like International Peace, sounds like an ideal altogether remote from the rough and tumble world of war and industry that we know, a dream unrealisable in any near future. But although full realisation may be impossible, a great deal of good may be done in the effort to attain the ideal. Of the practical usefulness that results from the biennial meetings of the International Labour Association, and the steady work carried on by the several sections, the present two reports afford complete evidence. Each section forms a nucleus of information in regard to industrial conditions, and affords the means of instituting comparisons between the different nations that belong to the Association. The International Association has communicated the experience of one country to another, and acts as a continual incentive for the preparation of inquiries and the carrying out of investigations. For the Conference held at Bâle in the present year, Miss Sanger has, at the instance of the Central Office, prepared a Report on the Administration of Labour Laws in the United Kingdom, which affords a most valuable compendium of information, not otherwise easily attainable, in a small space, and clearly stated and arranged. The report describes the system under which the Factory and Workshop Acts, the Mines and Railway Regulation Acts, and the Truck Acts are enforced, the powers of inspectors, statistics of work places and workers employed, so far as these are attainable, and summarises the special rules and exceptions for certain trades. The amount of information put together is remarkable, the only deficiency we notice being that the Truck Acts are barely alluded to and passed over rapidly. It would have been interesting, if space could have been found, to mention that large classes of home workers have, by a recent legal decision, been ruled outside the Truck Acts, the protection of which they sorely need, and that though shop-assistants are nominally under the Truck Acts, there are no inspectors who have authority to administer the law in their behalf. It is to be hoped the British Section will keep this valuable Report standing and from time to time reprint and bring it up to date.

In regard to the primary objects of the Society, it is gratifying to notice that in the present year several countries have joined in the Berne Convention, prohibiting the industrial night work of women. In regard to the prohibition of white phosphorus, our own country unfortunately remains outside the Convention, but it is satisfactory to learn that match manufacturers are themselves now urging the prohibition both of the use and the importation of white phosphorous in matches, and the Government intends shortly to bring in a Bill for that purpose.

B.L.H.

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BOARD OF EDUCATION CIRCULAR, 596.

This is a circular to Local Authorities on certain questions arising under section thirteen of the Education (Administrative Provisions) Act, 1907, and the Code of Regulations for Public Elementary Schools, 1908, viz., the function of the school medical officer; provision for medical inspection of school children under the Code



of 1908; the local education authorities' annual report on medical inspection to the Board of Education; and arrangements for attending to the health and physical condition of school children.

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#### DEER FORESTS IN SCOTLAND.

A brief House of Commons paper gives a list of the deer forests in the six Highland Crofting Counties with the amount of their acreage and assessments and the changes in acreage since 1883. The total area of land used for this purpose in the six counties amounts to 2,958,490 acres, the assessed value of which is about £131,841. There have been few changes since 1904, the net result being a trifling increase in acreage, but between 1883 and 1904 there was an increase of over 1,200,000 acres.

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#### DEATHS FROM STARVATION, OR, ACCELERATED BY PRIVATION (LONDON).

House of Commons Paper in 1907.

A foot-note to contemporary sociology is supplied by this annual paper which shows that in spite of charity and the Poor Law 46 persons died in London in 1907 of starvation, exposure or insufficient food combined with other causes.

The return states whether the deceased was or was not in receipt of outdoor relief, and whether admission to the workhouse was offered and refused. In the great majority of cases the answer is "No," in three cases it is "Unknown"; in one instance the deceased, a woman of sixty-three, had refused to stay in the workhouse on account of the bath. In one or two cases the death occurred shortly after admission to the workhouse; in several cases alcoholism is mentioned as a contributory cause.

## PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

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THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS. Vol. xxiii, No. 1.—Henry L. Moore: *The Statistical Complement of Pure Economics*. Frank H. Dixon: *Railroads in their Corporate Relations*. A summary of the principal motives for the acquisition of corporate control of railroads, and of the various methods by which such control is obtained. The character and functions of the "holding company" and its dangers, with suggestions of possible remedies based on the Special Report, No. I, of the investigation into the Intercompany Relationships of Railways in the United States. R. F. Foerster: *A Statistical Survey of Italian Emigration*. The writer lays stress on the unreliability of the statistics collected by the Italian government of emigrants into particular countries in Europe, as well as of transoceanic emigration. He shows that in both cases the official classification into "permanent" and "temporary" emigrants greatly understates the backflow into Italy, suggests other methods of determining the actual figures, and points out the greater accuracy of American official methods of computation. Thorstein Veblen: *On the Nature of Capital: Investment, Intangible Assets, and the Pecuniary Magnate*. Certain effects of investment and the price system: tangible and intangible assets, their nature and correlation. The pecuniary magnate, his functions and "timeless" gains from the use of large capital with the consequences for the community at large. F. W. Powell: *Two Experiments in Public Ownership of Steam Railroads*.

THE YALE REVIEW. Vol. xvii, No. 3.—Henry C. Emery: *Hard Times and the Standard Wage*. A discussion as to the fundamental principles involved in the policy of trade unions in fixing standard wages; its practicability and a comparison of the same tactics adopted by professional men. K. Asakawa: *Japan in Manchuria*—II. G. A. Kleene: *The Limitations of Charity Organization*. Suggested modifications of some of the methods and ideals in the C.O.S. programme to ensure the heartier co-operation of the general public. Ronald M. Byrnes: *A Statistical Study of the Yale Graduates, 1797—1866*.

RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE SOCIALI E DISCIPLINE AUSILIARIE. Vol. xlviii, Fasc. clxxxix.—P. Aurelio Palmieri: *Constantino Petrovitch Pobiedonostzev e le sue teorie religiose*. Dott. Emiliano Pasteris: *Religione e clero in America*. Prof. Carlo Dalmazio Minobetti: *Il clero nell'odierna ripresa del programma sociale cattolico*. Fasc. cxc.—Lorenzo Romanelli: *Il contratto collettivo di lavoro*. Antonio M. Bettanini: *Il fondamento giuridico della diplomazia pontificia*. G. Toniolo: *Le normali riforme giuridico-economiche in agricoltura*.

Vol. xlviii, No. exci.—Filippo Ermini: *La schiavitù nell'età moderna*. L. Caisotti di Chiusano: *Le abitazioni popolari nel loro aspetto morale ed economico*. Angelo Gurrera: *Gli zolfatari siciliani nell'ordinamento tecnico del lavoro*

REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE. Vol. xvi, No. 10.—Gaston Bonnier: *Le socialisme chez les abeilles*. Gabriel Prevost: *La valeur sociale de l'esprit d'épargne*. The harmfulness of the system of savings both in cause and effect from a sociological point of view with suggestions of remedial modifications.

Vol. xvi, No. 11.—E. Chauffard : *Les populations indigènes du protectorat français de la Côte des Somalis*. A recapitulation of details on the physique, manners, and customs of the Somalis, Danakils, and Gallas. Hugues le Roux : *Notes sur les Somalis, les Dankalis et les Gallas*. C. Mondon-Vidailhet : *Observations sur le même sujet*. René Maunier : *Tableau de la vie économique et juridique chez les Somalis, les Gallas, les Danakils et les Abyssins*. Francisco Garcia Calderon : *Amérique (les conditions sociologiques de l'Amérique latine)*. A memorandum of the main influences bearing on the evolution of the Latin-American peoples of South America from the sociological standpoint.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. Vol. xix, No. 1.—Alfred W. Benn : *The Morals of an Immoralist—Friedrich Nietzsche* The successive phases of thought and various influences modifying Nietzsche's attitude towards morality. Thomas Davidson : *Savonarola*. Miss F. Melian Stawell : *The Modern Conception of Justice*. The evolution of the conception of justice. An analysis of the modern ideal, which can only be justified through belief in immortality. Prof. J. B. Baillie : *The Dramatic and Ethical Interpretations of Experience*. Professor Charles W. Super : *Ethics and Law* The distinction between ethics and the motives which prompt most legislation and the administration of justice. William Mackintire Salter : *A New Type of Naturalism—Montgomery*.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE. Jahrgang xxxii, Heft iii.—K. F. Wize : *Eine Einteilung der philosophischen Wissenschaften nach Aristoteles' Prinzipien*. Ernst Lehmann : *Idee und Hypothese bei Kant*. G. von Glasenapp : *Die Leviratshe, Eine Soziologische Studie*. The underlying principles of the Israelite marriage law, and a comparison of analogous customs amongst other nations. Unsatisfactory results of considering the law as the outcome of religious motives : an attempt to show that it is based on a biological law of the highest importance. Gerhard Hessenberg : "Persönliche" und "sachliche" Polemik.

ARCHIV FÜR RASSEN-UND GESELLSCHAFTS-BIOLOGIE. Jahrgang 5, Heft 4.—Dr. Wilhelm Strohmayer : *Zur Kritik der Feststellung und der Bewertung psychoneurotischer erblicher Belastung*. Dr. Grassl : *Zur Frage der Fruchtbarkeit und der Mutterschaft*. An exposition of the fundamental causes of the fall in the birth-rate and the growing disregard and aversion for motherhood. Counteractive measures suggested for both the upper and lower classes. Dr. F. Von den Velden : *Die Minderwertigkeit d. Erstgeborenen*. A comparison of statistics tending to show that first-born children in particular fall an easy prey to disease. Dr. Georg Friederici : *Über die Mitwirkung der Neger bei der Erforschung Amerikas*. A short account of some of the negro companions of the different explorers of America with a criticism of a paper on the same subject in the "American Anthropologist," vol. iv, pp. 217 et seq.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY. Vol. xiv, No. 2.—Louis Wallis : *Biblical Sociology*. I. L. G. Powers : *The Assets of the United States*. Frederick L. Hoffmann : *The Problem of Poverty and Pensions in Old Age*. The state old-age pension system criticized with a plea in favour of a greater inculcation of voluntary thrift and the purchase of deferred annuities. Charles Richmond Henderson : *Industrial Insurance*. XI. Samuel G. Smith : *The Minnesota System in the Management of Public Charitable and Correctional Institutions*. The writer shows the superior efficiency of the Minnesota Central Board of Control and State Board of Visitors in the administration of public charities, and the high standard of public

honour maintained in that State. John M. Gillette: *The Sociological Warrant for Vocational Education*. The need for framing the educational programme to correspond with the special interests of each community demonstrated from the sociological standpoint. Samuel Z. Batten: *The Redemption of the Unfit*. Civilization and Christianity protect and care for the helpless and diseased, and are thus opposed to the great principle of the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence. There is, however, an absolute necessity that the family, church, and state should co-operate in preventing the multiplication of the unfit, and take a more active and intelligent interest in the programme of race-making.

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REVUE D'HISTOIRE DES DOCTRINES ECONOMIQUES ET SOCIALES. Vol. 1, No. 3.—A. Dubois: *L'Evolution de la Notion de Droit Naturel Antérieurement aux Physiocrates*. J. Lescure: *La Conception de la Propriété chez Aristote*. Was Aristotle in favour of private property, or of a communistic or socialistic division of it? A criticism of the views held by M. G. Platon and M. Souchon, with an attempt to reconcile the three opinions by pointing out that Aristotle drew a sharp line between the individual and social character of man, and that in the first part of his "Politic," using the *à priori* method, he imagined an ideal city, while in the second he sought to show the best government possible for a city, drawing his conclusions from his own observations and researches.

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REVUE DES ETUDES ETHNOGRAPHIQUES ET SOCIOLOGIQUES. Pt. 1., 1908.—A. J. Reinach: *La lutte de Jahvé avec Jacob et avec Moïse et l'origine de la Circoncision*.

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PROGRESS. Vol. iii, No. 4.—*Suggestions for Poor Law Reform*. General Booth: *Classification*. J. B. Paton: *Administration*.

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MAN. Vol. viii, No. 10.—R. H. Mathews: *Australia. Matrilineal Descent, Northern Territory*. R. Grant Brown: *Burma. Rain-making in Burma*. W. A. Cunningham: *Egypt. String Figures*. Father W. Schmidt: *Fiji. Totemism in Fiji*. T. A. Joyce: *Marshall Islands. Navigation*.

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MAN. Vol. viii, No. 11.—W. E. Roth: *Australia. Australian Canoes and Rafts*. W. A. Dutt: *England: Archaeology. New Palaeolithic Site in the Waveney Valley*. W. Allen Sturge: *England: Archaeology. The Polished Stone Axe found by Canon Greenwell in a Flint Pit at Grime's Graves*. C. G. Seligmann: *New Guinea: Totemism*. J. Edge-Partington: *Solomon Islands: Stone-headed Clubs from Malaita*. C. M. Woodford: *Solomon Islands: Note on Stone-headed Clubs from Malaita*.

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- Rolleston, T. W. "Parallel Paths: A Study in Biology, Ethics, and Art." Duckworth & Co.
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- Comte, Auguste. (Translated by J. H. Bridges, with Introduction by F. Harrison.) "General View of Positivism." Routledge. 1s. net.
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- Reynolds, Stephen. "A Poor Man's House." The Bodley Head. 6s.
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- Raine, G. E. "Present Day Socialism and the Problem of the Unemployed." Eveleigh Nash. 2s. 6d. net.



## NOTES AND NOTICES.

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The current number of "La Scienza Sociale," edited by Professor Francesco Cosentini, a corresponding member of the Sociological Society of London, contains the programme of the Institute of Sociology which has just been established at Catania in Sicily, with Professor Cosentini as its general secretary. The programme is divided into three sections. The first is concerned with sociology in its scientific aspect and includes lectures by distinguished professors from various Italian Universities. Religion, jurisprudence, anthropology, psychology, education, economics and hygiene, are to be treated from a Sociological point of view and as parts of a course on the science, and there are to be single lectures on such subjects as the origin of society, the camorra, social life in Japan, &c., &c. There will also be discussions on such burning questions as universal suffrage, militarism, and socialism. The second section is devoted to social problems specially connected with Sicily, such as the culture of the vine, agrarian banks, Sicilian folk-lore, local crime, the utilisation of water-power, and the means of increasing the industrial and commercial progress of Catania. In connection with this section, it is proposed to hold a Sociological Congress at Palermo in 1909. The third section deals with labour problems, with lectures on labour legislation, co-operation, &c., &c. A popular library, a recreation room, and a labour bureau are to be added. This is a very ambitious programme, and Sociologists will watch its development with much interest. Professor Cosentini claims, rightly or wrongly, that this institution will differ from all others previously founded, since it will combine theory with practice, scientific education with social utility. It will aim at attracting not only students and men of culture, but workmen and indeed all citizens. It will not be under the control of the state; nor will it be officially connected with the Universities in which sociological studies always occupy a subordinate position. If the project is successful it will certainly be a great honour to Sicily. There are many difficulties in the way of the application of sociology to questions so hotly debated as those relating to labour.

The same number of "La Scienza Sociale" contains a full report of the earlier sessions of the International Positivist Congress which met at Naples in May. Though many distinguished foreigners sent messages of adhesion, and in some cases, contributed papers, almost all who attended were Italians, the exceptions being two Russians and an Irishman. The word Positivist is used in a somewhat wider sense in Italy than it is in England or France. It has no special relation to the Positivism of Auguste Comte, and it includes spiritualists and materialists, in the philosophic sense of the terms. The subjects treated ranged over almost the whole field of science and its applications, with excursions into the realm of metaphysics. "All is energy," "metaphysics and language," "the study of philosophy," "the anatomic and physiologic bases of psychology," "the God of Israel," "anthropomorphism," "animism and religious evolution" (Professor Cosentini), "morality and religion," "the materialist theory of history" (S. H. Swinny), and "militarism" (Professor Novikov) were some among the papers read. The attendance was far better than I should have expected in Naples; but although the Congress was held in the city of Vico, and although the President, Professor Novikov, and the organiser, Professor

Cosentini, are distinguished Sociologists, it seemed to me that less interest was evinced in the sociological papers than in those relating to general scientific theory. Apparently contests between materialists and spiritualists, which have lost their freshness here, are still keenly fought in Naples.

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Dr. Ernest Delbet, Deputy and Mayor of La Ferté-Gaucher and President of the Conseil Général of the Seine-et-Marne, who died in Paris on December 9, aged 77, had been a personal friend of Comte and Leplay and was a link between the two sociological schools. Introduced to Comte by his brother-in-law when a student of seventeen, he attended some of Comte's lectures, and adopted a medical career on Comte's advice. But he was also much attracted to the school of Leplay, became a member of Leplay's society, and wrote the second of the monographs in "*Les Ouvriers des deux mondes*," that on the agricultural labourer of Champagne. He also collaborated with M. Hébert in the monograph on the weavers of shawls in Paris, and with M. Saint-Léger in those on the peasant labourers of the Basses-Pyrénées, and the long-shore fishermen of Saint-Sébastien (Spain). But in process of time, he came to the conclusion that the method of Leplay, so very valuable for special investigations, was too narrow a foundation for sociology and needed to be subordinated to more general considerations. He had pointed out to Leplay the affinities between his social science and that of Comte, and during all his later life he became chiefly known as an exponent of the latter's views. He took an active part in the Positivist movement in Paris and presided at the great meeting held there in September, 1907, to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of Comte's death. He established the *Collège libre des sciences sociales*, of which he was the Directeur, and he was engaged in a course of lectures on "Sociology according to Auguste Comte" at the time of his death. He had sat in the Chamber—as a Radical—since 1893. In his youth he travelled extensively in Asia Minor and the Near East. In his later years he paid more than one visit to this country, and fervently desired that friendly understanding between England and France which he lived to see an accomplished fact.

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It is a far cry from a Bedfordshire village to the ancient capital of the Mahrattas, but Mr. Mann, whose monograph on Life in an Agricultural Village in England appeared in the first volume of the Sociological Papers, has undertaken a civic survey of Poona. Such a survey is of the utmost importance to the understanding of Indian problems, and it is a happy accident that a trained sociological observer like Mr. Mann should find himself a resident in such a typical Indian city. There is indeed one condition absolutely necessary to the success of the undertaking, and that is the co-operation of the people; and it is therefore a great satisfaction to learn that Mr. Mann has secured the enthusiastic help of a band of young Indians. He may be sure of the cordial sympathy of his fellow-members of the Sociological Society in this difficult work.

S. H. SWINNY.

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#### AN EDUCATIONAL INFORMATION BUREAU.

A great deal of interest is at present aroused by experiments or unusual ventures in education, although these become very slowly known through ordinary agencies, and those concerned in them are unduly exposed to the frequent misnomer of faddist or crank. Yet it is believed that there is an increasing number of people who would like to see modifications of tradition and who do not know where to go in order to learn what is actually taking place. Their difficulty is the greater because, in this period of growing movement and transition, educationalists are themselves often sundered in their views: take, for instance, the great cleavage caused by those

who believe in co-education and those who do not, or who would have it up to a certain age only. Then there are those who would like to see education far more occupational—far more from things—whereas the Parents' National Educational Union, whilst not discarding things, focus their endeavour on rescuing respect for books (*viz.*, Literary works, not text snippets). Then it is hardly necessary to mention the war which rages around classics, not only when they should be begun but how they should be taught. Here we find boys' schools (those for girls are comparatively free, if they ever really entered the bondage of the old curriculum) which defer classics, and men who would like, except perhaps in special cases, to rule them out altogether. Again there are schools (besides already adventurous grammar schools) which defer specialization on principle and one which even rejects it altogether in the later as well as early stages of school life.

With a view to assisting the formation of an intelligent public opinion on these and kindred topics, the British Institute of Social Service, 11 Southampton Row, W.C., has undertaken the useful work of an information bureau regarding pioneer pedagogical endeavour. This object will be fulfilled according to the measure of use to which the public puts it, as well as the measure of information volunteered by those interested in the welfare of the young (*e.g.*, the Child Study Society has generously promised to make out a list of secondary schools designed to meet special physical defects). All who are anxious to learn what actually are the departures made in modern education may address their questions (with stamp for reply enclosed) to Mrs. Ussher (sub Mr. Matheson, the Sec.), 20 Glenmore Road, Hampstead, N.W.

E. H. USSHER.

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#### UNIVERSITY OF LONDON SOCIOLOGICAL SCHOLARSHIPS.

The Martin White Scholarship of £35 per annum tenable for two years has been awarded to Mr. John Cyril Flower, an internal student of New College.

Grants of £35 each from the Martin White Scholarship Fund have been awarded to Miss Emma Thomas, an internal student of the London School of Economics and to Mr. Moses Jacob Wodislowski, an internal student of King's College.

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#### SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY.

The following papers have been read during the autumn:—

- Professor F. Toennies - - - - - Monday, October 5th  
 "A METHOD OF STATISTICAL ENQUIRY."
- Professor Geddes - - - - - Tuesday, October 27th  
 "TOWN PLANNING AND CITY DESIGN, IN SOCIOLOGY AND IN  
 CITIZENSHIP."
- Mr. A. E. Zimmern - - - - - Monday, November 9th  
 "WAS GREEK CIVILISATION BASED ON SLAVE LABOUR?"
- Mr. J. A. Hobson - - - - - Monday, November 30th  
 "THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIALISM."
- Lt.-Col. Ernest Roberts, I.M.S. - - - - - Monday, December 14th  
 "THE SOCIAL ECONOMY OF INDIA."

The following is the programme of meetings for the Spring of 1909 :-

- Sir Edward Brabrook, C.B. - - - - - Monday, January 18th  
 "PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS."
- Dr. Gilbert Slater - - - - - Monday, February 8th  
 "THE FUTURE OF LONDON GOVERNMENT."
- Mr. F. G. D'aeth - - - - - Monday, February 22nd  
 "PRESENT TENDENCIES OF CLASS DIFFERENTIATION."
- Dr. C. W. Saleeby - - - - - Monday, March 8th  
 "THE OBSTACLES TO EUGENICS."
- Dr. G. Chatterton Hill - - - - - Monday, March 22nd  
 "RACE PROGRESS AND RACE DEGENERACY."
- Mr. C. Delisle Burns - - - - - Tuesday, May 4th  
 "THE RELIGIOUS ORDER."
- Mr. R. H. Tawney - - - - - Monday, May 24th  
 "THE THEORY OF PAUPERISM."